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Abstract
This thesis consists of a critical examination and 
comparison of Hegel's philosophy of history and Nietzsche's 
doctrine of nihilism. The thesis argues that the result of 
Hegel's thought is the collapse of the transcendent dualist 
world-view, with the resultant need to project values 
attached to life: Nietzsche's positive philosophy is such 
an attempt.
Hegel's philosophy of history is followed in the 
Master/Slave dialectic as elaborated in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit. This leads to an examination of the notion of 
the end of history, which is the culmination of the 
dialectic as the State, politically, and as the Sage, 
philosophically. The thesis argues that despite Hegel's 
thoroughgoing appropriation of values, accessible to 
humanity through Reason, our practical experience is of 
loss only: of the disappearance of an objective world of 
values. Far from realising the inherently meaningful 
nature of the human world, the result of the Hegelian 
revolution is nihilism.
The discussion of Nietzsche's notion of nihilism turns 
on his distinction between the 'other-worldly' nihilism 
inherent in the transcendent dualist world view, and the 
radical nihilism which is the effect of expecting values to 
emerge from such a world, but despairing of ever knowing 
them. Nietzsche's solution is to perceive values as the 
projection of a beyond from out of the richness and
fullness of life what he calls 'will to power. ' And
this, the thesis argues, is a return to Hegel, giving 
content to the Idea, to the relation of selves in the world 
which is one of actual freedom, and complete 
responsibility.
Both philosophers approach the question of meaning 
from the same negatively conditioned perspective of the 
collapse of transcendent dualism. Their positive
philosophies are their attempts to adopt an attitude 
towards the objectivity of values as the beyond within 
life.
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Introduct ion
The purpose of this thesis is to read Nietzsche in the 
light of Hegel's philosophy of history. Hegel provides the 
context which is the essential negative condition for 
Nietzsche's ideas. What Hegel accomplishes is the 
abolition of the transcendent dualist world-view, which 
requires that philosophy turn away from the search for 
truth in a realm beyond life, and engage in the projection 
of a beyond within life.
Hegel's thought negatively conditions that of 
Nietzsche because the result of its success is to exclude 
certain possibilities from subsequent philosophical 
discourse. These 'limits' are ones which Nietzsche 
specifically adopts: references to a fixed, other-worldly 
beyond are, in fact, references to nothing, and are 
therefore nihilistic. At the same time, the world of
humankind the immanent, temporal, and 'present'
reality is imbued with absolute power and potential.
Hegel collapses the transcendent dualist world-view by 
incorporating all of its essential elements into a unified 
whole, one which contains and is, in fact, wholly 
constituted by human self-consciousnesses. But in so 
doing, he destroys the 'over-all' or 'behind-everything* 
character of the objective beyond, and so makes 
meaning-giving references impossible in previous ways. 
Nietzsche recognises the immediate, negative consequences 
of the dissolution of the transcendent dualist world view, 
and describes it as the 'death of God. ' By imbuing the
world with divine Spirit, by showing the necessary 
interdependence of the particular1 and the ‘universal,' 
the temporal and the eternal, Hegel has brought this about: 
he has deprived the transcendent beyond of its effective 
power, and therefore the previous, historical force of 
faith in God. Far from making the world a more meaningful 
place, Nietzsche tries to show that our reaction to the 
death of God is nihilism, because values have been attached 
so firmly to divine authority, and to ‘absolute* reference.
For this reason, Hegel's philosophy is not of as much 
practical use for Nietzsche as one would have thought. In 
a curious way, Nietzsche is both wholly determined by it, 
and yet free with respect to the future and the formulation 
of his own ideas. The conclusion of Hegelian philosophy is 
the attainment of a standpoint from which we can act fully 
self-consciously. In terms of the philosophy of history, 
this standpoint is the end of history. As the development 
of freedom and the rising to self-consciousness of man, 
history is ended. But the drive to put oneself in a wider 
framework, to situate and find meaning in life, continues, 
and gains force by being now raised to the level of self- 
consciousness. Being is becoming and Being is a whole: 
Hegel's metaphysical reconciliation is recognised by 
Nietzsche, de facto if not de jure, in the doctrine of the 
eternal recurrence.
The success of Hegel's critique is undeniable: the
historical world-view of transcendent dualism has lost its 
effective power. But his positive philosophy is
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unacceptable for post-historical humanity, largely because 
it is the mere elaboration of a conclusion: it is a
reflective condition, which projects no future. The Sage 
is a type of humanity which reflects back upon the whole of 
its becoming: it is radically imbued with potential, yet 
because it is not forward-looking, it anticipates no states 
of affairs not yet at hand. For Nietzsche, this type of 
humanity 'depreciates life,' and since life is now the new 
source of all our value-feelings, it is also nihilistic.
Both Hegel and Nietzsche deny themselves the
possibility of engaging in philosophy by attempting to 
discover values which are references to a fixed and 
unchanging realm of truth. Their 'positive programme' is 
therefore the attempt to posit or project values out of our 
actual existence, onto an object which extends beyond the
particular self, and reflects upon the self as its
enlightenment and growth.
Hegel believed that philosophy always gives utterance 
to its times: it is the moment of speech which links action 
and Being. Philosophy marks the denouement. the decline of
an era: its resolution by complete articulation. What it 
does is both observe and make a change: these things are 
ultimately indistinguishable because the thought of the 
thing is inconceivable apart from the thing itself.
Therefore, Hegel recognises in both senses the collapse
of the transcendent dualist world-view. If a meaningful 
life is to be possible, then values must be found or made 
which are of life, and from life. It is this negative
condition which unites the positive philosophies of both 
Hegel and Nietzsche.
If what we previously held to belong to the 
transcendent beyond has in fact been made present and not 
merely destroyed by its progressive appearance as history, 
then our actual existence should be 'pregnant with the 
future': our mortal lives in a world of appearances is one 
which we may now approach with both tremendous power, and 
awesome responsibility. The 'positive programmes'
presented by the two philosophers are therefore of the same 
genus, if not of the same species. For this reason, it is 
more useful to draw out similarities in approach than 
differences, to more adequately examine the worth of 
results. The negative context of the collapse of 
transcendent dualism marks the same starting-point for the 
constructive philosophies of both Hegel and Nietzsche: both 
are attempts to find meaning for humanity from a beyond 
which is within life.
The value in following the argument of Hegel's 
philosophy of history is, first of all, to elaborate the 
Hegelian notions of Reason, history, dialectic, individual­
ity and freedom. Secondly, one thereby demonstrates 
Hegel's contention that Being becomes, that the essence of 
what-there-is is to appear, as it is, in itself, to itself. 
That 'substance' which is the object of philosophy is not 
a remote realm of truth, but an exhaustive whole, which is, 
ultimately, a radically present reality, accessible to the 
knowing subject through mediation, or the terms of Reason.
Hegel1s philosophical science includes the knowing and 
acting subject; his account accounts for itself. The 
circular nature of Hegel*s philosophy is a self-sustaining
whole which circumscribes everything both spatially or
* absolutely' and temporally or 'eternally' and marks the
bounds of sensibility. But, at the same time, it exhausts 
all possibilities; any conceivable configuration of things 
exists both in potential and in fact 'within' the Hegelian 
circle. Hegel therefore provides the widest possible 
tableau upon which post-Hegelian philosophers, such as 
Nietzsche, are able to project their own particular vision.
The conclusion of Hegel's philosophy of history is the 
end of history; in philosophy, this is reflective wisdom, 
and in action, this is the regime of actual freedom. The 
end of history is not the ever-receding goal of man's 
striving in the realm of action; it is not an occasion 
outside of time, but the meaning of temporality, within 
temporality. It is in this sense that the end of history 
is an 'eternal moment'; not a realm of eternity remote and 
distinct from one's actual life being led, but the very 
substance of that life, its telos which is implicit in the 
beginning, makes itself apparent and known in the process, 
and is fully realised in the end. Hegel is, therefore, not 
a philosopher of dualism, not 'metaphysical' in the sense 
of opposing the real and the ideal absolutely. What he 
does is to set up oppositions in appearance, or phenomeno- 
logically, for the sake of understanding, in order that the 
world and humanity within it can be made intelligible. In
fact or ‘actually, 1 or at the end of history these
oppositions form a unity, one which comprehends and is 
comprehended by man when he rises to self-consciousness.
Therefore, when Nietzsche attacks transcendent 
dualism, this cannot be seen to be, in practice, a 
reference to Hegel. As Stephen Houlgate writes, “Hegel is 
in fact an ally of Nietzsche's in his critique of 
transcendent dualism."1 Although some question may exist 
whether Nietzsche thought he was criticising Hegel, when he 
attacked the view that there was an overriding, imposing, 
systematising order of things, Hegel is not, in fact, a 
proper object for such an attack. For philosophy, if not 
for the history of philosophy, the attack on dualism is not 
carried out against Hegel. When one views the conclusion 
of Hegel's philosophy properly, one sees that Nietzsche's 
demonstration of the nihilism inherent in the dualist 
world-view raises man out of what Hegel would call his 
'incomplete moments of consciousness.' Such levels of 
consciousness are inadequate to that level of reality 
articulated and made manifest by Hegel, and have not yet 
reached the 'new starting point' of the end of history 
perspective: the emergence into the world of human self- 
consciousness .
Nietzsche's writings make relatively little mention of 
Hegel, and do not provide a clear picture of his view of
1 Stephen Houlgate, Hegel. Nietzsche and the Criticism of 
Metaphysics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986). p. 37.
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his predecessor. The principal target of his attack on 
transcendent dualism was Kant, and at times Nietzsche seems 
to put Hegel in the same camp. In one place, in The Will 
to Power. Nietzsche writes: **Hegel seeks reason everywhere
 before reason one may submit and acquiesce.”2 His view
of Hegel here is that, for Hegel, reason is an object to be 
discovered, which, when found, imposes its structure upon 
an accepting and otherwise formless human being. This is, 
as will be made clear, an erroneous view of Reason in 
Hegel. In Hegel, Reason actually appears in a two-fold 
movement: the world is structured from out of the self, by 
the external isat ion of the inner nature of the human 
individual, and the resultant *world-made* reflects upon 
the self as its objective certainty or confirmation. 
Nietzsche would describe this as the pleasure of the will 
in finding things to oppose it, things which it must have 
the strength to overcome. For Hegel, Reason is not * found* 
in the terms of mediation, nor has it any existence prior 
to the emergence of the apparent opposition between the 
self and the world, whether one considers this question 
logically or temporally. Nietzsche*s will to power is 
precisely this *driving-outwards* of the self, the positing 
of the world from the overabundance or potential within a 
human person. Hegel sees the influence of this self- 
determination as Reason from the immanent perspective, and
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power. Translated by 
Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. Edited by Walter 
Kaufmann. (New York: Random House, 1967). p. 60.
he also looks at this same process from the objective point 
of view. Nor does Nietzsche ignore this latter aspect: he 
is not trapped in modern subjectivity, what I call 'sheer 
wilfulness.1 His strong assertion of human individuality 
is of a situated self, a self with radical responsibility 
because of the 'fatefulness of every act.' Amor fati is 
essential to will to power: the self extends beyond its 
immediacy into the future, through the consequences of 
present action, and it extends into the community or 
culture, through the reactions of similarly free 
individuals. This context, with respect to which we are 
both entirely free and wholly responsible, is the bevond 
within life. So Nietzsche's view of 'will to power' does 
conflict with the view of Reason as a structure imposed 
upon reality, and Nietzsche may have seen himself as being 
opposed to Hegel in this respect. But, in fact, Hegel's 
notion of Reason is not 'metaphysical': It is neither
imposed nor external, and so it is not inconsistent with 
Nietzsche's world-view. It is this common, negative 
condition which is most interesting, and the beginning of 
a useful comparison. As Houlgate observes: "Not only are 
Hegel and Nietzsche both critics of 'reality-behind- 
appearance' dualism or 'other-worldly' consciousness? they 
are both critics (at least in intent) of all conceptual 
oppositions or Geaensatze."3 To compare these two views, in 
a mutually engaging way, is therefore useful to philosophy, 
while to oppose them from a textual point of view forms
3 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 22.
merely a footnote to the history of philosophy.
Houlgate makes the case that Nietzsche failed to carry 
out his intent to criticise all conceptual oppositions, and 
that, in fact, Nietzsche's definition of "life” is meta­
physical. On the contrary, I believe that if Nietzsche is 
wrong to say that, for Hegel, the Idea is pre-existing, 
then Houlgate, by the same token, is wrong to say that, for 
Nietzsche, life is pre-existing. For Nietzsche,
metaphysics is imposition, and Houlgate, like many others, 
sees the will to power and Nietzsche's extreme 
individualism in just this light. But this leaves out of 
account the eternal recurrence, and why Nietzsche would 
want to introduce or hold such a doctrine. I perceive 
eternal recurrence as the objective counterpart to the self 
in the whole of will to power. Amor f ati. or the 
fatefulness of every act, introduces an objective beyond 
within life. Tragedy rescues humanity from the nihilism of 
absolute freedom. Thus I 'read in' a dialectical movement 
to Nietzsche's philosophy, but not as an over-riding 
structure. I perceive a whole which is a unity, but one 
which subsists in a context of nihilism: there is nothing 
behind appearance, and there is nothing outside life.
There are indications that Nietzsche formed a more 
sophisticated view of Hegel in his later writings. In a 
passage from Will to Power, which I cite in the conclusion, 
Nietzsche describes Hegel as a romantic, who longs for a 
return to the 'Greek world,' but who finds that he can only 
do so through the 'rainbow-bridges of concepts.' This, I
x
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believe, is a correct understanding of Hegel, and 
demonstrates Nietzsche*s insight into the consequences of 
previous philosophy which situated his own. Hegel shows, 
in the Phenomenology. that the greatest height to which man 
can aspire, in the realm of objective Spirit, is the 
condition of ethical life, which can only be founded in 
substantial community. Man possessed this, in the form of 
the Greek polis, but only immediately, which is to say, 
only in an unreflective way. This first appearance of 
ethical life could not survive the effects of man's 
emerging self-consciousness, and of his attempts to ground 
this condition in something else, in something more 
primordial. These attempts projected the beyond to life 
which marked the decline of the feeling of satisfaction in 
life. And so, Hegel describes the beginning and 
development of the dialectic, which can be seen as the 
history of man's progressive attempts to recapture the 
feeling of situatedness in ethical life, but from a 
perspective which is mediated (i.e., through the terms of 
Reason). Nietzsche is thus afforded the possibility of a 
perspective which reflects upon this whole movement. He is
able to perceive the projection of a beyond to life a
realm of truth alienated from the actual, human world as
a long path away from, and ultimately back to, the 
condition of man's greatest happiness. Quite consistently 
with Hegel, Nietzsche argues that this historical 
enterprise made it impossible for man to belong to his 
former condition in the same way as before, because his
actions reflect upon, and transform his self. The 
Completion of the circle1 or return to the origin, is 
therefore accomplished on a different level, one which is 
higher because now man is reflective, he is self-conscious, 
he has realised at the same time his essential freedom and 
his radical responsibility. And so, Nietzsche*s more 
sophisticated view of Hegel turns out to be more fruitful 
than his blank opposition to the straw man of Hegel*s 
*dualism.'
For the purposes of philosophical inquiry, it does not 
matter what Nietzsche's views were on the historical Hegel. 
What is of importance is whether it is useful or not to 
view Nietzsche from an Hegelian perspective. I believe 
that it is, and that new insight can be gained into 
Nietzsche's thought by casting it in the light of Hegelian 
conclusions.
On a philosophical level, then, the most difficult 
task in reconciling the philosophies of Hegel and Nietzsche 
arises in considerations of the notions 'the whole' and of 
'unity. ' Briefly, Hegel states that the whole is a unity, 
and Nietzsche denies this. But what Nietzsche attacks is 
the idea that there is a rationality behind things, that 
somehow reason comes first, and 'real' things like people 
and events fit into its categories. Nietzsche sees this 
view as a fundamental confusion of cause and effect. In 
fact, for him, truth is about things, it emerges from their 
essentially pre-rational life. I argue, however, that this 
view does not contradict Hegel, and that the combination of
X
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Nietzsche’s acceptance of the notion of a whole as is
shown in his doctrine of eternal recurrence with
potentially infinite variations within through the idea
of will to power leads one to a view of 'unity* in the
Hegelian sense.
The unity of all things in Hegel is not 'behind' those 
things, not their 'cause' or logically prior principle. 
Unity emerges from the way things appear, ultimately 
revealing the whole. Reason describes the two-fold 
movement of selves projecting a world, and the world 
projecting itself through instantiation in selves. It is 
nothing behind things or beyond things; unity is neither 
presupposed nor 'absolute' in the transcendent/dualist 
manner. Houlgate rightly observes that "The words 'reason' 
and 'Idea' in Hegel's philosophy . . . .  refer to the 
immanent dialectical rationality within nature and human 
self-consciousness."4 Nietzsche does not oppose this view: 
he attacks the transcendent beyond, and neither 'reason' 
nor 'the Idea' in Hegel form such a beyond. A proper 
understanding of Reason in Hegel leads to the recognition 
that the unity of the whole is nothing over-and-above the 
whole, but only a description of the ultimate relatedness 
of all things within the universe of discourse. Houlgate 
writes: "To say that consciousness is rational for Hegel is 
not to say that consciousness conforms to a presupposed 
notion of reason."5 The notion of Reason serves to show
4 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 151.
5 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 179.
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that the relation of the self to the world is real, that 
there are other entities which ’object' to the self, but, 
at the same time, thereby extend it into a wider framework, 
so that, in the end, it is not 'merely' a self, but a self- 
determining individual (i.e., a subject through objects). 
This conclusion is essential to Nietzsche's view that will 
to power is not 'carte-blanche' for sheer wilfulness, but 
a projection of the world which reflects back upon the self 
in a very real way as its fatefulness, through the 
consequences of action.
The conclusion of Hegelian philosophy in a realised 
whole which is a unity does not limit or oppose Nietzsche 
in the way that transcendent/dualist philosophy does. 
Hegel's conclusion articulates the Nietzschean perspective 
in negative terms: it excludes the possibility of
meaningful references to an external world of truth, and 
shows the need for objectivity within a comprehended whole 
for meaning to be possible. In fact, Hegel's philosophy is 
an example of Nietzsche's 'ideal' of the affirmation of the 
whole, of 'bearing the greatest burden,' and taking 
ultimate responsibility. What Nietzsche does is to 
emphasise the aspect of will, of the connection of the 
subject to process, into the non-imposing structure of a 
reality made manifest by Hegel. In Hegelian terms, he 
makes distortions within Being which are essential to the 
dialectic: he emphasises some aspects of the whole, and 
wilfully leaves out of consideration others, in order to 
make a meaningful life possible for us, being human actors
X
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with perspectives limited by our mortality, and the 
discrete nature of the self.
This philosophical project is necessary because of the 
success of the Hegelian revolution. Hegel describes the 
end of history as a return to self, as a 'night of self- 
consciousness, 1 or as reflective wisdom. Both Hegel and 
Nietzsche show that reflective wisdom, or 'world-historical 
philosophy' mark the decline of an age, and the end of 
strong action, in the sense of the production of unforseen 
consequences. Conclusions are essentially meaningful with
reference to their origin they always afford the
perspective of looking-back upon a spent force and a 
finished movement. But conclusions are not merely a return 
to the beginning, but a recollection at a new height, by 
benefit of the experience of the whole. From this new 
height, one is able to project new goals, to perceive wider 
horizons. So the end of history only completes one great 
movement: the emergence of self-consciousness. This
effectively recaptures the ability to feel 'at home' in the 
world, but now across the 'rainbow-bridges of concepts,' or 
through Reason, or a mediated relation to other 
individuals: the return, at a new height, to the condition 
of ethical life.
Nietzsche describes how one can live in such a world, 
how one can manifest one's actual freedom when one knows 
one is ultimately responsible. He must first show, as 
Hegel does, why it is impossible to act authentically in an 
'historical1 way, which was to 'find oneself' involved in
x
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inevitable progress, to act and speak with reference to a 
state of affairs removed from one’s life temporally (i.e., 
the Christian millennium) or spatially (i.e., the 
transcendent other-world of truth). Now, these beyonds are
within life the 'return to self' means that the human
individual is once again potent with world-creating force. 
Nietzsche grapples with the problem of how one actively 
engages in what is effectively post-historical life.
When one sees that, for Hegel, the end of history
marks a most radical return to self, now at the level of
self-consciousness, one can understand better Nietzsche's
statement that 'will to power' is ontological. Will to
power can be ontological and still not be logically prior
its manifestation through subjects. This is certainly the
case with Hegel's notion of 'desire,' which is how he
begins describing the dialectic from an immanent point of
view: it is his entry-point into the circle, rather than
the foundation of the whole system. Houlgate writes:
Hegel's is a non-metaphysical philosophy because 
it does not conceive of the subject as a found­
ational entity or as a simple substance in the 
manner of a Leibnizian monad. The subject for 
Hegel is constituted in the activity of thinking 
and speaking; it is not merely a spiritual 
'thing' which underlies that activity.6
Houlgate argues that Nietzsche's philosophy is
metaphysical, because 'life* is a 'foundational entity.'
But for Nietzsche, the self can only be said to possess
will to power, or to exist at all, dependent upon the
resistance of obstacles, and the strength it exhibits in
6 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 167.
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their overcoming.
Hegel"s beginnings are on the level of appearance, 
made for the sake of the understanding. Nietzsche argues 
just as forcefully that there is nothing behind appearance, 
no guiding principle which underlies activity. His 
emphasis on will to power can therefore be seen as a useful 
distortion or "necessary fiction,* made in order to bring 
to light the ultimate connectedness of things. Will to 
power is ontological, but not metaphysical in Houlgate's 
sense of the term. It is thought which moves from the 
subject to the object through the term of mediation, and 
then reflects upon the subject as its higher nature. In 
Hegel*s terminology, these things form an identity (i.e., 
a unity) "absolutely," or universally. In Nietzsche’s 
terminology, these things "return eternally.' Eternal 
recurrence is the objective counterpart of the self in the 
whole of will to power. To assert this is to 'read in' a 
dialectical movement in the Hegelian manner: not as an
over-riding structure, but as the immanent development of 
life in its aspects both as the radically free self and as 
the fatedness of its context.
Nietzsche saw himself as engaged in a new task, made 
possible because of the exhaustion of previous movements 
and forces. This perspective makes sense in light of 
Hegel's philosophy of history. Stanley Rosen recognises 
this when he writes: "Having exhausted the spiritual
capacities of reason, he [Nietzsche] believes, man once 
more girds his loins and attempts to become master and
19
possessor of nature, not by ordering and measuring or by 
speculatively appropriating it, but by projecting or 
creating it ex nihilo."7 In other words, once reason is 
incorporate in the human individual at the level of 
self-consciousness, man begins anew. His creation is only 
apparently 'ex nihilo* because everything is now known to 
be * present* or at hand with the full elaboration of 
reason. But this everything is effectively nothing: in
itself and as a whole, it is the context for widespread 
nihilism, as Rosen argues. Only by selecting certain 
possibilities and excluding others is a meaningful life 
made possible: Rosen calls this *tradition,* or the
'discontinuity of remembering and forgetting.' Tracy 
Strong brings out this same point, which is the dilemma of 
having all possibilities before one, but needing to select 
only one to most truly manifest one's nature, and find the 
reflected happiness of situatedness in life: "Nietzsche
continues on to indicate that human life characteristically 
reposes on a forgotten past. If one cannot forget, such 
that all is eternally present, then action and life itself 
become impossible, for all choices appear equally invalid."8 
Hegel's reflective wisdom, incorporate in the person of the 
Sage, is such a condition where the past is 'eternally 
present.' The new task is therefore to cast eternity into
7 Stanley Rosen, Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay. (New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1969). p. 93.
8 Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of 
Transfiguration. (Berkeley, California: University of 
California Press, 1975). pp. 26-27.
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temporality, and what is present into a beyond. This task 
is now different from the way things appeared historically. 
From the perspective of reflective wisdom, of one who has 
experienced the whole, this task is self-conscious: the 
eternal return of things is perceived in their temporal 
appearance, and the beyond is a beyond within life. From 
the standpoint of wisdom, one excludes possibilities for 
the sake of action and authentic engagement, which produces 
consequences which are novel configurations of already 
'rationally present' things, which in turn reflect upon the 
acting subject, generating a new perspective, and new 
possibilities for this process to repeat itself.
Neither Hegel's 'recollection of the spirits' or 
Nietzsche's 'eternal recurrence of the same' is a mere 
repetition. Were it to be so, it would be an imposed 
structure upon human experience, which both Hegel and 
Nietzsche deny. One re-encounters former perspectives from 
'new height' because of the addition of experience. 
Experience emerges from active engagement between selves 
and world: again, it is something which is coincidental 
with all other aspects of the whole. The dynamic of life 
is the proper focus of thought for both these philosophers. 
Hegel describes this as the movement of dialectic: the
tendency of all things to look for their essential nature 
in their opposites, and to recover themselves there. 
Nietzsche describes this as the working of vital will to 
power: the capacity to take in more than what one
immediately has; to extend oneself into a wider context
through an overabundance of force or life. Both
philosophers are therefore anti-dualists? both emphasise
the real, the actual, and life over the abstractions of
previous philosophy. Houlgate writes:
Hegel and Nietzsche share a common aim: to
criticise the lifeless abstractions that in their 
view have formed too prominent a part of European 
religious and philosophical thinking since the 
Greek period, and to develop a new mode of 
philosophising which does justice to the multiple 
and dynamic quality of life.9
A discontinuity must be set up by this 'new mode of 
philosophising.' Although all aspects of life are 
comprehended to form a unity, or to exist within a whole, 
they must, on the level of action, be taken to appear to 
'happen.' It is for this reason that Nietzsche emphasises 
'life' or 'will to power,' and not because he believes that 
these things have any existence apart from human beings who 
live, or who manifest will to power. I therefore disagree 
with Houlgate's view that life is an 'external standard,' 
which Nietzsche sets up as an alternative to transcendent 
standards given by dualist philosophy. In Houlgate's view, 
"Nietzsche criticises traditional metaphysical concepts, 
particularly that of the subject or soul, by reference to 
the external standard of 'life.'"10 'Life* is as much a 
thought-beginning for Nietzsche as 'desire' is for Hegel. 
One 'completes the circle,' and so comes to realise that 
life is not a logically prior category, through Nietzsche's 
argument of the eternal recurrence, his elaboration of a
9 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 182.
10 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 182.
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holistic perspective which provides a beyond to life which 
is within life as its fullest possible expression. To 
begin one's consideration with the self, or the will, 
emphasises our perspective on this movement, but it does 
not exclude the Hegelian ’reverse' movement of the whole 
through selves, or eternity engendered in time as history. 
The human dimension is meaning-creating and meaning-finding 
when one excludes, for the moment, consideration of the 
universal or eternal aspect of things, and concentrates on 
the 'importation of will' into events. This is what 
Nietzsche perceived himself as doing, not discovering that 
some force called 'will to power' underlies life. Bela 
Egyed rightly observes that "Nietzsche never says that will 
to power is, or determines, the essence of being."11 
Nietzsche does not observe that the will to power is true: 
What he does is assert the will to power because its time 
is ripe. I argue that this is the appropriate kind of 
activity in a post-Hegelian and post-historical world. 
Nietzsche describes his task, in The Antichrist. as 
follows: "The problem I thus pose is not what shall succeed 
mankind in the sequence of living beings (man is an end), 
but what type of man shall be bred, shall be willed, for 
being higher in value, worthier of life, more certain of a
11 Bela Egyed, "Tracing Nihilism: Heidegger to Nietzsche 
to Derrida," in Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism, 
edited by Tom Darby, Bela Egyed and Ben Jones. (Ottawa: 
Carleton University Press, 1989). p. 4.
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future.”12 What is different is the emergence of self- 
consciousness . of freedom as self-determination. The 
capacity is now there to take an active part in events 
bevond the historical enterprise of progress and 
liberation: now, the flow of events is affirmed according 
to one's strength of will, is conditioned to manifest one's 
freedom in a particular way.
Nietzsche therefore gives content to Hegel's notion of 
the ongoing dialectic, or the continual presencing of all 
things. The death of God means, in fact, that the divine 
Spirit has been dissipated into the world: man is made
divine. This turn of events can only progressively appear 
once, and reflection upon them can only truly enlighten a 
person once. Thereafter, their appearance is a matter of 
self-aware projection, of willing a change, of involving 
oneself in the stream of events. This is the same kind of 
movement, and so Hegel speaks of it as a 'recollection' and 
Nietzsche refers to it as a 'return. ' But the change which
has occurred in the origin the new height of the self as
a result of experience means that the actual movement
forward will be new: not truly unanticipated as before, but 
effectively spontaneous because of the limitations of 
particular and mortal human individuality. Nietzsche 
writes, in Twilight of the Idols: "Progress in mv sense. 
I too speak of a 'return to nature,' although it is really
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, in The Portable 
Nietzsche. Translated and edited by Walter Kaufmann. (New 
York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1968). p. 570.
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not a going back but an ascent up into the high, free,
even terrible nature and naturalness where great tasks are 
something one plays with, one mav play with.”13 Will to 
power illuminates the subjective side of experience: the 
need to exercise one's freedom, to 'play' with the 
apparently given substance which is at hand, available for 
the imposition of one's nature upon a wider tableau. But 
the eternal recurrence, to 'will for all eternity, 
eternally the same,' introduces the objective aspect: the 
need to take ultimate responsibility upon oneself, to 
radically situate the manifestations of one's freedom so 
that they are, reflectively, authentic or meaningful.
The progress of history, as elaborated by Hegel, was 
a certain kind of process, which produced a certain kind of 
result. But the nature of things to manifest themselves, 
to themselves, as they are, continues. Nietzsche shows 
that although the essential movement remains the same, it 
is impossible for the same process to re-emerge 
identically, or immediately self-same. Thus, we cannot now 
begin with the historical perspective that the goal of 
human striving is a world of truth removed from our own or 
a condition of eternity at odds with our temporality and 
mortality. But we will continue to cast out objects to be 
overcome, and project a future to be realised. Now, 
however, we will know that we subsist with reference to a
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in The 
Portable Nietzsche. Translated and edited by Walter 
Kaufmann. (New York: Viking Press, Inc., 1968). p. 552.
25
beyond which is within life. The beyond is our present 
life's higher or future condition? it is the fatefulness of 
our actions in the present, extending their ripples of 
consequences into our social condition and our future. 
This was essentially our activity within history, but now 
we engage in it from a new height, having learned, by our 
experience, the need for the discontinuity of remembering 
and forgetting. Houlgate draws attention to this 
self-determining, or 'non-metaphysical' situatedness of 
human life when he writes: "The self-imposed fate of man 
[is] the fact that he drives himself to maturity through 
the unintended consequences of his actions."14 Hence 
Nietzsche's amor fati. his requirement that we adopt a 
self-conscious attitude towards fate, to the 'unintended 
consequences' of our freedom which are made irrecoverable 
by relentless temporality. All events are ultimately 
reducible to an origin in an extension of self into the 
world, into a manifestation of will to power. But for 
one's own life, the appearance or consequences of these 
things is fate. Only from the present, and momentarily 
forgetting the past, can the future be projected, can an 
action be creative or 'spontaneous,' and can an meaningful 
life be led.
It is for the foregoing reasons that this examination 
of Hegel's philosophy of history and Nietzsche's philosophy 
has been undertaken. Hegel is absolutely instrumental in
14 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 152.
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collapsing transcendent dualism, making possible 
Nietzsche's proclamation that 'God is dead.' One sees that 
Nietzsche confronts real problems when one views his 
situation as resulting from the conclusion of Hegelian 
philosophy. The point is to imaginatively read Nietzsche, 
and to apply his ideas, as necessitated by a negative 
context which was most fully elaborated by Hegel. The 
unsatisfactory nature of Hegel's positive programme makes 
future engagement in philosophy, along the lines taken by 
Nietzsche, absolutely essential if we are to lead a 
meaningful life. I agree with Heidegger's view that "there 
exists between the two [Hegel and Nietzsche] an essential 
connection that conceals itself in the essence of all 
metaphysics."15 It is my purpose to explore this connection 
in the present thesis.
15 Martin Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God Is
Dead'" in The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays. (New York: Harper and Row, 1977). p. 59.
Chapter One 
Hegel's Philosophy of History
28
Reason in Hegel
One may begin a discussion of Hegel*s philosophy 
almost anywhere, for his system may be described as 
circular rather than linear. As such, it has no real 
•beginning,* no origin in an unquestioned and unquestion­
able premise. Hegel's claim is to have elaborated the 
system of philosophical science, which is a completed whole 
which contains and is the content of itself. Any entry 
point into this system is unquestioned for the moment only, 
for the circular nature of the system means that any 
premise is in the end a conclusion, a reflection of itself 
through the whole of the system's elaboration. The 
circularity of Hegel's philosophy is both its weakness and 
its strength: it stands or falls depending on its
completeness. Hegel must posit a metaphysics which is 
exhaustive, which contains all and therefore excludes no 
possibilities, for his philosophy to be complete. I shall 
examine this claim to completeness through Hegel's 
philosophy of history, which is the temporal and human 
experience of this circle.
Having chosen the philosophy of history as the entry 
point into Hegel's system, I will begin by following the 
argument on mastery and slavery given in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit. To introduce this, a few remarks shall be made 
about the nature of reason for Hegel, by way of a preface 
to his arguments about the philosophy of history. It is 
Hegel's view that one does philosophy by following the 
development of an idea (of course, by doing so one is drawn
into Hegel’s view that ideas £0 develop, but this will be 
considered further in the section on the dialectic). 
Therefore, although one can state baldly the nature of 
reason, such statements are not philosophy. Hegel himself 
says that prefaces are useless to philosophy, but he makes 
this statement in his own preface to the Phenomenology!1 
Before following the development of reason through history, 
then, the following remarks can be made about this all- 
important concept.
"Reason” is the preeminent idea in Hegel1s philosophy 
and, moreover, of the world which that philosophy projects. 
Reason is not merely a faculty of the human mind, it is 
also the very essence of the world itself. The difference 
between "reason" in ordinary usage, and "Reason” in Hegel’s 
philosophy is the difference between mere ratiocination in 
the mind of a human being, and the very structure and 
activity of universal "Mind" or "Spirit": "Being" and not 
"a being" in its essence, in its engagement with or 
working-out of itself. Hegel uses the term "Understanding" 
to denote the everyday usage of "reason": for him, Reason 
is much more. To get at this idea that Reason is 
structure, and not just a kind of thinking, we must 
understand that, for Hegel, "reason is purposive activity."2 
To define Reason is therefore to state the nature of its 
activity, or to say what it is that Reason does.
1 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by 
A. V. Miller. Forward and Analysis by J. N. Findlay. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) . p. 1.
2 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 12.
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We can see what Reason does by looking for its effects 
in the world. The * purposive activity' of Reason is its 
directed presencing, its making itself apparent as that 
effect which is human history. Whatever Reason is can be 
known by following its appearance. For now, we can 
anticipate the end of the metaphysical journey by stating 
that, for Hegel, "Reason is the soul of the world it 
inhabits, its immanent principle, its most proper and 
inward nature, its universal."3 As an 'immanent' principle, 
Reason can only be grasped from within, by engaging oneself 
in the process of its development: to do this is to
comprehend world history, and to return to the 'starting 
point,' to grasp Reason itself.
The dominance of this notion of Reason in Hegel's 
philosophy is indicated in his Introduction to the Lectures 
on the Philosophy of World History, where he writes: "The 
only thought which philosophy brings with it is the simple
idea of reason the idea that reason governs the world,
and that world history is therefore a rational process."4 
Reason can be the only thought of philosophy because it is 
subject, process, and object. Reason as subject is the 
'soul of the world': Reason itself does its rational
activity as history. Reason as process is this activity 
itself, the 'inward nature' of the world it not only
3 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel's Logic: Being Part One of the 
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830) . 
Translated by William Wallace. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975). p. 37.
4 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World 
History; Introduction: Reason in History. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975). p. 27.
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inhabits but makes up. Reason as object is its own the 
whole of the process of realisation: the telos or end of 
reason is its completed appearance, its making present and 
obvious what it essentially is. Reason can be the only 
thought of philosophy because in Hegel's formulation it is 
indeed exhaustive: Reason is Hegel's alpha and omega, the 
origin, substance, and end of the world. The nature of 
Reason is thus its appearance as world-history, within the 
space/time of human being which, as we shall see, is the 
medium of this appearance. If Reason is purposive 
activity, then its nature is discovered in its end, in the 
completed realisation of itself which is its telos. 
Hegel's teleological view of Reason leads him to the 
startling discovery that world-history, the substance of 
Reason, is ended: the knowledge of Reason and the end of 
history are two aspects of the same process. Again in the 
Introduction. Hegel writes: "To try to define reason in
itself if we consider reason in relation to the world--
amounts to asking what the ultimate end of the world is; 
and we cannot speak of an ultimate end without implying 
that this end is destined to be accomplished or realised."5 
History is not an open-ended process, directed towards some 
indeterminate and ever-receding goal. Rather, it is end- 
directed: namely, to the realisation of Reason, to the
arrival at the perspective of self-consciousness. The end 
of history is, first of all, the logical category over­
arching both the ideal and the real. But it is more than
5 Hegel, Reason in History, p. 44.
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this metaphysical abstraction: the end of history is a
state of affairs entered into by humanity as the completion 
of the historical enterprise to belong to the world through 
the categories of Reason. And so, as will be shown, 
history not only is ended, but has ended by this very 
realisation. The conclusion of Hegelian philosophy, 
inasmuch as it embodies world history, is the end of 
history.
Hegel considers Reason not just as a way, but as a 
beginning and an ending: in his terms, Reason is not merely 
mediation, but subject and object also. His philosophy is 
a consideration of what Reason is in-itself. which means 
that it is not only a consideration of reason in a mind, 
but of Reason as Mind: Reason is not just an effect but a
cause it does things, it is an agent in the world.
Reason itself is directed towards an end, namely, its own 
realisation, its complete 'presencing,1 or 'showing-forth.' 
Cause and effect, origin and destination, beginning and
end these are 'moments' or aspects of one thing: Reason.
In the Preface to the Phenomenology. Hegel makes clear that 
"everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not 
only as Substance, but equally as Subiect. "6 The True is 
simply 'what there is* (Being) and 'what this does' 
(Becoming). Reason as a subject, as Mind or Spirit, is 
that Being whose appearance is its own Becoming. A 
phenomenology of Spirit, then, is a description of what 
Being does as Reason. To grasp the movement of Being as
6 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 10.
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the progress of Reason, or the phenomenology of Spirit, is
to grasp what Being is, because its nature is essentially
its activity. Being is rational; reason is purposive
activity; therefore the essence of Being resides in the
outward showing of its inner self, which is its Becoming.
Hegel writes:
The true is the whole. But the whole is nothing 
other than the essence consummating itself 
through its development. Of the Absolute it must 
be said that it is essentially a result, that 
only in the end is it what it truly is; and that 
precisely in this consists its nature, viz. to be 
actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of 
itself.7
The phenomenology of Spirit is Being working itself 
out to its end; it is Being becoming what it truly is. 
Hegel says that the True is the whole and also that it is 
Subject. In other words, there can be no ‘outside1 to what 
there is, and this 'what-there-is' (which is, in fact, 
everything) does something. Conventionally, philosophers 
think of themselves as 'subject1; Being, therefore, is 
something that exists for them. It is somehow apart for 
the purposes of examination: it is their object. But
mankind, including philosophers, is part of Being, and so 
the subjectivity we have as actors and thinkers is 
something within Being. The essence of Being-as-Subject, 
the nature of what the 'what-there-is1 does, is not what 
it is, or how it appears, to us. but what it is in itself. 
Being retains its conventional status of substance, as an 
object for our inquiry, but because it is the whole, it
7 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 11.
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cannot be truly 'outside1 or 'external' to us, even as an 
object. Being is not, as an object, essentially something 
for us, because we are not, and cannot be, disinterested 
observers. The truth of Being-as-Object can only be what 
it is for itself.
If the True is both subject and object, and if it is 
the whole, then Being, what there is, must be mediated: 
there must be distinctions within Being itself. Distinct­
ions must exist within Being because there is Reason within 
it. "Reason'' describes whatever is about or by the whole, 
the True, whether it is a statement, a thought, or an 
action. Hegel describes this predication of Being, this 
connectedness as subject and object, this permeation by 
Reason, as the dialectic. For Hegel, Being is a whole 
which is differentiated: "In the philosophical proposition 
the identification of Subject and Predicate is not meant to 
destroy the difference between them, which the form of the 
proposition expresses? their unity, rather, is meant to 
emerge as a harmony."8
The dialectic is the description of the nature of 
Reason as both subject and object, as both that which acts 
and that which is acted upon. The dialectic is a tension 
and a movement, what Hegel calls "this course that 
generates itself, going forth from, and returning to, 
itself."9 The appearance of this dialectic, the succession 
of the moments through which it manifests itself, is its
8 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 38.
9 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 40.
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phenomenology. By this phenomenology, Reason becomes, and 
knows itself to be, what it truly is. The end, or telos. 
of the dialectic is where Reason reaches this self- 
knowledge: "The sole endeavour of spirit is to know what it 
is in and for itself, and to reveal itself to itself in its 
true form.”10 What it knows, in the end, is its true 
nature: that all along its 'other,.* its object, was itself, 
the subject. In Hegel's terms, the end of the dialectic is 
where Being is in-and-for-itself. This awareness which 
comes into Spirit, into Reason-as-Subject, is its 
self-realisation. This self-realisation is nothing other
than self-consciousness the kind of thinking which
expresses 'I* and 'other* (but knows both to be a unity in 
Reason). Hegel writes: "the essence of spirit, then, is 
self-consciousness."11 The dialectic is the process of 
Reason as simple consciousness, as 'subject,' becoming 
Reason as self-consciousness, as that subject which knows 
its object to be itself within a completed whole of 
differentiated Being. History is the self-realisation of 
Reason, in time, for man. Because Reason is its own 
object, what it is it is for itself. Knowing the object 
is, in the end, a return to self: "For the in-itself is
consciousness? but equally it is that for which an other 
(the in-itself  ^ is."12 To realise the nature of Reason is 
to bring together its two aspects. The first aspect is
10 Hegel, Reason in History, p. 53.
11 Hegel, Reason in History, p. 51.
12 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 104.
Reason as Spirit, as that universal Mind which is the agent 
of the world, which through its activity comes to self- 
awareness. The second aspect is Reason as substance, as 
the structure of the world, as the effect of the first 
aspect of Reason. Ultimately, Reason is both: what it is 
and what it does; Being and Becoming? thought and reality. 
In the Logic, Hegel writes: "It may be held the highest and 
final aim of philosophic science to bring about, through 
the ascertainment of this harmony, a reconciliation of the 
self-conscious reason with the reason which is in the 
world in other words, with actuality.1,13
This is where the human dimension comes in, and we can 
begin the phenomenology as history, for man is the medium 
of Reason, the substance of the consciousness of Being.
Through him, Being knows itself as Reason thus it fulfils
its nature, it realises its end. The dialectic is, 
abstractly, or in-itself, the phenomenology of Spirit: the 
succession of moments of Reason's articulation of Being. 
But for us, for man in an through whom Reason works, the 
dialectic is the progress of history. History is the 
connection between man the immanent, worldly being, and 
Spirit the transcendent, metaphysical being. For Hegel, 
"world history as a whole is the expression of Spirit in 
time."14 Just as the real nature of Reason is revealed to 
itself at the end of its phenomenology, so too is man, the 
incarnation of this movement, revealed to himself at the
13 Hegel, Logic, p. 8.
14 Hegel, Reason in History, p. 128.
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end of his history. When Reason is fully realised as Being 
which is in-and-for-itself, man is thereby revealed as 
completed self-consciousness. Man's telos is self- 
knowledge. This essence resides in the end of history, the 
culmination of the process by which man becomes fully 
self-conscious. As Alexandre Kojeve observes in his 
commentary on Hegel: "Man is Self-Consciousness.1,15 It is 
all the same movement: man achieves self-consciousness, and 
self-consciousness (Reason as Being which is in-and-for- 
itself) achieves itself through man.
Mastery and Slavery
In order to illustrate Hegel's philosophy of history, 
and so to explain the notion of the end of history, I will 
follow the argument in the Phenomenology of Spirit in the 
section entitled "Self-Consciousness." I choose this part 
because it enucleates the whole work, setting out a 
'mythological' beginning of history, and anticipating its 
paradigmatic end.
The foundation or 'beginning' of history for Hegel is 
undifferentiated Being, Being in-itself, the True simply as 
subject, consciousness without an object. Rather than 
speaking as Hegel does, of the dialectic as it appears to 
not-yet-fully-realised Being, I will speak of it as it 
appears to man, the manifestation of self-consciousness. 
This makes the phenomenology more concrete and accessible
15 Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969). p. 3.
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as history. The dialectic begins, or history commences, 
then, with the existence of a desire. Man experiences a 
desire, and this lifts him out of the level of simple 
unity, out of that consciousness which says "I am I” and 
goes no further. This occurs because desire reveals an 
object: the object of desire is the thing which will
satisfy it. Equally, the object is the lack within man, 
his experience that he does not have what he wants. And 
the emergence of the object reveals the existence of a 
subject. The object is the 'other,1 that which is desire, 
and the subject is 'I,1 that which desires. So the 
existence of a desire makes possible the first and simplest 
kind of dialectical tension: "I desire the other."
To satisfy a desire, one must take the object into 
oneself: in Hegelian language, one must negate its other­
ness. 'Taking in' the object destroys the other as some­
thing which stands apart from the 'I,' and it also fills 
the lack within that 'I.' The subject is thereby 
conditioned by its object: its desire has turned out to
find its essence in something apparently other than itself. 
Yet this otherness is actively denied, and a certainty of 
self regained, through the satisfaction of desire. Hegel 
writes: "Desire and the self-certainty obtained in its
gratification, are conditioned by the object, for self- 
certainty comes from superseding this other: in order that 
this supersession can take place, there must be this 
other."16
16 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 109.
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The simplest kind of desires are natural desires, 
those which obtain for man as an animal. The existence of 
the desire of hunger, for example, introduces a limited 
sentiment-of-self: the awareness of man as a subject and 
food as an object implies that human life subsists in a 
biological context. It is in this way that the object 
conditions the subject; man takes on the character of what 
he desires; like the food he eats, he is part of the 
natural world.
For man to know himself as something more than a part 
of natural being, though, he must find as an object for his 
desire something apart from nature. If man could find such 
an object, one which exists beyond 'given' reality, then by 
appropriating it he would rise above nature. Kojeve writes 
that "for there to be Self-Consciousness, Desire must 
therefore be directed towards a non-natural object, toward 
something that goes beyond the given reality."17 But, so 
far, both the 'I' and the 'other' have been experienced 
solely as parts of 'given' reality. Only what is already 
there reveals itself, 'presences' itself, in the primitive 
dialectic of sentiment-of-self. The only thing which is 
actually introduced into given reality is the desire 
itself. Desire is the mediation, that thing which 
introduces differentiation into Being. And because desire 
is between 'I' and 'other,' desire is apart from 'I' and 
'other.' Desire itself is that something which rises above 
given reality. Man, therefore, distinguishes himself from
17 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 5.
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nature by making desire his object. In other words, he 
desires a desire, which is to say that he makes himself the 
object of another human being*s desire.
Man goes about satisfying his desire for the desire of 
another in the same way as before: by overcoming it as an 
object; by negating its otherness. The apparent independ­
ence of the other from one's own consciousness must be 
superseded. Hegel writes: "Self-consciousness is thus
certain of itself only by superseding this other that 
presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent 
life; self-consciousness is Desire."18 Again, as with 
natural objects, the subject is conditioned by its object 
through this act of supersession (or 'negating otherness'; 
or 'satisfying a desire'). The self becomes human by 
having another human as the object of its desire.
Put less abstractly, the desire for the desire of 
another is the need to be acknowledged, the need to be 
recognised. Hegel calls this the achievement of objective 
certainty of self. Self-certainty rises to objective truth 
in human recognition because the self is in turn recognised 
by its object. The other turns out also to be a self, 
similarly human. Consciousness in general, then, becomes 
not only subject, but object as well. The experience of 
self as both subject and object is self-consciousness. 
Thus, Hegel observes: "Self-consciousness exists in and for 
itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for
18 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 109.
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another? that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.1,19 
This acknowledgement is a two-fold process, because what is 
true for one human consciousness is also true for the 
other. Each is an object for the other, and aware
subjectively that this is the case: "They recognize
• • 20 themselves as mutually recognizing one another." The
complete satisfaction of human desire, which is what fully
realised self-consciousness is, lies in mutual recognition.
In other words, man is only human in a community of his
kind. One needs others for one to be what one is: "Self-
consciousness achieves its satisfaction onlv in another
self-consciousness. "21
Here, though, Hegel is anticipating the end of the
dialectic of desired desires, in order to see what it
means. The way this dialectic first appears, though, to
man in history, is quite different. For man as the medium
of consciousness does not at first recognise the other as
being human like himself. Why should he, when the only
'self* he knows, which he experiences, is his own? So man
at first confronts the other as he did purely natural
objects: by negating its otherness; by denying its
independence. Man attempts to destroy the object as such:
he tries to kill his opponent. This movement, or
dialectical development, is also occurring in the other,
because in fact (or to us, the phenomenological observers)
that other is also a subject, also a self, and sees the
19 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 111.
20 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 112.
21 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 110. (Emphasis Hegel's)
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first subject in turn as something external and unessential 
to itself. In order to satisfy the desire for the desire 
of another, each moment of consciousness, each person, 
"seeks the death of the other."22 The purpose of this fight 
is not only to deny the object, but it is intended also to 
confirm the subject. Man shows that he is unattached to 
life by risking that very life in a murderous struggle for 
pure prestige.23 The struggle serves each combatant 
equally: to 'prove* that the other is unessential to
oneself, and that one's self is an identity apart from 
nature. One is apart from nature because one's natural
being life is held to be of less importance than one's
non-natural being: prestige, the way one appears for
another, becomes of paramount importance. It is Hegel's 
contention that "the relation of the two self-conscious 
individuals is such that they prove themselves and each 
other through a life-and-death struggle."24
The important object in this dialectical movement is 
death itself. By confronting death through this murderous 
struggle, man attempts to rise above the natural, given 
world of which he has been hitherto an indistinguishable 
part. To overcome, or to realise death in this way, is in 
fact a prerequisite of freedom: "If man were not mortal, he 
is, he would not be free of God. Consciousness of this 
would not be free of the eternal and infinitely given, that 
freedom, and it alone, can satisfy Man's infinite pride,
22 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 113.
23 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. p. 8.
24 Hegel, Phenomenology. pp. 113-114.
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that is, his unbounded desire for recognition.1,25 To be 
recognised, to realise one's own consciousness (i.e., to 
be self-conscious) , one must obtain from the other 
acknowledgement, to find oneself, objectively, in him. One 
rises above the merely natural, and so realises freedom, by 
confronting death in the form of this other. Thereby, one 
demonstrates one's unnaturalness, which is at first taken 
to be the substance of one's humanity. To desire the 
desire of another, to seek recognition, to strive for
prestige this movement marks the emergence of human being
out of natural being: "Man appears, then, in the midst of 
the naturally given world, for the 'first' time when he 
risks his life in a murderous struggle for pure prestige."26 
Prestige, the non-natural object, is thus the first human 
object.
This life-and-death struggle is the 'mythical' begin­
ning of history for Hegel, the division between man living 
in time but within nature, and man living in time as 
history. The difference is that man here 'realises' death, 
and now knows himself as a mortal being. Through history, 
man will come to transcend his mortality not by treating 
life to be of no account (the way of the master) , but by 
revealing that life in an enduring way through action, 
thought, and speech (the way of the slave) . But in the 
dialectic of master and slave, history finds its genesis
25 Barry Cooper, The End of History: An Essav on Modern 
Hegelianism. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984). 
pp. 92-93.
26 Cooper, End of History, p. 93.
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and its substance. Barry Cooper writes:
The fights and labours of Masters and Slaves are
the occasions for the appearance of death; the
realization of that appearance can come only with
a reflective account of those appearances. But 
the fights and labours of Masters and Slaves are 
the substance of history. Consequently, the 
sought-for account will be an account of history. 
It will be also an account of man, the one whose 
being is historical.27
There are three possible outcomes to this life-and- 
death struggle: when both combatants die? when one dies; or 
when both live because one submits to the other. In the 
first case, both men, both 1 moments of consciousness, 1 have 
failed to gain recognition and also to show that they are 
unattached to the natural world: a dead object cannot
provide recognition, and a dead subject has a purely
natural, organic nature. Clearly, the dialectic of
consciousness is not advanced by this result. In the 
second case, the victor has indeed shown that he is apart 
from the natural world, because he has risked his life. 
But he gains no objective confirmation of self through his 
risk, because his opponent is dead. As a moment of 
consciousness then, he is therefore back where he started, 
as a merely subjectively certain self, who is confronted 
only by natural objects.
It is the third result which advances the dialectic. 
The victor triumphs over the other, yet the vanquished 
continues to live, and so acts as an objective confirmation 
of his victory. The one who is defeated gives up his 
desire to be recognised by the other, and recognises that
27 Cooper, Endxof History, p. 105.
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other: he is the slave. The slave thereby shows that, for 
him, life is more important than prestige. The one who 
wins the fight does not back down, refuses to recognise the 
slave, but is recognised by him: he is the master. There 
is recognition here, so this is a 'human' dialectic, but 
there is not mutual recognition: "For recognition proper
the moment is lacking, that what the lord does to the other 
he also does to himself, and what the bondsman does to
himself he should also do to the other. The outcome is a
28recognition that is one-sided and unequal."
The problem is that the master does not and cannot 
satisfy his desire for recognition by being recognised by 
the slave. This is because he himself does not recognise 
the slave as being human; "in the beginning, he sees in the 
other only the aspect of an animal."29 The master cannot be 
satisfied, cannot have objective certainty of self, because 
the other for whom he is an object is not someone who he 
recognises as being human. Through his victory in the 
life-and-death struggle, then, the master has succeeded 
only in showing that he is unattached to life, that he 
transcends nature by valuing prestige above existence. Yet 
this 'humanity, ' this unattachment to life, is still 
something abstract. The master is not actually satisfied, 
because he has not gained authentic recognition, and cannot 
do so until he in turn recognises the slave. But for this 
to happen, the slave will have to cease to be a slave, and
28 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 116.
29 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. p. 13.
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so the master cease to be a master. Because mutual 
recognition is the complete satisfaction of human desires, 
or the end of the dialectic of consciousness, the 'moments' 
of master and slave must be overcome in history. 
Therefore, Kojeve writes that "the historical 'dialectic' 
is the 'dialectic' of Master and Slave."30
The way of the master is an impasse, for all he can do 
as a master is continually prove he is unattached to life 
by risking it in life-and-death struggles. The way of the 
slave is the way forward because at least he has an object, 
the master, whom he recognises as human. Hegel expresses 
this when he writes: "This moment of pure being-for-self is 
also explicit for the bondsman, for in the lord it exists 
for him as his object."31 Furthermore, unlike the master, 
the slave has experienced that he is in fact attached to 
life: he knows himself to be a part of natural given-being. 
The slave wants to live, and shows this by backing down 
when that life was at risk. The fear of death, which the 
master has shown he does not have, turns out to be 
essential to man as self-consciousness. The experience of 
dread, which for Hegel is "this pure universal movement, 
the absolute melting-away of everything stable, is the 
simple, essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute 
negativity, pure being-for-self. which consequently is 
implicit in this consciousness,"32 i.e., for the slave.
30 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 9.
31 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 117.
32 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 117.
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The dialectic of history is the dialectic of the slave 
overcoming himself as such. He does not overcome the 
master as his object directly, because he has backed down 
in the life-and-death struggle. But in the service of the 
Master he works upon the natural world. Through work, the 
slave transforms nature, and gains, ultimately, objective 
recognition, because he works on something 1 other' (the 
world) for another (the master; a recognised human 
consciousness) . The slave will come to realise that the 
master needs his labour to transform the natural world for 
him. The need of the master is an implicit recognition of 
the slave? furthermore, this recognition is by someone whom 
the slave already recognises as being a human conscious­
ness, as being an essential object. Also, the artifacts 
which emerge from the work of the slave endure as a lasting 
and objective confirmation of self. Kojeve writes: 
"Therefore, it is by work, and only by work, that man 
realises himself objectively as man.”33 The slave gets rid 
of his attachment to life not by risking it, but by 
overcoming the natural world, by making it his object 
through work. It is in the service of the master, and not 
by confronting him, that the slave obtains the satisfaction 
of his desire for recognition. Work lifts the slave from 
his status as animal, and propels him towards freedom and 
self-consciousness. As Hegel writes: "Through his service 
he rids himself of his attachment to natural existence in
33 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. p. 25.
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every single detail; and gets rid of it by working on 
it.”34
The subsequent dialectic is concerned with the changes 
in that mode of self-consciousness which begins as the 
slave. The slavish consciousness1s service to the master 
is nascent human recognition; the slave's view of the 
master as an essential other gives rise to the first view 
of the self as a being existent with reference to another 
human being. At first, the slave takes his own identity to 
be unessential, but his whole idea of '11 at least involves 
another self which he does take to be essential. And the 
fact that the slave's notion of the self includes the 
other, the master, shows that human identity subsists in 
relation, that 'I' is only meaningful with reference to 
'other.' Hegel's dialectic subsequent to that of the 
master and slave is the appearance of the notion that the 
self participates in that essentiality which was taken to 
belong to the master; one is a person only in a community. 
The master, with only the unessential slave as his other, 
can never develop real personality, never be 'this-person- 
and-not-any-other-person.' In his Science of Logic. Hegel 
writes: "What the slave is without, is the recognition that 
he is a person: and the principle of personality is
universality. The master looks upon his slave not as a 
person, but as a selfless thing. The slave is not himself 
reckoned an 'I'--  his 'I' is his master."35
34 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 117.
35 Hegel, Logic, pp. 227-228.
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The slave does have a self, does have an *1,* although 
in this incomplete mode of consciousness he takes it to be 
the master. The way in which the notion of the self 
necessarily involves the other is indicated in the use of 
the word * I. • Hegel writes: "When I say ' I ' I mean my
single self to the exclusion of all others; but what I say, 
viz. * I,1 is just every *1,* which in like manner excludes 
all others from itself.”36 This is what Hegel means when he 
says that the way forward is the way of the slave; inherent 
in his status is movement towards another, and this 
relatedness is always the 'engine* of the dialectic in
Hegel the experience of the movement from ' I ' to ' other'
and back to 'I* is the experience of developing selfhood, 
of a personality which is situated in its proper context.
Freedom
The developing selfhood of the slavish consciousness 
is the development of freedom. At first, this notion would 
appear at odds with the nature of the slave as a person 
wholly determined by the will of the master. But Hegel 
demonstrates how the freedom which pertains to the master 
is absolute, and therefore empty: it has no context 
without, no recognised social milieu, and therefore no 
content within, no objective certainty in the mind of the 
master. Only the slave can rise to objective freedom, 
because the slave does recognize an object in the master.
3 6 Hegel, Logic, p. 31.
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The entire dialectic subsequent to that of the master and
slave can be seen as the slave finding himself in the
master, realising concretely the freedom which the master
has only abstractly. Thought and action, the substance of
history, are the media through which the slave overcomes
his unessential nature, and finds himself in the essential
master. Developing freedom is a return to self, a movement
towards free individuality which is situated through the
individuality of others: mutual recognition. Hegel
sketches this whole movement when he writes in the Logic:
For thinking means that, in the other, one meets 
with one's self. It means a liberation, which is 
not the flight of abstraction, but consists in 
that which is actual having itself not as some­
thing else, but as its own being and creation, in 
the other actuality with which it is bound up by 
the force of necessity. As existing in an 
individual form, this liberation is called I: as 
developed to its totality, it is free Spirit? as 
feeling, it is Love; and as enjoyment, it is 
Blessedness.37
In this last sentence, Hegel is describing the dialectic 
from several perspectives. For the historical actor, the 
dialectic is liberation, whose end is free individuality: 
the situated self. From the universal perspective, the 
dialectic is Spirit, or Mind, or the True-as-Subject, 
realising itself completely. In the moment of mediation, 
of the relatedness of subjects and objects, the dialectic 
is mutual recognition or love. And finally, 'blessedness' 
describes that unity which is the end of history, the 
successful mediation between man and Spirit, bringing 
together the immanent and transcendent realms.
37 Hegel, Logic. p. 222.
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The end of history is the achievement of actual 
freedom. In his commentary on Hegel's philosophy of 
history, Burleigh Taylor Wilkins writes: "The ultimate
purpose of the world is freedom, and the means of its 
realization are the actions and passions of men.”38 
Developing freedom is the political face of the progressive 
appearance of self-consciousness in the world: the
phenomenology of Spirit which is the content of history. 
Progress towards freedom is a commonplace framework for 
understanding history? as Cooper observes, "it is difficult 
to deny that we habitually and unthinkingly interpret our 
own history as the development of freedom."39 So let us now 
turn to the development of freedom in Hegel's philosophy of 
history: of what does becoming free consist?
Hegel had a very positive, active idea of freedom. 
Any definition of freedom as merely a condition of the 
absence of restraints to action would be incomplete, and a 
false consciousness of what human being is like where it is 
free. Also unsatisfactory would be the idea that freedom 
is merely the expression of what man is, the outward 
showing of his inner self. The first notion of freedom, 
that of absolute autonomy, is devoid of any context in 
which free action can be meaningful. The second notion, 
which is the expression of self such that the outer world 
conforms wholly to the subjective ideal, is devoid of that
38 Burleigh Taylor Wilkins, Hegel1s Philosophy of History. 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1974). pp. 
52-53.
39 Cooper, End of History, p. 7.
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otherness* or beyond which makes an action spontaneous 
(i.e., bringing forth something new that was not always 
there). Hegel*s concept of freedom is a unity of these two 
notions? Charles Taylor calls Hegelian freedom "the fullest 
rational autonomy with the greatest expressive unity."40 In 
its expressive aspect, this unity "points us towards a 
fulfilment of man in freedom, which is precisely a freedom 
of self-determination, and not simply independence from 
external impingement."41 At the same time, considered in 
its autonomous aspect, one who is free in this unified 
Hegelian way can say: "I am free in a radical sense,
self-determining not as a natural being, but as a pure 
moral will."42 The self expresses itself by free action, 
but the self expressed is not the animal being rooted in 
nature, but a human being whose context is a community of 
similarly free individuals: a self in oneself,
subjectively, and for others, objectively, through mutual
recognition. The question now is what, for Hegel, is this
'moral will,' this 'free individuality' which is the human 
dimension of the dialectic? Hegel explains these notions 
most clearly in the Philosophy of Right.
Hegel sketches the dialectic of freedom in the Intro­
duction of the Philosophy of Right. The human aspect, 
which is the immanent moment of self-consciousness, or the 
self, is what is meant by the term 'will'; the universal
40 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979). p. 12.
41 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, p. 5.
42 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, p. 4.
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aspect Spirit, or Mind, or realised Reason is indicated
in its political dimension by the term 'system of right.' 
Hegel writes: "The basis of right is, in general, mind? its 
precise place and point of origin is the will. The will is 
free, so that freedom is both the substance of right and 
its goal, while the system of right is the realm of freedom 
made actual, the world of mind brought forth out of itself 
like a second nature."43 Freedom is the 'substance' of
actual, realised reason or 'right' as the liberation of
the slave, as his overcoming of his apparent other- 
determination. Freedom is the 'goal' of this liberation as 
the unity of the ideal and the real, the unity of the kind 
of life projected by aspiring to freedom, and the actual 
kind of life being led.
Hegel considers first the dialectical moment of the 
self, or the will, and then turns to the moment of univer­
sality, or the State. The freedom of the will in turn is 
composed of two aspects, what Charles Taylor has described 
as 'moral autonomy' and 'expressive unity.' Hegel begins 
with autonomous freedom because the first moment of any 
dialectical progression for Hegel is always the universal 
moment, albeit that empty, abstract universality which does 
not yet comprehend itself as a unity of discrete 
instantiations of itself. Hegel describes this moment, or 
element, of freedom as follows:
43 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right. Translated by T. 
M. Knox. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). p. 20.
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The will contains the element of pure indeter­
minacy or that pure reflection of the ego into 
itself which involves the dissipation of every 
restriction and every content either immediately 
presented by nature, by needs, desires, and 
impulses, or given and determined by any means
whatever. This is the unrestricted infinity of
absolute abstraction or universality, the pure 
thought of oneself.44
This is a pure reflection because it is not a reflection
against anything else, anything other than itself. The
absence of any other means the absence of any limits to the
self? therefore, its freedom is absolute. However, this
freedom is still abstract determination is yet needed to
make this freedom actual.
Freedom as the absence of constraints is negative
freedom. The only 'content* of such freedom consists in
eliminating obstacles; as Hegel writes, "only in destroying 
something does this negative will possess the feeling of 
itself as existent."45 Freedom is believed to lie in 
whatever is left after any kind of determining structure is 
destroyed, although, in fact, all that remains is a void. 
Overcoming obstacles, and not eliminating them, is the 
substance of freedom for Hegel. For now, in this aspect of 
'moral autonomy,' freedom is abstract, i.e., nothing in 
itself. The negative activity of this kind of freedom is 
not what Hegel would call negation, which is overcoming the 
other to develop the self, but what he would call sheer 
negativity, which is destroying the other. This moment of 
freedom is precisely that enjoyed by the master, but, as
44 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 21.
45 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 22.
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Hegel observes, "what negative freedom intends to will can 
never be anything in itself but an abstract idea, and 
giving effect to this idea can only be the fury of 
destruction.”46 This kind of freedom is not wrong. but 
incomplete. What is missing is the self, a will with a 
content, with concrete determinations. So now we turn to 
the second moment of freedom, the 'singular* aspect of the 
dialectic, which is 'expressive unity.'
This aspect of freedom is the opposite extreme from
the unessential self. Here, the self is alls the other is
merely an outward-showing of the self. The self is a
determinate will, but a wholly subjective one it is sheer
wilfulness. Hegel writes:
The ego is also the transition from undifferent­
iated indeterminacy to the differentiation, 
determination, and positing of a determination as 
a content and object. Now further, this content 
may either be given by nature or engendered by 
the concept of mind. Through this positing of 
itself as something determinate, the ego steps in 
principle into determinate existence. This is 
the absolute moment, the finitude or 
particularization of the ego.47
This second moment of freedom is only a one-sided
determination, because only the subject is deemed to be
essential. The entire content of the object of anything
outside the self is exhausted by the content imported
into it by the self. The world outside the self is an
immediate reflection, and thus an empty one, one which
shows nothing besides what is already implicitly present.
46 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 22.
47 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 22.
56
The self is an unqualified particular.
The unity of both these moments, of moral autonomy,
and expressive unity, expresses the truth of freedom for
Hegel. Freedom is self-determination: content is *given*
to appear from without, but it in fact is an emergence of
the self. Freedom describes this reflection of the self
mediated by the apparently given nature of *the world.1
Actual freedom remains that of a * moral* will because it is
other-directed; and the relationship with the object
(unity) remains an expression of self, albeit a self
transformed by this unity. Hegel writes:
The will is the unity of both these moments. It 
is particularity reflected into itself and so 
brought back to universality, i.e. it is individ­
uality. It is the self-determination of the ego, 
which means that at one and the same time the ego 
posits itself as its own negative, i.e. as 
restricted and determinate, and yet remains by 
itself, i.e. in its self-identity and univers­
ality. It determines itself and yet at the same 
time binds itself together with itself.48
True self-consciousness is the awareness of one’s 
difference from everything else, that part of being a self 
is not being another. It is also the awareness that one is 
not merely *not-anything-else,' but something-in­
particular: and that this content of the self is brought to 
light through its distinctiveness from what it is not. 
Hegel describes the experience of self-consciousness as 
follows: "Every self-consciousness knows itself (i) as
universal, as the potentiality of abstracting from 
everything determinate, and (ii) as particular, with a
48 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 23.
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determinate object, content, and aim.”49 The actions of 
human beings rising to self-consciousness, realising their 
freedom, is to *narrow the gap' between these two notions 
of freedom. The expression of self must become more than 
arbitrary wilfulness, and one's autonomy must be given a 
context. Hegel describes this kind of action when he 
writes: "The will's activity consists in annulling the
contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity and 
giving its aims an objective instead of a subjective 
character, while at the same time remaining by itself even 
in objectivity."50
The self-determining individual is a moral will 
because it is sustained through consideration of its 
relatedness to others. Awareness of one's context is both 
finding oneself in others and setting oneself apart from
them this, very simply, is the condition of the free
individual in society. The enjoyment of freedom is a 
function of one's unity with and difference from others? in 
other words, freedom does not belong so much to a person, 
as a description of the self, but rather describes the 
relation between persons, as a description of self- 
consciousness (of 'I' and 'other'). Hegel writes: "This 
relation of will to will is the true and proper ground in 
which freedom is existent."51 A community of
consciousnesses is essential to self-consciousness and
49 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 23.
50 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, pp. 32-33.
51 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 57.
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freedom because the ’middle term' of relatedness, or 
recognition, is their very substance.
So freedom is a rational combination of self-
expression and autonomy; the expression of self is a 
participation in unity, and the self is autonomous in a
moral relation---- hence ’expressive unity' and 'moral
autonomy. ' But how does freedom come about in 'the world, '
that is, for man? First of all, it is essential that 
freedom does indeed 'come about,' that man becomes free. 
Becoming consist of a change over time. For Hegel,
becoming consists of negation within Being, the process 
whereby 'what there is' rises to objective truth (which is 
self-consciousness, beholding itself as its own object). 
In the Logic, Hegel writes: "The truth of Being and of
Nothing [Negation] is accordingly the unity of the two: and 
this unity is Becoming."52 'Becoming' is then an 
overarching term for Hegel, circumscribing Being and that 
which stands against it (which is states of affairs not yet
present to it). Becoming is more than mere Being  it is
'what there is' and also 'that which what-there-is does.' 
The instantiation of Being is its dialectical rise to 
truth, so Hegel writes: "Becoming is only the explicit
statement of what Being is in its truth."53 In terms of 
freedom, the being of freedom can be considered to be the 
regime of actual freedom, that state of affairs where
freedom is realised and enjoyed. The becoming of freedom
52 Hegel, Logic, p. 128.
53 Hegel, Logic, p. 132.
x
59
is liberation, the process whereby man overcomes both his 
atomistic autonomy (pure subjectivity) and his immersion in 
monolithic unity (pure objectivity). The whole process of 
liberation and freedom, then, is a teleological one: the 
meaning of liberating action lies in its end, in its 
achievement, and the meaning of the state of freedom 
realised lies in the struggle to rise to this condition. 
In terms of the philosophy of history, liberation is the 
content of history, and freedom is the end to which it 
maintains. The essential mediating term in any case is 
man: the subject who liberates himself, and the object in 
whom freedom realises itself.
Either term in this process, either moment of the 
dialectic, considered in itself. is an incomplete 
understanding of freedom. Liberation in itself, or without 
the notion of what realised freedom is, is action without 
purpose, struggle without overcoming, and life without 
meaning. In itself, liberating action has no perspective, 
no from-to directedness. On the other hand, freedom in 
itself, without the notion of liberating action as its 
substance, is an ideal lacking realisation, an utopia 
unconnected to real polities.
Freedom as a completed goal, as the telos of liber­
ation, is an end condition only as a reflection upon 
history. Becoming free (history) and being free (the end 
of history) are together the truth of freedom for Hegel. 
Barry Cooper writes: "The inseparability of freedom and
historicity is obvious enough: there is history, properly
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speaking, that is unforseen creative evolution, only where 
there are free actors, and freedom can be actualised only 
by the creation of a historical world.”54
History is the process whereby man becomes free.
Action--- working, struggling, thinking is the way man
liberates himself, and the content of history. And
satisfaction having freely transformed oneself and the
world is the destination of this way. The truth of Being
is completed becoming. As Alexandre Kojeve writes: "Man is 
negating Action, which transforms given being and, by 
transforming it, transforms itself. Man is what he is only 
to the extent that he becomes what he is; his true Being 
(Sein) is Becoming (Werdin), Time. History."55 History is 
progressive because man becomes more and more human within 
it. To become free, in both the expressive and autonomous 
senses, is to become humane. Hegel defines the end of 
history in the Philosophy of Right as follows: "The good is 
thus freedom realized, the absolute end and aim of the 
world."56 The 'good' is Hegel's Notion or Idea, which is 
unity of the universal with the particular. The unity of
what is abstract, or potential, and what is real, or
present, is the actual. In terms of freedom, the unity of
realised freedom and realising liberation is the entire 
process: history. The end of history is "freedom
realised," which is where one's ideal of free individuality 
matches one's actual condition in the world.
54 Cooper, End of History, p. 73.
55 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. p. 38.
56 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 86.
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Because of the inseparability of history and freedom, 
the end of liberation in freedom means the end of history. 
Cooper writes: "History, according to Hegel, was the
process by which the principle of freedom actualized
itself. Once the regime where all were free had been, in
principle, established, no further historical action was 
possible. ”57
Hegel is saying more than just that history is the 
progress of liberating action. Objectively, history is the 
action of freedom making itself actual in man. For Hegel,
freedom is also a subject considered in this way, man is
the middle term, the ‘carrier* of freedom*s appearance. It 
is important to realise that the coming-to-be of freedom is 
only partly what man does. Freedom in history has a life 
of its own: it possesses logos. Man is a participant in, 
more than a creator of, history, and this allows the 
individual self to rise above sheer wilfulness and become 
creative. History transcends individual choice, yet it is 
nothing but the whole of human choices and their 
consequences in time. Only in the face of the determinate 
character of existence does man's freedom have substance. 
To perceive freedom as a subject is to make freedom real, 
and more than a wilfulness without context, or choices made 
in a vacuum. For Hegel, the determination and the freedom 
of the will are not opposing ideas, but rather each idea 
finds its truth in the other: freedom has substance by
working upon the 'fixed character of existence, and mere
57 Cooper, End of History, p. 122.
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Being has life has movement and becoming through the
freedom which works itself out in it. Hegel writes in the 
Logic:
A good man is aware that the tenor of his conduct 
is essentially obligatory and necessary. But 
this consciousness is so far from making any 
abatement from his freedom, that without it real 
and reasonable freedom could not be distinguished
from arbitrary choice a freedom which has no
reality and is merely potential. . . .  In short, 
man is most independent when he knows himself to 
be determined by the absolute idea throughout.58
Man is the 'raw material1 for something else what Hegel
calls Spirit, or Mind, or in some contexts Reason to
realise itself. For this other, the actions of man are
wholly determined. But for man, his acts remain free,
because all possibilities reside in this other, and these
possibilities are made actual by man's raising this other
to objective truth. 'Determination1 and 'freedom' of the
will are therefore descriptions of one's philosophical
perspective within one and the same process conflict
between these notions is the work of the dialectic, of the
shifting of perspectives, and not the clash of opposites.
It is important to make this mental shift between freedom
as a description of a quality in man and freedom as the
name of a subject which uses man, both perspectives within
the same framework, to understand Hegel's notion of
freedom.
The perspective of freedom for man is history. Within 
history man is at first merely subjectively free, which 
means that he feels himself to be free, but does not yet
58 Hegel, Logic, p. 220.
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know it. For man's freedom to rise to objective truth, he 
must exist in relation to an object which confirms his 
freedom. Human beings objectify their freedom by acts of 
creation, by bringing forth the new out of the given. The 
possibility of freedom is made actual in the act? the human 
creator is proved essential to this process through the 
enduring product of his will. The object which emerges 
from human creativity is reappropriated, and so confirms, 
objectively, the freedom of human being. The kind of 
person who engages in history in this way appears first as 
the slave, as the person whose work in the service of the 
master produces essential objects: the natural world which 
he transforms, and the master for whom he works.
This slavish consciousness does not set out to know 
himself or to realise his freedom through his work: at
first, his work is entirely for another, and is not yet 
reflected onto himself as his work, as evidence of his 
freedom of will. But this knowledge will come, as it is in 
the very nature of the slave's activity. Hegel writes in 
the Phenomenology: "Through work . . . the bondsman becomes
conscious of what he truly is."59 The evidence of work---
which is, in fact, history itself is the return to man as
a confirmation of self. Cooper writes: "When man created 
History he revealed himself to himself by way of his 
creation."60 Within history, man at first believed that his 
works were essential only in that they were exercised upon
59 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 118.
60 Cooper, End of History, p. 136.
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a real world, for a recognised master. This proved,
though, to also be an externalisation of self man was
in-forming his own consciousness. The knowledge which man 
gains through the transformation of given-being for another 
consciousness turns out to be knowledge of the self: 
consciousness has become self-consciousness. The slave
finds his own essence in what he took to be merely 
external. So, Cooper writes: "To be fully Conscious of the 
world was to be fully Self-Conscious since the Self was a 
worldly being."61 Work, then, is the reflective proof of 
human freedom. This occurs because to regard the work of 
man is to regard man in the work: "By becoming conscious of 
their works, human beings became conscious of themselves, 
since they were what they did."62
Work is a more specific term in Hegel's dialectic, a 
concrete manifestation of freedom. Work describes the 
relation between the slave and the master, and it will be 
remembered that both these 'moments' in the historical 
dialectic are essential to human being. But work 
transcends the persons it mediates by its generation of an 
enduring product. The proof of work in the object is a 
more enduring form of prestige than the fleeting triumph of 
the master over the slave in the life-and-death struggle. 
Endurance is a temporal projection of the self, positing a 
future context for life out of the present state of 
affairs. So the slave, through work, is the mode of
61 Cooper, End of History, p. 226.
62 Cooper, End of History, p. 175.
consciousness which is capable of satisfaction. of 
beholding an end which persists beyond the self, and which 
is not destroyed in its achievement. Hegel writes in the 
Phenomenology: "Work . . .  is desire held in check,
fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and 
shapes the thing. The negative relation to the object 
becomes its form and something permanent. because it is 
precisely for the worker that the object has 
independence.”63 The object has independence because it 
belongs to the master, and the master is an essential, 
recognised human consciousness. And desire held in check,
or 1 delayed gratification,1 is the engine of history the
return to consciousness of its self, manifested in the 
products of work. The self mediates itself through the 
objects of the apparently external world and the future.
The truth of objective freedom is that it lies outside 
man himself. Freedom belongs to him as a quality of the 
self, but this does not exhaust its nature: freedom must be 
within Being for man to be free. So, subjective freedom is 
the experience of the freedom of the will, but objective 
freedom is the experience of the freedom with Being 
expressing itself through one's will. Freedom is the term 
of mediation between man and world, each moment the subject 
of freedom to itself, and the object of freedom to the 
other. The self-in-the-world, and the world-through-the- 
self, constitute the human dimension of the dialectic, what 
Hegel calls the individual, that 'moment1 in whom and
63 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 118.
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through whom freedom appears. This appearance is history, 
which is the projection of the self through action, 
creation, and work, and the reflection to the self through 
knowledge and recognition. Projection and reflection are 
both what man does in the world, and what the world does 
through man. The real, other-directed nature of a human
act transcends the individual the wider context of
* world* is the community of similar selves and the 
continuity of human history: the consequences go beyond the 
act, and reflectively situate the actor in community and 
history. The knowledge of the self is real, then, because 
it is more than an empty reflection: it is a return-to-self 
through a wider context. Only in human community is the 
self truly human, truly an individual, both separate and 
belonging. Hegel makes it clear that man is only human 
through mutual recognition, through a realised community of 
his kind. In the Phenomenology. he writes: "For it is the 
nature of humanity to press onward to agreement with 
others; human nature only really exists in an achieved 
community of minds."64 To make Hegel's notion of freedom 
more concrete, it is necessary to examine the kind of 
person in whom and through whom it manifests itself. 
Hegel's idea of the self is expressed by the term 
individual. which is both an abstract moment of the 
dialectic, and a very real kind of person which Hegel 
considers to be both the truth of human nature, and an 
ideal to which history aspires.
64 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 43.
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Individuality
In the Philosophy of Right. Hegel gives the following 
definition of individuality: "Individuality is awareness of 
one's existence as a unit in sharp distinction from 
others."65 The unitary nature of the self is only apparent 
by its distinctiveness, so one's relation to others is 
essential to one's independence. One is independent only 
from other individuals.
"Individual" is a synthetic term for Hegel. In it are 
brought together the universal and singular character of 
the self. With regard to freedom, the political aspect of 
the dialectic, this universal character is 'expressive 
unity,' and this singular character is 'moral autonomy.' 
For Hegel, "everything that exists is a particular, which 
couples together the universal and the singular."66 A 
person is a 'particular' through the coupling of both his 
social or species nature, and his discrete or autonomous 
nature. The latter proceeds to the former, and then 
returns again; a single consciousness is at first alone, it 
then confronts other consciousnesses, and then returns to 
itself as self-consciousness, as an individual. The result 
is neither loss in the whole nor isolation in the self. 
For Hegel, the individual compares to its constituent 
universality and singularity, its communal and autonomous 
nature, as a self raised to self-consciousness, higher yet 
the same. The ascent to individuality is described thus:
65 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 208.
66 Hegel, Logic, pp. 39-40.
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By means of particularity the immediate [i.e., 
not defined in relation to something else] 
individual comes to lose its independence, and 
enters into an interconnection with something 
else. Man, as this man, is not this single man
alone: he stands beside other men and becomes one
in the crowd. Just by this means however he 
belongs to his universal [political community], 
and is consequently raised.67
Reflection, or the return to self through the universal,
makes apparent to the self that it is an individual, a self
among selves. Just as the word 'I1 means the discrete,
autonomous person, but says all personality, so in the same
way does the individual find in his self an element in
common with all other individuals. This, in political
terms, is the community or State, and in natural terms is
the species; a man is both this man and also an instance of
mankind. Hegel writes in the Logic: "Individuals are born
and perish: the species abides and recurs in them all: and
• • • • A 8its existence is only visible to reflection." The
species, mankind, meets the discrete self, a man, in a
middle term, which is individuality. In the rather
technical language of the dialectic, this is what Hegel
says in the Phenomenology. where he writes:
We have a syllogism in which one extreme is the
universal life as a universal or as genus, the
other extreme, however, being the same universal 
as a single individual. or as a universal 
individual? but the middle term [individuality] 
is composed of both: the first seems to fit
itself into it as a determinate universality or 
as species, the other, however, as individualitv 
proper or as a single individual [the autonomous 
self].69
67 Hegel, Logic, p. 240.
68 Hegel, Logic, p. 34.
69 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 177.
69
Hegel calls the 'single individual' or autonomous self a 
'universal' because the 'I,' as this 'I,' is merely any 
other 'I' until it is situated in a context, until it rises 
to individuality. A person is only an individual with 
respect to other individuals, only then does the particular 
emerge from these extreme moments of universality.
In the Philosophy of Right. Hegel is concerned not so 
much with individuality as the result of abstract 
dialectical determinations, as he is with it as a working 
dynamic within this framework. Here, his concern is with 
individuality as personality. or as moral will. 
Personality is essentially a tension between the extremes 
of the autonomous self and the universal community, or 
State. Hegel writes: "The will is the unity of both these 
moments. It is particularity reflected into itself and so 
brought back to universality, i.e. it is individuality."70 
A person's nature partakes of both these extremes: he is 
both an instantiation of species (the universal), and an 
autonomous unit (the singular). He is an individual 
through these other moments: apart from others, and
belonging to others. What he is, as this person, is known 
only through other persons, as the way he is both different 
and the same. In the Logic. Hegel writes: "A subject as 
Individual is coupled (concluded) with a Universal 
character by means of a (Particular) quality."71 A quality 
is a measure of character, and its value as a reference
70 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 23.
71 Hegel, Logic. p. 247.
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derives from other qualities: what it is not, and how it
is similar. A quality makes a person distinct the word
"distinct” itself implies its opposite: a thing is distinct 
from all that is not itself. This separation is not 
absolute, though, and so one's very differences allow one's 
participation in a unity. The unity of personality is 
common humanity. Though it appears contradictory, one can 
be unique only in a group of similar individuals.
Hegel does emphasise the communal nature of man, 
stressing the universal aspect of individuality over its 
autonomous aspect. But for him, universality is the origin 
of man's independence: through the universal, one's
individuality is made concrete. In the Logic. Hegel 
states: "The universal is the ground and foundation, the
root and substance of the individual."72 Thus, man's 
humanity, his nature in general, is not something he has 
over and above his particular qualities. Rather, these 
qualities derive solely his universal character. It is 
this that makes these qualities meaningful references, and 
not empty, unconnected states of being. Reflection, or the 
rising to consciousness of Reason, gives the knowledge that 
one's very identity is tied inextricably with that of other 
individuals: one is what one is in particular only through 
what one is in general. Through Hegel's communitarianism, 
the self comes to be seen as a situated self, and this is 
the real meaning of individuality. The emphasis on the 
universal is essential to this understanding. Again in
72 Hegel, Logic, p. 240.
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the Logic. Hegel writes:
The individual man is what he is in particular, 
only in so far as he is before all things a man 
as man and in general. And that generality is 
not something external to, or something in 
addition to, other abstract qualities, or to mere 
features discovered by reflection. It is what 
permeates and includes in it everything 
particular.73
The Dialectic
Reason, mastery and slavery, freedom, and individual­
ity are tied together by the way in which they appear and 
the way in which they are known: this is the dialectic.
The dialectic sustains the whole of Hegel's philosophy; it
is the substance or inner working of each of his concepts, 
the connectedness between aspects of his philosophy, and it 
is also the manner of the understanding of these things. 
The dialectic is the motive force within things, it is the 
life, the 'Spirit' within Being. Hegel writes in the 
Logic: "Wherever there is movement, wherever there is life, 
wherever anything is carried into effect in the actual 
world, there Dialectic is at work."74 Without movement,
Being is pure or 'mere' Being it has no negation, no
becoming, no constituents other than a monolithic oneness. 
Dialectic describes the distancing within Being, both 
spatially as subject and object and temporally as history, 
which raises it to the level of Spirit, to Being-with-life. 
Hegel writes in the Logic: "In its true and proper
character, Dialectic is the very nature and essence of
73 Hegel, Logic. p. 240.
74 Hegel, Logib. p. 116.
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everything predicated by mere understanding the law of
things and of the finite as a whole."75 ’Mere understand­
ing1 is man's one-sided appropriation of the substance of 
Reason, his own apprehension of the dialectic. The 'true 
and proper character' of the dialectic includes the wider 
consideration of the dialectic as objective structure.
The dialectic is both a movement in thought and a 
movement in 'reality,' or 'the world.' The movement in 
thought is a change in perspective, altering the focus of 
thought for the sake of understanding. The movement in the 
world is the progress of history, where the in posse of 
thought is made the in esse of reality. The world is a 
unity, a whole-composed-of-parts, thus allowing variegation 
of perspective between thinking and acting subjects and the 
objective horizons of life. The dialectic separates and 
brings together? the concrete result is, as Nietzsche will 
observe, something higher yet the same: nothing other than 
what was there before, but now something in particular, 
something brought home to consciousness. Hegel writes in 
the Logic: "To mediate is to take something as a beginning 
and to go onward to a second thing? so that the existence 
of this second thing depends on our having reached it from 
something else contra-distinguished from it."76 These 
shifting perspectives change not only the thing observed, 
but also the observer himself, because a perspective is 
wholly dependent on both its moments, having a quasi­
75 Hegel, Logic, p. 116.
76 Hegel, Logic, p. 17.
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existence only between them both. An observer is no more 
the 'cause1 of his perspective than is that which he 
observes. Understanding shifts between the apparently 
opposite moments of mediation, taking each subject-moment 
to be the 'cause' only as a distortion for the sake of 
perspective. In this way, the dialectic teaches a higher 
truth to Reason. The result of following the dialectic, as 
Hegel writes, is that "the relation of the two things is 
reversed; and what came as a consequence being shown to be 
an antecedent, the original antecedent is reduced to a 
consequence. This is always the way, moreover, whenever 
reason demonstrates."77 The end of an action not just its 
result, but actually its 'cause' as the principle which 
guided it in the first place. Hegelian circularity finds 
the origin of a desire in its satisfaction, but at first 
present only negatively, as the lack of the condition of 
satisfaction within the desiring subject.
For Hegel, the realm of thought is not divorced from 
the realm of action, where Being is Becoming, which is the 
realm of the dialectic. In fact, thought is the very 
structure of reality, and so the dialectic of thought 
follows the dialectic of reality. Thought is abstract 
because it is coincidentally removed from and essential to 
the object. The dialectic is at work in this two-fold 
nature of thought. Hegel explores this theme in the Logic, 
where he writes: "To see that thought in its very nature
77 Hegel, Logic, p. 58.
is dialectical, and that, as understanding, it must fall
into contradiction the negative of itself will form one
of the main lessons of logic.”78 Contradiction is necessary 
to stir thought from the lethargy of its fixed 
determinations. For Hegel, thought is in motion towards an 
ever more complete appropriation of the Idea. Spirit fully 
manifested is a living, comprehensible whole which is a 
unity. To hold conflicting ideas in mind at the same time, 
mediated by an overarching understanding of their essential 
unity, is the result of dialectical thinking. Thus, for 
Hegel, ”to know, or, in other words, to comprehend an 
object is equivalent to being conscious of it as a concrete 
unity of opposed determinations.”79 The dialectic of 
thought parallels that of the object: the tension of which 
the latter consists is made apparent to the former.
In the Phenomeno 1 oov and the Logic, Hegel asks his 
reader to follow the dialectic without *proving' this 
method. His reason is that 'the proof of the pudding is in 
the eating.' The text is ultimately self-referential, just 
like its subject-matter. The method of dialectic is as 
much a 'result' of world-history as this object is 
'categorised' by the method. In the Logic. Hegel writes:
"It thus appears that the method is not an extraneous form,
• 80 • •but the soul and notion of the content." If thinking
beings are a part of Being, and if that Being is
78 Hegel, Logic, p. 15.
79 Hegel, Logic, p. 78.
80 Hegel, Logic, p. 296.
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dialectical, then the proper form of thought is dialectic. 
By this congruence, reason in mind appropriates the Reason 
in Mind; Understanding rises to wisdom, and consciousness 
rises to Self-Consciousness. As Alexandre Kojeve observes 
in his commentary on Hegel, "there is a dialectic of 
* scientific1 thought only because there is a dialectic of 
the Being which that thought reveals.”81
Thinking and Being meet in the movement of Being: its 
becoming, its history, and for man, his experience. 
Thought moves dialectically and changes the world? the 
world moves dialectically and changes thought. The unity 
of both is Spirit, Reason, or the Idea worked out 
completely. In the Phenomenology. Hegel writes: "Inasmuch 
as the new true object issues from it. this dialectical 
movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which
affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely
• • 82 •what is called experience." Experience teaches the lesson
of the dialectic: that the subject finds its essence in its 
object? that the self finds its identity in others. Thus, 
the thinking person, the consciousness rising to self- 
consciousness, casts off the seeming nature of existence 
for an awareness of his true situation. The mask removed 
is the appearance that the object is either unessential or 
that it is everything, or that the self fits these 
extremes. The dialectic moves between these oppositions in 
appearance, which is experienced by many as history.
81 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 172.
82 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 55.
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The goal, for Hegel, is where thought and reality coincide: 
"In pressing forward to its true existence, consciousness 
will arrive at a point at which it gets rid of its 
semblance of being burdened with something alien, with what 
is only for it, and some sort of ‘other1 at a point where 
appearance becomes identical with essence.*'83
Dialectical determinations in thought match these 
determinations in action stage by stage, so that it is 
impossible to say that one sphere has primacy over the 
other. But Hegel does emphasise thought over action, 
because he argues that 'thought rules the world,' that 
Reason is Mind, and so the 'actual world' is nothing but 
concrete determinations of thought. And indeed, without 
thought the world does not exist as such. It would have no 
nature, for qualities are only given to thinking. Hegel is 
an unapologetic idealist? in the Logic, he writes: "Thought 
and thought alone has eyes for the essence, substance, 
universal power, and ultimate design of the world."84 Man's 
Understanding allows him to gain this perception, and 
Reason in history allows Spirit to introduce this 
perception in and through man. There is nothing not given 
to thought: the dialectic is Becoming, which Hegel writes 
is the unity of Being and Nothing?85 beyond this thinking 
cannot go. Thinking takes on the confidence of this 
universal power when it exhausts all possibility, when the
83 Hegel, Phenomenology. pp. 56-57.
84 Hegel, Logic, p. 81.
85 Hegel, Logic, p. 128.
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barriers of seeming are overcome, but not eliminated,
through the exercise of reason and the experience of
history. In the Phenomenology. Hegel writes:
Action alters nothing and opposes nothing. It is 
the pure form of a transition from a state of not 
being seen to one of being seen, and the content 
which is brought out into the daylight and 
displayed, is nothing else but what this action 
already is in itself. It is implicit: this is 
its form as a unity in thought; and it is
actual  this is its form as an existent
unity.86
What is important here is the movement from 'not being 
seen* to 'being seen,' and this, precisely, is the 
dialectic of thought. Action alters nothing because 
nothing is added: Being is self-identical regardless of
history. Within Being, though, action introduces
mediation: the monolithic whole becomes a whole composed of 
parts. This introduction of relation is the dialectic. 
In itself, it is nothing; but its 'working out' within 
Being makes the implicit explicit, and the seeming actual.
The resolution of the dialectic is, for man, an over­
coming of the alienation of the object: in his case, other 
human beings and the world. Man's experience, the movement 
of the dialectic in his thoughts and in his acts, is a 
recovery of self, a situated self, a self understood as a 
definite relation to other selves and the world. To become 
self-conscious is to become at home in the world. Hegel 
writes in the Logic: "The aim of knowledge is to divest the 
objective world that stands opposed to us of its 
strangeness, and, as the phrase is, to find ourselves at
86 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 237.
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home in it: which means no more than to trace the objective
world back to the notion to our innermost self."87 The
world as the object of our inquiry, which we thought was 
remote, turns out to be essential to ourselves. This 
revelation raises our thinking from being a technique 
applied to reality, to being its very structure or logos. 
This is what it means to be * at home.*
The dialectic is the irresistible power of movement at 
work in a living world. Thought is dialectical because it 
is the faculty of a living being at work in this dynamic. 
It is also the structure of the living whole of Being, 
which is Spirit. The universal is also a subject, the 
whole is an agent, contradicting the hubris of modern
subjectivity. Thought elevates humanity to the level of 
individuality situated in substantial community, which 
transcends its mortality by partaking of, and not just 
making, a living world. Because, as Hegel writes, ”all
things, we say that is, the finite world as such are
doomed; and in saying so, we have a vision of Dialectic as
the universal and irresistible power before which nothing
• • 88 can stay, however secure and stable it may deem itself.”
Each moment of the dialectic is an end. An end is both a
conclusion, and so the origin and meaning of an action, and
a termination, the loss of the experience of acting
authentically in precisely the same way as before.
87 Hegel, Logic, p. 261.
88 Hegel, Logic, p. 118.
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Chapter Two 
The End of History
80
The Sage
In this discussion of what history is for Hegel, the 
end of history has always been within sight. The end of 
history is not simply the termination, but the meaning of 
history: what its constituent events are for. History is 
meaningful only in light of its end. So, if history is the 
development of freedom, or liberation, then the end of 
history must be the regime of actual freedom. If history 
is the awakening of self-consciousness, then the end of 
history must be where human being is fully self-conscious. 
That Being which becomes through history is the True-as- 
Subject, or Spirit, or Reason. The end of history is where 
this universal concept has become. or is actual, and 
therefore has lost its 1potential1 or 'not-yet-realised' 
nature. History is the transformation of pure (unmediated) 
Being to Being-in-and-for-itself. At the end of history, 
what there is exists as a true outward-seeming, and a true 
reflecting-back. Hegel, in the Logic, calls this great 
synthesis the Idea: "The Idea is truth in itself and for 
itself— the absolute unity of the notion and objectivity."1 
In others words, pure Being, or what-there-is implicitly, 
is united with its object, which is itself. This unity is 
Being made explicit, made 'in and for itself.' History is 
the mediating process, through which this dialectical 
movement occurs.
Inextricably bound up with history is the way in which 
it is known. This is because man does history in two ways.
1 Hegel, Logic  ^ p. 274.
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First, he is the agent within history, the subject who 
acts. Second, he is the philosopher reflecting upon 
history, the subject who thinks and speaks. Hegel does not 
oppose the knower and the known, rather, he distances them 
so that in mediating the gap the truth of consciousness 
emerges. His philosophical stance avoids the perversion of 
perspective afforded by pure objectivity, or radical 
subjectivity. The merit of having a dialectical philosophy 
to elucidate a history which itself is dialectical is 
obvious. Barry Cooper writes: "A philosophy of the
concrete was a repudiation of abstract thought 
(philosophical form without concrete content) on the one 
hand, and common sense (concrete content without 
philosophical form) on the other.”2 And so, in Hegel's 
philosophy, particularly the Phenomenology. we follow a 
story told from two perspectives. First, there is the 
knower, which is the standpoint of Hegel, or his reader, or 
the 'Sage, ' who knows the end of the story, and so can 
place each event in its proper context, in light of its 
end. Second, there is the known, which is human being 
within its world, within the context of historical action. 
Because man within history is immersed in dialectically 
incomplete 'moments' of the whole, or Spirit, his 
perspective is a defective vision of his place in the 
larger story. The phenomenological observer looks at the
whole at what Being is, and what Being does 
objectively, and this is Being for itself: a distanced
2 Cooper, End of History, p. 105.
perspective. The historical actor looks at the whole from 
within, from the perspective of active engagement. This 
involvement is the subjective moment of the historical 
dialectic, which is Being in itself. It would be incorrect 
to say that the truth lies in either perspective. Only the 
whole is the True, and it is a unity achieved by the inter­
action, or dynamic mediation, of these two perspectives. 
The culmination of this interaction is the end of history.
Hegel does not just ask what the True is, but also how
it could come to be that he knows what this is. His
account must account for itself. Both knower and known,
subject and object, are essential to wisdom. Hegel shifts
the locus of truth from the object, to the space between
subjects and objects herein lies his advance over
previous philosophy: "All pre-Hegelian philosophy
exclusively identified the True with Substance, the
unchanging object of discourse, while forgetting that the
subject who articulated the discourse was equally
primordial."3 In the Logic. Hegel dismisses pure
objectivity as the realm of truth as follows:
The Thing-in-itself (and under 'thing* is 
embraced even Mind and God) expresses the object 
when we leave out of sight all that consciousness 
makes of it, all its emotional aspects, and all 
specific thoughts of it. It is easy to see what
is left  utter abstraction, total emptiness,
only described still as an 'other-world' the
negative of every image, feeling, and definite 
thought.4
In other words, pure objectivity is nihilism. This idea,
3 Cooper, End of History, p. 53.
4 Hegel, Logic, p. 72.
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and that of the 1 other world,* will be returned to in the 
discussion of Nietzsche. For now, it is essential to 
recognise the importance for Hegel of the subject to truth. 
That subject is the philosopher, and ultimately the Sage. 
The connection Hegel makes between wisdom and Spirit is a 
logical progression of the connection Hegel makes between 
the dialectic and history. Both are connections between 
subject and object, both are perspectives. For Hegel, 
reality and thinking about reality are separate and 
connected, and to bridge the gap between them is the goal 
or end of history: to achieve wisdom. Wisdom is related to 
philosophy as Reason is related to the understanding: 
Wisdom appropriates Reason, the completed whole of Being- 
having-become, while philosophy articulates that becoming, 
as the involvement through speech within history.
It will be recalled that "Reason” describes both 
thought and reality? it is the logos of Being. Hans-Georg 
Gadamer brings out this confluence when he writes: "Reason 
is not only in thought. Hegel defines reason as the unity 
of thought and reality. Thus, implied in the concept of 
reason is that reality is not the other of thought and, 
hence that the opposition of appearance and understanding 
is not a valid one."5 The word and the thing to which it 
applies only seem to be opposed to that consciousness which 
is within history, but not to completed self-consciousness. 
In fact, apart from its articulation, apart, as Hegel
5 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic: Five
Hermeneutical Studies. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1976). p. 56.
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says, from one’s ’image, feeling, and definite thought* 
about it, the thing has no reality. So one cannot give 
primacy to the 'thing-in-itself.' The perspective of 
wisdom, that of the Sage, says, according to Gadamer, that 
"ontologically, the difference between idea and appearance 
is as invalid as that between the understanding and what it 
explains."6 Phenomenology, then, does history in both its 
senses: as a philosophical method it thinks through events 
(the in-itself) and it thinks about events (the for- 
itself). Experience is both the act and its recollection, 
and both these things follow a dialectical movement. But 
here a problem arises. If one is truly immersed in 
history, in process, then one can never rise above the 
immediacy of events. One's thinking would always be 
historicist: conditioned by one's times. The only way the 
philosopher can put an historical moment in perspective, to 
fit it into a pattern, into a context, is for him to know 
the whole. To talk about the importance of an historical 
'moment,1 which is a level of consciousness, one must 
stand, not outside, but 'above' that moment, in a wider, 
more self-conscious framework. This more all-embracing 
moment is always the next epoch of history. To talk about 
the whole historical movement, one must in a similar way, 
stand beyond the whole of history, and this is the 
perspective of the end of history. There can be no such 
thing as an observer who is completely outside history,
6 Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic. p. 56.
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though, no witness who is utterly autonomous of the act. 
The end of history is a beyond within time, not an outside 
of time. This 'beyond-within-time* is both 'having
experienced' as well as 'having thought through' action
and thinking do not cease, but they do complete their 
essential movement, which is total self-manifestation, or 
making all possibilities actual. If one cannot see the 
whole from 'outside, ' one can gain the perspective of 
beyond-within-time by experiencing the whole from within, 
by running the course of the dialectic in thought, 
recollecting the action of history to oneself. The 
holistic standpoint is made concrete, it is given content, 
by history, by action-in-time. It is not an empty 
idealisation, but a realised ideal. For Hegel, the person 
who does this is the Sage. The Sage is the philosopher who 
has become wise, who lives at the end of history; the one 
for whom each successive moment of history has appeared.
The Sage is the philosopher who has appropriated the 
object of philosophy, who has ceased to approach wisdom, 
and who has achieved it. To articulate the end of 
philosophy in wisdom is Hegel's goal in the Phenomenology; 
"To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to 
the goal where it can lay aside the title 'love of knowing'
and be actual knowing that is what I have set myself to
do."7 This is in fact a dilemma about history, that its 
meaning is its end. To know the meaning within history, 
the end of that process must be present to one. This puts
7 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 3.
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one beyond the possibility of involvement. Barry Cooper 
writes: "Historical existence is a problem, a dilemma, a
predicament. On the one hand one must act 'in' history, 
but on the other one must rise above the stream of events 
in order to understand the sense and direction of one • s 
action."8 Wisdom is hindsight: one knows what history was 
for. Comprehension is the result of experience: only when 
all possibilities are realised is understanding complete. 
The realisation of all possibilities does not end all 
experiences as such, but it does signal the end of all new 
experiences. The word "new" is used here in its most 
radical sense: as meaning 'unique,' 'unprecedented,' a
substantial addition to a life being led. The kind of 
experiences which are possible at the end of history are 
novel ones, rather than new. Novel experiences are merely 
different configurations of already present things. It 
must be pointed out that this radical sense of "new" is one
of seeming, or appearance something is new for man in his
developing self-consciousness. For Spirit, the dialectic 
is the configuration of what was already present in the 
Idea, immediately, or potentially. Hegel writes in the 
Logic that "in its beginning the thing is not yet, but it 
is more than merely nothing, for its Being is already in 
the beginning."9 For man, though, limited by perspective 
and temporality, this distinction between "new" and "novel" 
is very important, because it illuminates the way in which
8 Cooper, End of History, p. 46.
9 Hegel, Logic, p. 130.
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the end of history is unlike history itself, how post- 
historical action is not action in the strong sense, but 
mere activity.
The distance necessary to make sense of the whole of 
one's actions unfortunately puts one entirely out of the 
sphere where that action is possible. But one thereby 
replaces the seeming truth of an enclosed mode of historic- 
ist thinking with the revealed truth of hindsight: one
knows what one's actions meant. Thus, Hegel's claims about 
history are not subject to the attack that he himself was 
immersed in history, with his truths as changeable as the 
process of which he was a part. Cooper writes: "Hegel's 
answer [to historicism; to the claim that truth changes 
with the world], restated most emphatically by Kojeve, was 
that the philosopher can understand history only if history 
is over, if all historical human possibilities have been 
achieved, and all interpretive discourse has been 
completed. "10
The end of history argument is essential to Hegel 
because he wants to maintain coincidentally the 
propositions that history is an exhaustive whole and that 
the True is revealed in and by it. He forecloses the 
possibility of claiming that the True underlies history, 
and is gradually revealed by experience and knowledge, or 
that the True imposes its nature upon otherwise formless 
Being. Therefore, Hegel posits the end of history as a 
beyond within life. This is the 'destination reached' of
10 Cooper, End of^History, p. 49.
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the dialectic, one which is 'metaphysical* in appearance, 
yet nothing but mediated reflection in actuality.
The end of history is within the temporal realm inhab­
ited by human being, within the same context as history. 
But man's experience of time at the end of history is of 
changelessness: the end of history has the same character 
as eternity. If all possibilities are made actual, then 
nothing can be truly added, no new thing can be introduced 
which will alter the character of experience. For Hegel, 
the end of history marks the coming together of the 
eternal, transcendent realm and the temporal, immanent
realm. Time at the end of history is the post-historical 
epoch: like any period in history, it is defined by what 
has gone before, but the post-historical epoch looks back 
to a completed whole, to a metaphysical journey ended.
The post-historical epoch is still a temporal one, and 
still a human one. It is temporal because there are
changes in states of Being from moment to moment, there are 
varying experiences. But these experiences may be
described as novel, rather than new, being the consequence 
of mere activity, rather than creative action. The on­
going dialectic is sustained by the persistence of natural
desires? strictly human desires, on the other hand the
desire for the non-natural object, the recognition of
another, or prestige no longer give rise to new moments
of history, as their realisation is at hand. The
temporality of the end of history consists of shifts in 
perspectives within realised Being; these changes do not
X
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involve a wider perspective, though, as the widest possible
perspective that of Spirit, or everything-there-is-as-
subject has been reached.
The post-historical epoch is a human one, because 
freedom is present to man in it: he continues to make
himself what he is, but now in the widest, most radical 
way. But no manifestation of freedom in this epoch can 
change the realised potential of freedom: no new state of 
affairs can be brought to be such that the freedom man now 
enjoys is diminished? one cannot leave behind one's 
experience, one's remembrance of things past. The exercise 
of freedom is no longer liberation, but the manipulation of 
perspective, the wilful placing of the self into a context. 
The consequences of such activity may be novel in 
themselves, but they add nothing to the possibilities of 
freedom. The Sage is the type of humanity who embodies 
this post-historical epoch, in whose faculty of reason is 
incarnate the nature of Reason.
What is made complete by the end of history is the 
whole of man and world, action and thought, history and 
Spirit, all made manifest in a unity, one which is mediated 
and therefore differentiated. And because this whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts, because there is a 
universal perspective which transcends any particular 
perspective (but not in the dualist manner), the moment of 
realisation and completion is eternal, whilst each moment 
in history was as fleeting as the human lives engages in 
struggle and labour within them. Barry Cooper comments:
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The moment of completion was a moment for which 
there was no future ? anything that happened 
'later' would simply repeat what had already been 
said. Absolute knowledge was, then, eternal. Or
better, it was eternity. Yet it had been 
engendered by or 'in' time.11
Hegel writes in the Logic: "The history of philosophy, in
its true meaning, deals not with a past, but with an
eternal and veritable present: and, in its results,
resembles not a museum of the aberrations of the human
intellect, but a Pantheon of godlike figures."12 Each of
the moments of history is recollected by philosophy, and
made present in one, universal moment,, which is the end of
history.
If history, the progressive chain of action is ended, 
then so too is history, the comprehension of action, ended. 
The first kind of history is ended because there is nothing 
left to do, because everything has been done or the 
potential of its realisation is actual or made present to 
consciousness. The second kind of history is ended because 
there is nothing left to know, because everything is known 
or at least graspable by means of fully realised Reason. 
Man can no longer become free if he is free, and he can no 
longer seek wisdom if he has found it. A free man cannot 
do anything genuinely new, just as a wise man cannot truly 
learn anything he already knows. Cooper writes: "The end 
of history, then, is also the end of philosophy: wisdom has 
been actualized."13 The end of history is not merely the
11 Cooper, End of History, p. 234.
12 Hegel, Logic. p. 126.
13 Cooper, End of History, p. 49.
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completed whole of action, but also the completed whole of 
speech and thought. Wisdom is the complete discourse, the 
dialectic in speech, and to give a fully rational account 
is the goal of philosophy. As Hegel says in the Preface to 
the Phenomenology. philosophy must give up its love of 
wisdom in order to become actual wisdom. The philosopher 
is the one who becomes wise, while the Sage is wise. The 
story which the Sage is able to tell is the true one 
because it is the completed one. Therefore, the Sage lives 
at the end of history, where no deeds can add to the tale 
being told, nor any words embellish the account conveyed: 
"If the description is indeed exhaustive, nothing can 
possibly be added, and it is •eternal.1”14
One can see what Hegel means when he says that the 
philosophy of history is the history of philosophy. To 
understand history is to undergo in oneself the successive 
comprehensions of history which came about in that history. 
Each successive account marked the denouement of its 
historical moment. Hegel writes in the Philosophy of 
Right: ”As the thought of the world, it [philosophy]
appears only when actuality is already there cut and dried 
after its process of formation has been completed.”15 So 
the end of history is marked by the end of thought-of-the- 
world, by the all-inclusive account. This completed speech 
encompasses or supersedes all previous accounts, just as 
each moment of history, or experience, was a wider one
14 Cooper, End of History, p. 68.
15 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, pp. 12-13.
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than the one previous. If the succession of historical 
accounts is philosophy, then the end of history account is 
wisdom: speech articulated by the Sage. Cooper writes:
"Wisdom, in other words, was a singular discourse that 
included all historical philosophies as its own elements 
and co-ordinated them as the total revelation of Being.”16
The Universal and Homogeneous State
The regime of actual freedom is the end of history 
from the perspective of action, just as wisdom is the end 
of history from the perspective of speech and thought. 
This is the political face of reason when it has fully 
revealed itself within Being. The condition of man where 
he is free is, in Hegelian terms, the rational political 
order: the State. In Reason in History. Hegel writes: "The 
state is the more specific object of world history in 
general, in which freedom attains its objectivity and 
enjoys the fruits of this objectivity."17 He means much 
more than just the institutional state; Hegel means also 
the spiritual nation whose condition is ethical life, which 
is freedom and mutual recognition existing within a unified 
and rational whole. "State" describes the living reality 
of free individuals: this is the particular consciousness 
from the vantage point of universality, or a person in 
community. Alexandre Kojeve, in order to convey this 
meaning of "State," gives the term more substance by
16 Cooper, End of History, p. 218.
17 Hegel, Reason in History, p. 97.
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describing the regime of actual freedom as the "universal 
and homogeneous State.” This, for Hegel, is the true 
political order, which is to say that it is the end to
which political action the manifestation of liberation
 within history was directed. Spirit, as subject, 'uses'
man to rise to this objective state "state" meant both
politically and existentially. Cooper writes: "The goal to 
be actually attained by Spirit, which cunningly used the 
World-historical Individuals for its own rational purposes, 
was the State and, eventually, the universal and 
homogeneous State."18
Hegel gives the clearest definition of the State in 
the Philosophy of Right. "State" describes free
individuality from the objective point of view. Hegel 
writes: "Since the state is mind [Spirit] objectified, it 
is only as one of its members that the individual himself 
has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical 
life."19 An ethical life is the enjoyment of genuine
recognition one is a person through others, hence the
necessity of community to self-consciousness. For Hegel 
ethical life, or ethical substance, "as containing 
independent self-consciousness united with its concept, is 
the actual mind of a family and a nation."20 In an addition 
to the section of the Philosophy of Right on the State as 
the objective realm of Spirit, Hegel writes: "The state in 
and by itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of
18 Cooper, End of History, p. 108.
19 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 156.
20 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 110.
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freedom? and it is an absolute end of reason that freedom 
should be actual. The state is mind on earth and 
consciously realizing itself there.”21 So individuality is 
commensurate with citizenship in the state, to belonging to 
the regime of actual freedom. The end of reason is the 
actualisation of freedom, which is the State.
Hegel makes clear that the State is universal, and he 
means both that it fits the aspect of universality within 
the dialectic, and also that it is ubiquitous and all- 
embracing. In the Philosophy of Right he writes: "The
state is universal in form, a form whose essential 
principle is thought.”22 The ‘thought1 which guides the 
State is the 'mind of the nation1: the universal aspect of 
self-consciousness, or, quite simply, a culture. To be a 
citizen of the State is to participate in a unity. The 
citizen is individual. a discrete consciousness, only by 
its involvement with other, similar consciousnesses. By 
this means, the individual is self-conscious. The State is 
'above and beyond' the autonomous person, but nothing other 
than the universal aspect of all persons en masse. Hegel 
writes that "Mind [Spirit] is the nature of human beings en 
masse and their nature is therefore twofold: (i) at one
extreme, explicit individuality of consciousness and will, 
and (ii) at the other extreme, universality which knows and 
wills what is substantive."23 The State is this second
3Fl Hegel. Philosophy of Right, p. 279.
22 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 172.
23 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 163.
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extreme. It is the effect of the willing of discrete 
individuals, but, more than this, it is an affect: a
subject which embodies the universal aspect of their 
natures. Hegel writes: "The state, as the mind of a
nation, is both the law permeating all relationships within 
the state and also at the same time the manners and 
consciousness of its citizens."
The State at the end of history is universal because 
the aspect of transcendence and eternity has been brought 
home to man by history. What was taken to be essentially 
other is, by the end of history, known to belong to 
humanity, as an aspect of itself within Being. Transcend­
ence is not, ultimately, a reference to another realm, but 
mediation within the whole of reality; it is not merely an 
abstract beyond, nor is it an indistinguishable identity. 
Eternity is endurance: it is fame and prestige which lasts 
beyond mortality. Universality is an aspect of humanity: 
it is its wider context. It is beyond the individual self, 
yet it is nothing other than the cumulative projections of 
the whole of selves. Kojeve justifies calling the Hegelian 
State universal thus: "The transcendent Universal (God),
who recognizes the Particular, must be replaced by a
Universal that is immanent in the World. And for Hegel
this immanent for Hegel this immanent Universal can only be 
the State."25
Hegel describes this 1meeting of realms' in the
24 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, pp. 178-179.
25 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 67.
conclusion to the Philosophy of Right. The aspects of
transcendence and immanence within Being the distancing
and the involvement there is in everything, and every
thought of a thing come together in the end of history.
The free individual, the citizen, is the human dimension of
this dialectical confluence. The State is the immanent,
human, and historical moment 'rising up' to truth, which
is, and must be, universal. Hegel writes:
These two realms stand distinguished from one 
another though at the same time they are rooted 
in a single unity and Idea. Here their 
distinction is intensified to absolute opposition 
and a stern struggle ensues in the course of 
which the realm of mind lowers the place of its 
heaven to an earthly here and now, to a common 
worldliness of fact and idea. The mundane realm, 
on the other hand, builds up its abstract 
independence into thought and the principle of 
rational being and knowing, i.e. into the 
rationality of right and law. In this way their
opposition implicitly loses its marrow and
disappears.26
The 'stern struggle' of which Hegel speaks is the 
dialectic? the opposition 'losing its marrow and 
disappearing1 is the resolution of this dialectic. This is 
the homogeneity of the State: not a collapse into sameness 
or monolithic oneness, but certainly the loss of struggle, 
the loss of action in the strong sense. Tensions persist, 
but they are now comprehended within a unifying framework 
 the universal State must be a homogeneous State.
The state at the end of history is homogenous because 
it is a condition of mutual recognition. The desire for
the desire of another can only be fully satisfied when it
26 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 222.
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is met by all individuals. Only the State, as the living 
embodiment of the whole of free individuality, can meet 
this need: "Man can be satisfied only by being universally 
recognized.1127 In history, the aspect of universality from 
which man sought this recognition was the transcendent, 
eternal realm: from 'true' Being. It would not be
facetious to say that man wanted to be recognised by God. 
By the end of history, though, man goes about satisfying 
his desire to be recognised universally by making immanent 
his object. Instead of God, man embodies the State with 
universality: it is the 'beyond* of humanity, entirely of 
individuals, yet transcending the life of each individual. 
Kojeve writes: "Man can be truly 'satisfied,' History can
end, only in and by the formation of a Society, of a State, 
in which the strictly particular, personal, individual 
value of each is recognized as such, in its very
particularity, by all. by Universality incarnated in the
28State as such." Homogeneity is essential to the State 
for freedom to be actual and for recognition to be genuine 
(i.e., to be from similarly free individuals). This state 
is Being at the end of history, the reality of what was 
experienced and known as the manifestation of reason in man 
and in the world. As Kojeve writes, the universal and 
homogeneous State is the substance of the Sage's knowledge, 
the reality that corresponds to his words: "Given that the
Wise Man's knowledge reveals nothing other than Man in the
27 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. p. 80.
28 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 58.
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World, the reality that transforms this total and circular 
knowledge into truth is the universal and homogeneous State 
('homogeneous* here means free from internal contra­
dictions: from class strife, and so on)1,29
Hegel makes it clear that the overcoming of contra­
dictions is the resolution of the dialectic, and thus the 
'homogeneity' of the State. An example in the Philosophy 
of Right is given in Hegel's note to the text discussing 
the refusal of certain religious sects to perform duties to 
the State. It is clear that such anomalies are tolerated
rather than accepted the rational principles which guide
the State, because they are universal truths, require that 
the State be not only over all (universal) , but also 
throughout (homogeneous). Hegel writes: "Only if the state 
is otherwise strong can it overlook and suffer such 
anomalies, because it can then rely principally on the 
strength of custom and the inner rationality of its 
institutions to diminish and close the gap between the 
existence of anomalies and the full assertion of its own 
strict rights."30 'Closing the gap' is the resolution of 
the dialectic: the end of history. Homogeneity means pure 
mediation: no truly external element enters into the
relation between the two things. Apparent or seeming 
contradictions persist, but now comprehended in a unity.
The resolution of dialectical tension was present in 
the opposite moments all along, but it was implicit. The
29 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 90.
30 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, pp. 168-169.
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end of history means that the overcoming of opposition is 
anticipated through knowledge: the awareness that the
subject will find itself in the object, or that a person 
will be an individual in a community, precedes any act to 
put .such a state of affairs into effect. This framework of 
resolution will not change, no matter what concrete steps 
are taken within it. The end of history means the 
disappearance of strong actions which introduce new 
consequences: what persists is 'mere activity* and *novel 
experiences.* Man enjoys real freedom, freedom-in-context, 
by being 'wholly determined by the Idea, ' to return to a 
Hegelian phrase: this all-pervading embodiment of Reason 
is the State.
The State is universal because there can be no 
addition to it, because it is complete. The State is 
homogenous because there can be no change made to it, 
because it is fully rational, and therefore perfect with 
respect to the process (history) for which it is the end 
and meaning. Reason appears at the end of history in the 
person of the Sage and in the condition of the universal 
and homogeneous State: "The Wise Man must necessarily be
Citizen of the universal (i.e., nonexpandable) and 
homogeneous (i.e., nontransformable) State."31 It does not 
matter that this state does not exist, merely that it is 
not impossible in principle: "If we see that Hegel's system 
actually is circular, we must conclude in spite of 
appearances (and perhaps even in spite of common sense)
31 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 96.
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that History is completed and consequently that the State 
in which this system could be realized is the perfect 
State.1,32
The state in history was any political order; the 
State at the end of history is the rational political 
order. The beginning of the end of history was, according 
to Hegel, the French Revolution. It was the first attempt 
to construct a state based solely on rational principles. 
The French Revolution was not just different in degree from
previous political progress, it was different in kind a
difference which puts its influence outside the continuum 
of change, outside history: f,The significance of the French 
Revolution was greater than its empirical aftermath, 
Liberalism. Its World-historical significance lay in the 
establishment, in principle, of a rational political 
order. "33
That this political order has become, in principle, 
universal and homogeneous is shown by the obvious fact that 
"so far as the state itself is concerned, no one dares deny 
that the slogan of the French revolutionaries is the 
highest practical wisdom in public affairs."34 We are all 
revolutionaries for liberation of one sort or another: it 
is not practically possible to be other than modern in this 
respect. Whether one lives within the terms of reference 
of the universal and homogeneous State, or whether one
32 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. p. 98.
33 Cooper, End of History, p. 120.
34 Cooper, End of History, p. 285.
rebels against this fate, one cannot choose to live without 
this manifest reality. This is what living in the post- 
historical epoch is all about: "If we refuse to take refuge 
in the discourses of the past, if we refuse to pretend, for 
example, that we are polis-dwelling pagans or subjects of 
the sacrum imoerium. then we must come to understand the 
truth of our existence by way of our modernity."35 But if 
history was essentially the coming-to-be of the universal 
and homogenous State, the question remains of what this 
State is for. What do free men do, think, and talk about 
at the end of history?
The end of history is freedom and self-consciousness 
fully realised within humanity. Freedom, which is the goal 
of liberating action within history, is realised in the end 
of history as an actual condition. The beyond has returned 
to man; the transcendent is made immanent. Hegel writes: 
"In the Christian age, the divine spirit has come into the 
world and taken up its abode in the individual, who is now 
completely free and endowed with substantial freedom."36 
Freedom and self-consciousness meet in mutual recognition 
(i.e., in the condition of the universal and homogeneous 
State). To be self-conscious, the self must be objectively 
certain of itself and not just subjectively so. To achieve 
objective certainty, the self must be for another? it must 
be confirmed as an object in the eyes of another subject. 
For this to happen genuinely, all of history must take
35 Cooper, End of History, pp. 11-12.
36 Hegel, Reason in History, p. 131.
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place, for a regime of mutual recognition to come about. 
In order for the recognition of the self by the other to be 
genuine, that other must in turn be recognised by the self 
as human? and the recognition which is given by the other 
must be given freely. Genuine, fully-realised self- 
consciousness depends, therefore, on freedom.
History can be seen as a sequence of unsatisfying
recognitions either by non-human objects (Nature or God)
or by un-free objects (slaves). The human and free object 
is another self-consciousness like oneself, so the regime 
in which true recognition takes place is a community of 
self-consciousnesses, a regime of mutual recognition. 
Cooper writes: "Love, or recognition, could exist only
among or between equals. So long as History existed there 
was no equality but rather only various forms of 
inequality that resulted from struggle and labour. Until 
the advent of the universal and homogeneous State, 
therefore, there could be no mutual recognition or true 
love."37 Self-consciousness is not simply a particular, 
autonomous state of a human being. Real awareness of 'I* 
is an awareness of the world and all human beings. Human 
being is a social condition, so self-consciousness is a
unity of 'I1 and 1 other,1 of self and world, of man and
mankind: "Self-consciousness, then, if it is to exist in 
its proper form, implies mutual recognition, a regime that 
Kojeve identified as the universal and homogeneous State."38
37 Cooper, End of History, p. 189.
38 Cooper, End of History, p. 284.
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Furthermore, the universal and homogeneous State is 
the regime where wisdom is possible. This State is reason 
completely elaborated in human time, and wisdom is the 
completed discourse about reason, or about the state, or 
about history (all aspects of Being which converge at the 
end of history). Cooper quoted Hegel * s famous phrase from 
the Philosophy of Right to illustrate the nature history in 
its end: 1,1 The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with 
the falling of the dusk.1 Rational political principles of 
the state, Hegel's political wisdom, could be elaborated 
only with the end of history."39 The history of philosophy, 
whose end is wisdom, and the history of action, whose end 
is freedom, come together in the Sage, who is the fully 
self-conscious citizen of the universal and homogeneous 
State. Completed thought is actualised, and completed 
action is rationalised: "The historical, actual, worldly
reality that transformed the universal, total, and circular 
Knowledge of the Sage into a homogeneous truth, that is a 
truth revealed, in principle, to everybody, was the 
universal and homogeneous State, which came into existence 
at the end of history."40
Technology
The outstanding feature of the post-historical epoch,
the essence of the universal and homogeneous State, is
technology. Hegel describes the end of history as Being-
39 Cooper, End of history, p. 245.
40 Cooper, End of history, p. 215.
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in-and-for-itself, which is Being that is purely mediated. 
Mediation is the between of subjects and objects: it is the 
•across,1 the 'from-to,' the via, which is the real nature 
or ’substance* of meaning itself. Pure mediation is fully 
rational mediation. In the realm of activity, such pure 
mediation is means which are wholly efficient. Efficiency 
of means is the essence of technology. "Technology,11 in 
this broad sense, is descriptive of the kind of mediation 
that takes place at the end of history, the 'valuing* that 
is the nature of free and wise action. Technic is the 
activity of the understanding when the rational political 
activity of the understanding when the rational political 
order is made actual. Reason as an ideal becomes rational 
structure in reality through its appropriation by the 
understanding. The way in which it does so is through pure 
mediation, through means which are efficient, which inject 
no external substance into the terms of mediation.
Technology is not, essentially, a method which 
organises nature, just as dialectic is not a method which 
interprets reality. It is not behind the working of 
things, not logically prior to their actual relation. 
Technology is pure mediation, a relation of means and ends 
without distortion, without inefficiency. That it has been 
taken to be a guiding principle, an end in itself, is a 
result of nihilism: of the loss of ends which is the
practical effect of the end of history, as we shall see 
later.
Properly considered, technology is simply a means, and
x
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it is directed towards the achievement of certain ends by 
desires which are not strictly a part of its structure. 
Efficiency of means is pure mediation: Hegel's idea of the 
relatedness of parts within the realised whole of Being at 
the end of history. In the Philosophy of Right. Hegel 
writes: "The means is precisely that which is nothing in 
itself but is for the sake of something else, and therein,
i.e. in the end, has its purpose and worth provided of
course ti be truly a means."42 At the end of history, 
though, it is the nature of ends which has changed. No 
longer are ends unanticipated, not potentially realised in 
their very formulation. It still takes activity on the 
part of the desiring creature, man, to satisfy his desire,
but the structure of the means to that satisfaction--
technology is already in place, waiting to be applied.
The end is clearly anticipated in the origin, since the 
means add nothing unessential along the way. The means to 
the achievement of ends do not have to be devised by a 
creative act, all that is required is reaffirming activity: 
the application of technology. "Technology" is used here 
in the broadest sense of any system of means which are 
wholly efficient: the word gives content to Hegel's idea of 
pure mediation.
The end of history means the absence of ends in the 
strong sense, in the sense of an unanticipated result. 
However, the unprecedented nature of ends was merely their 
appearance to man involved in history. In fact, or at the
42 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 98.
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end of history, all ends are known to be implicit in their 
origin: this is the self-conscious reflection upon the
nature of goals. Ends at the end of history are now known 
to be aspects of activity occurring within a whole. Ends 
appear to be outside the whole, but the reflection of their 
satisfaction reveals that they are a beyond within the
whole. The result of this transition is that ends the
outer-directedness of human acts lose their compelling
power, and means assume new importance. Technology, then, 
becomes a quasi-end in itself: the 'how* overcomes the
•why* in the political agenda of the post-historical epoch. 
Hegel perceives this danger at the end of history, a result 
of the success of Reason and Science as a way of knowing. 
In the Logic. Hegel describes logical, rule-based 
descriptions of relation as 'mechanism,' or the 'mechanical 
mode of inquiry. ' In our parlance, we would call this 
technology: it is the absence of subjectivity, the absence 
of arbitrariness in an act, what Hegel describes as a man's 
behaviour when "his own mind and will are not in his 
actions, which in this way [by being mechanical] are 
extraneous to himself."43 Hegel does not reject this formal 
mechanism absolutely, but only when it exceeds its 
reasonable bounds. Technology succeeds when it is a means 
of organisation, when it is a way of marshalling resources 
in a purely efficient manner towards some extraneous end. 
Technology exceeds its rightful function when it ceases to 
be a wav, and becomes a destination, when the world is
43 Hegel, Logic.xp. 262.
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organised for the sake of efficiency, and not efficiently
organised for the sake of a human goal. Hegel writes: ”But
even in considering the formations in the world of Mind,
the mechanical theory has been repeatedly invested with an
authority which it has no right to.”44 Hegel*s conclusion
is stated as follows:
Thus decidedly must we reject the mechanical mode 
of inquiry when it comes forward and arrogates to 
itself the place of rational cognition in 
general, and seeks to get mechanism accepted as 
an absolute category. But we must not on that 
account forget expressly to vindicate for 
mechanism the right and import of a general 
logical category.45
Instead of subserving itself to extraneous desires, 
technology becomes a system for domination and control, 
because of the relative weakness of human ends in the post-
historical epoch. Technology itself recognises no ends--
these must be provided by the human subject who applies its 
organising principle. Where these ends are not given, the 
only practical limits to technology are natural ones. 
Technology does not do only that which it is incapable of
doing or not yet able to do. Only man can supply the
moral dimension to any form of mediation, and, at the end 
of history, the on-going dialectic is all that provides 
such directedness to technology: the continual presencing 
of the Idea. The historical dialectic, the coming-to-be of 
freedom, self-consciousness, etc., is ended in its 
realisation or satisfaction. The strong ends of progress
44 Hegel, Logic, p. 262.
45 Hegel, Logic, pp. 262-263.
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disappear with it. And so, the constraints of belonging 
to a process fall away, and all that is left are the 
not-very- limiting constraints of the logically and 
physically impossible. Barry Cooper writes: "Technical
man, in principle, is liberated from all natural 
constraints.1,46 To the extent that man allows himself to be 
determined by his means, by technology, constraints to his 
activity disappear. There is no 'given,' no standing limit 
to activity, which is recognised by technology, by pure 
mediation, as such. However, as we shall see, Reason may 
be directed by a pre-rational urge, such as the urge to 
truth, or to life.
The absence of limits is a manifestation of nihilism. 
It is not argued that limits disappear with the end of 
history. It is true, though, that limits are no longer 
perceived as constitutive of an external reality, as the 
'outside world' has been re-appropriated by realised 
Reason. And it is also true, that pure mediation of Being, 
in itself, recognises no limits. Only Being itself imposes 
limits on its mediation, or provides the bounds of 
possibility. It is when a means assumes more importance 
than its due that the problem of nihilism arises. Hegel 
writes in the Logic: "A thing is what it is, only in and by 
reason of its limit. We cannot therefore regard the limit 
as only external to being which is then and there. It 
rather goes through and through the whole of such
46 Cooper, End of History, p. 324.
existence."47 This is the conclusion reached by Spirit, by 
the universal perspective fully realised. The triumph of 
technic is a manifestation of the undue importance given to 
means, to the particular perspective within the dialectic. 
When the strong ends of the historical dialectic fall by 
the wayside, technology fills its place. It transforms 
nature into raw material: any impediment which arises in 
the consideration of nature as 1 input* for rationalised 
processing appears, then, simply as an inefficiency to be 
overcome, and not as a limiting, meaning-giving horizon to 
that activity. The * givens* of nature which used to 
condition our work upon it, and thereby condition 
ourselves, are no longer recognised. They are still there,
though, but our distorted perspective is blind to them--
this, in part, is felt as the crisis of modernity. A 
technological society is, according to Barry Cooper, one 
where "production and consumption are understood to result 
from the wilful imposition of rational form on otherwise 
formless and natural human being.*'48 But, as Hegel shows, 
'rational form' arises from the expression of the innermost 
nature of things, not placed upon things because they 
totally lack it. The ideology of technic is in fact a 
manifestation of nihilism because of its persistence in 
historically incomplete modes of thinking, such as the 
belief that mediation arises from the effect of an 
organising principle, imposed from without, upon given
47 Hegel, Logic, p. 136.
48 Cooper, End of History, p. 290.
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reality. This ignores the rootedness of means in a context 
which is an exhaustive whole: a whole which is unified by 
its 1 actualisation, 1 by its completed appearance, as it is, 
to itself.
The effect of the dominance of technology is that 
process overshadows result: "technology” describes both the 
structure and the activity of the universal and homogeneous 
State, and it is thoroughgoingly radical in its influence 
upon man and his world. Langdon Winner writes: "Absolutely 
fundamental is the view that modern technology is a way of 
organizing the world and that, potentially, there is no 
limit to the extent of this organization. In the end, 
literally everything within human reach can or will be 
rebuilt, resynthesized, reconstructed, and incorporated 
into the system of technical instrumentality."49 This can 
be said to be the case in spite of Hegel, for he does not 
assign to mechanism the position of paramountcy which it 
has actually attained in the post-historical epoch. Hegel 
writes in the Philosophy of Right: "The state is not a
mechanism but the rational life of self-conscious 
freedom."50 In other words, the state ought not to become 
merely an organisation for the satisfaction of needs, but, 
more than this, the structure of ethical life. That it has
not succeeded in this is a result of nihilism the result
of history which is coincidental with the greatest
49 Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-
Control as a Theme in Political Thought. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1977). p. 24.
50 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 170.
possible freedom and self-consciousness.
Now, at the end of history, man, being self-conscious, 
realises that he and his world are in fact a unity. So if 
technology transforms the world according to maximum 
efficiency, so too must it transform man in this way. 
Technic is no different in this respect than any other 
means of accomplishing desired ends within history: "human 
beings do make their world, but they are also made by it.”51 
But at the end of history, means other that rational ones 
are precluded: technology is the conditioning mediation. 
This is another aspect of the homogeneity of the post-
historical State. Mankind which is a realised whole at
the end of history is wholly rationalised by its
instrumentality, by technic. The universal and homogeneous 
State, this self-and-world embodying reason, is "a 
technological society where production and consumption are 
understood to result from the wilful imposition of rational 
form on otherwise formless natural and human being."52
Technology as an end, as a principle beyond its 
medium, nature, has no limits on what it can control, 
rationalise, or make efficient. Needless to say, a 
principle of efficiency works by eliminating the 
inefficient. To return to Hegelian terms, the end of 
history precludes historical moments because they are 
incomplete (i.e., not a full revelation of Reason within 
Being). The gain of manifest Reason seems to require the
51 Winner, Autonomous Technology, p. 88.
52 Cooper, End of history, p. 290.
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loss of the irrational. Technology succeeds because of its 
essence: efficiency produces results most closely
fulfilling those anticipated in the origin. But as an end, 
technology precludes results to which it could apply. It 
cannot overcome its nature as a means to project ends: 
reason cannot dictate what we ought to do, merely how we 
ought to do it.
Regardless of any other, non-rational merits, other 
aspects of human existence (i.e., historical ones) are 
eliminated or transformed to conform to technic. They 
become part of a system of inputs, processes, and outputs; 
effort, organisation, and results. Winner writes: "Science
succeeds over rival ways of knowing poetry, religion,
art, philosophy, the occult not by its ability to
illuminate, not even by its ability to organize knowledge, 
but by its ability to produce solid results."53 Science, or 
reason, is true because it works? technology is embraced 
because it produces results. The strongest affect, which 
produces the greatest effect, is taken to be the measure of 
value in the post-historical world of non-expanding truth. 
Hegel recognised the implicit nihilism of his time (which 
is our time: the end of history and the post-historical 
epoch) as the triumph of conviction over truth, of the 
feeling of power aroused by an idea over its rational 
completeness. Hegel writes in the Logic:
53 Winner, Autonomous Technology, p. 25.
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It marks the diseased state of the age when we 
see it adopt the despairing creed that our 
knowledge is only subjective, and that beyond 
this subjective we cannot go. Whereas, rightly 
understood, truth is objective, and ought so to 
regulate the conviction of everyone, that the 
conviction of the individual is stamped as wrong 
when it does not agree with this rule. Modern 
views, on the contrary, put great value on the
mere fact of conviction, and hold that to be
convinced is good for its own sake, whatever be
the burden of our conviction there being no
standard by which we can measure its truth.54
Nietzsche also recognised the danger in a form of 
mediation becoming an end in itself. An idea which
embraces differentiation (the Hegelian ideal) becomes a 
projection of a world which is at first at odds with 
mankind, used as he is to the value-feelings of progress in 
history (the post-historical dilemma); in the post-
historical epoch, the feelings aroused by an idea come 
first, and truth is secondary. In The Will to Power. 
Nietzsche writes: "The sudden feeling of power that an idea 
arouses in its originator is everywhere accounted proof of
its value: --  and since one knows no way of honouring an
idea other than by calling it true, the first predicate 
with which it is honoured is the predicate •true.1"55 
Because reason in itself has no limits, it is the most 
powerful organising principle possible: Nietzsche would say 
that this feeling elevates it to truth; Hegel would argue 
that its completeness and circularity makes it the truth. 
In any case, technic, which is the practical activity of
54 Hegel, Logic, p. 35.
55 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power. Translated by 
Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. Edited by Walter 
Kaufmann. (New York: Random House, 1967). p. 103.
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the understanding aspiring to Reason at the end of history 
does eliminate less powerful, less complete forms of
mediation such as magic, or art because it 'works*
better. And when means become ends as they first appear,
with the realisation that ends are not given from without
out actual experience then they take their place as the
focus of our attention. This has meant that, "the triumph 
of technique spells the silence, the death, of God."56 This 
thought anticipates Nietzsche, and it expresses the idea 
that reference to a supersensible world is dispensed with 
because it is no longer needed, because such mediations are 
unsatisfying with respect to subjects who have aspired to 
an other-worldly beyond, but have instead discovered 
'merely* their innermost nature writ large. Both Hegel and 
Nietzsche agree, in different ways, that the 'death of 
God,' is a truth for modernity, but neither dispenses with 
those aspects of Being which were taken to pertain to the 
transcendent realm. These very aspects, though, are 
ignored by triumphant technology, by means as ends, by 
neglect of fundamental human desires which project a human 
world through these terms of mediation. The end of history 
does mean the 'death of God, ' the loss of ends in the 
other-worldly sense. But Hegel argues that these ends are 
now possible within our world, by and for us. Our 
experience, though, has been of loss only: the failure both 
of the other-worldly beyond and of our rising to the new 
task of projecting a context or 'beyond* out of the
56 Cooper, End of History, p. 319.
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'over-full* nature of life. Hence, our first reaction to 
the 'death of God' is the nihilism of the post-historical 
epoch.
The Post-Historical Epoch
Hegel's completed notion of 'end' clearly rejects the 
historically useful fiction of an 'other-world.' Attaching 
values to an independent beyond made them remote from that 
life which they measured. The dialectic shows that values 
as ends are values as results, profoundly present to the 
process which they measure, as the beyond within life. For 
Hegel, the True is amongst things, as their origin or 
positing, their mediation or dialectical movement, and 
their result or end. It is his belief that "apart from 
their interdependence and organic union, the truths of 
philosophy are valueless, and must then be treated as 
baseless hypotheses, or personal convictions."57 
Previously, we observed how Hegel condemns the 'mere fact 
of conviction' as the criterion of truth. Similarly, 
philosophical truth which refers to a true world 
independent of the knowing subject is valueless, and, in 
fact, a manifestation of nihilism.
Were the philosophical beyond of an other-world of 
truth to exist, then the substance of philosophy would be 
a perpetual succession of attempts to approximate this 
world, always falling short. Hegel blankly rejects such an 
open-ended dialectic for philosophy, or his 'system of
57 Hegel, Logic, -jp. 20.
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philosophical science.1 He writes in the Logic: ”The true 
infinite is more than a mere world beyond the finite, and 
. . . we, in order to become conscious of it, must renounce 
that proaressus in infinitum.1'58 For Hegel, the truth is,
ultimately, radically present all around us, plain to see
for the observer who rejects mere subjectivity, and allows 
the objective realm to determine itself through him (i.e., 
rises to true self-consciousness and freedom) . The task of 
reasoning man is to perceive the Reason which is the 
substance and subject of the world. Hegel writes in the 
Philosophy of Right: "Philosophy is the exploration of the 
rational, it is for that very reason the apprehension of 
the present and the actual, not the erection of a beyond, 
supposed to exist, God knows where, or rather which exists, 
and we can perfectly well say where, namely in the error of 
a one-sided, empty, ratiocination.1,59 The result of the 
dialectic, the end of history, is for the 'realm of truth' 
to lose its false character of a beyond to life which is 
alienated from that life, and to be known as an actual, 
present, living reality. At the end of the Philosophy of 
Right. Hegel writes: "The realm of truth has abandoned the 
world of beyond and its arbitrary force."60
The realm of truth takes up its home within Being.
This is to say that mediation is introduced within what
began as an undifferentiated unity. Mediation allows
58 Hegel, Logic, p. 154.
59 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 10.
60 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 222.
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speech about Being, which means that through speech one
distances oneself and at the same time participates in the
world. Truth emerges from the dialectic, from the widening
of perspective until it includes all possibilities. Hegel
writes, in the Logic. that the overcoming of immediacy is
Being rising to truth: "True Being is just the superseding
of all that is immediate . . . .  things, as they
immediately are, have no truth.”61 The overcoming of
immediacy is the same thing as the negation of given-Being:
eliminating the simple, undifferentiated character of
existence by bringing to light oppositions within it. This
is the dialectic. The end of the dialectic is completed
negation, where all oppositions have worked themselves out
 not to disappear, but to lose their special, progressive
force. Hegel defines the nature of 'end' as follows: "In
the End the notion has entered on free existence and has a
being of its own, by means of the negation of immediate
objectivity.62 The 'notion* is the Idea: Hegel's all-
embracing term of Being and its becoming, Reason and its
realisation. He defines it, in the Logic, as follows:
The Notion is the principle of freedom, the power 
of substance self-realized. It is a systematic 
whole, in which each of its constituent functions 
is the very total which the notion is, and is put 
as indissolubly one with it. Thus in its self- 
identity it has original and complete 
determinations.63
The whole is 'systematic,' i.e., mediated. The term 'self-
identity' also describes the through-and-through mediation
61 Hegel, Logic, p. 164.
62 Hegel, Logic, p. 267.
63 Hegel, Logic.- p. 223.
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which is the end of history: the 'complete determinations' 
of the Idea.
The nature of this mediation is to bring together
subjects and objects within Being. The end of history is
thus where the unity of the whole is made manifest or
actual. Hegel writes: "The realized End is thus the overt
unity of subjective and objective.''64 Subjective and
objective were, from the beginning, an implicit unity, but
at the end of history this unity is 'overt,' or explicit.
The veil of seeming is removed, and the distinction between
the 'is' and the 'ought to be' disappears. The post-
historical epoch does not come unannounced: it was heralded
by the whole of that history for which it is the essential
result. Hegel writes in the Logic:
But, as a matter of fact, the object is the 
notion implicitly: and thus when the notion, in 
the shape of End, is realized in the object, we 
have but the manifestation of the inner nature of 
the object itself. Objectivity is thus, as it 
were, only a covering under which the notion lies 
concealed. Within the range of the finite we can 
never see or experience that the End has been 
really secured. The consummation of the infinite 
End, therefore, consists merely in removing the 
illusion which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. 
The Good, the absolutely Good, is eternally 
accomplishing itself in the world: and the result 
is that it need not wait upon us, but is already
by implication, as well as in full actuality,
accomplished.65
The end of history is not merely an ideal but an actuality:
it has already come about in the world. The result, the
end secured, is the Good, 'eternally accomplishing itself':
64 Hegel, Logic, p. 273.
65 Hegel, Logic, p. 274.
119
a telling foreshadow of Nietzsche*s doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence.
This unity is a very precise understanding of the 
identity of subject and object. Subject and object are, at 
the same time, identical and distinct. Only the dialectic, 
the movement of perspective, can show that Being consists 
of participation and distance, involvement and distinction. 
Hegel wishes to make clear that the end of history is not 
a simple return to pure Being: that the whole, through its 
realisation, is the same as a whole, but now elevated 
within itself: it is mediated. In the Logic. he writes: 
"If we say for example, that the absolute is the unity of 
subjective and objective, we are undoubtedly in the right, 
but so far one-sided, as we enunciate the unity only and 
lay accent upon it, forgetting that in reality the 
subjective and objective are not merely identical but also 
distinct."66 This is a refinement on what has been called 
the * on-going dialectic* of the end of history: it is the
continuing tension within Being the nature of its
constituents as both identical and distinct.
The unity of the subjective and the objective is the 
unity of the immanent or human sphere, and the transcendent 
or divine sphere. Man, as subject, appropriates the realm 
of objective truth to himself. Spirit, as subject, mani­
fests itself through man the object of Self-Consciousness. 
Although neither sphere can be said to disappear in the 
other, their reconciliation marks what Hegel calls the
66 Hegel, Logic, p. 121.
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'absolute turning point.' In the Philosophy of Right. 
Hegel writes: "This is the absolute turning point? mind
rises out of this situation and grasps the infinite 
positivity of this its inward character, i.e. it grasps the 
principle of the unity of the divine nature and the human, 
the reconciliation of objective truth and freedom as the 
truth and freedom appearing within self-consciousness and 
subjectivity.67 Mind, or Spirit, rises out of the situation 
of open-ended progress, which is to say it realises the end 
of history. The reconciliation of objective and subjective 
freedom is the unity of our abstract ideal, and our actual 
experience.
This 'overt unity, ' the end of history, has, for 
Hegel, already come about. As he writes in the
Phenomenology: "This unification has . . . already
• • • coccurred in principle." Hegel rejects the notion that the
completion of the dialectic is merely potential, or
abstract. Because, for him, thought is all, the all-
embracing Idea is all reality: its realisation is an
irresistible force. In the Logic. Hegel writes: "The
object of philosophy is the Idea: and the Idea is not so 
impotent as merely to have a right or an obligation to 
exist without actually existing."69 Far from being
impotent, the Idea is omnipotent the very breath and soul
of existence. Hegel expands on the concrete and active
nature of 'mere thought' later in the Logic: "For on the
67 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 222.
68 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 483.
69 Hegel, Logic, p. 10.
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one hand Ideas are not confined to our heads merely, nor is 
the Idea, on the whole, so feeble as to leave the question 
of its actualization or non-actualization dependent on our 
will. The Idea is rather the absolutely active as well as 
actual. "70
The 'absolutely active' and 'actual' Idea is fully 
present to end-of-history humanity. Its activity is the 
recollection of the historical moments: "This in fact means 
that the present world and the present form and self- 
consciousness of the spirit contain within them all the 
stages which appear to have occurred earlier in history."71 
Any absolute distinction between appearance and reality 
disappears at the end of history. The world turns out to 
be a world inferred, which reveals that thought is 
ontological. Thus, there can be nothing to a thing apart 
from what is made of it by thought, and so, 'nothing' marks 
the bounds of sense. Nihilism is the horizon of thought or 
meaning, and therefore the context of all reality. Meaning 
must be an inherent quality of Being if it is to exist at 
all. Hegel's philosophy takes on the question of thought 
and what is present to thought, and situates it absolutely. 
The universal and eternal completion which is the 
achievement of the philosophy of history, marks any kind of 
external reference as being the manifestation of nihilism.
Man at the end of history cannot bring about anything 
authentically new, because all possibilities are realised.
70 Hegel, Logic. p. 201.
71 Hegel, Reason in History, p. 150.
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His speech, thought, and action, cannot be directed towards 
any state of Being which is not at least theoretically 
present. What happens at the end of history, therefore, is 
not action, the creation of what was not there before, but 
activity, the reconstitution in new forms of the old. The 
only thing which activity ‘does* is to articulate the 
whole, to make actual what is already potentially present 
by the elevation of Reason as the truth of Being. The 
nature of activity is not to develop the whole: this was
action the historical dialectic. Activity is the
reproduction and sustaining of the whole: it is the
on-going, post-historical dialectic. The citizen of the 
universal and homogeneous State turns the 1 in principle1 to 
an 1 in fact.' The last historical act, the act of men at 
the end of history, is to make themselves actually free, 
truly self-conscious, and completely wise.
'The new,1 which was brought about by action in 
history, was not just an apparent creation, but an 
authentic move from incompleteness to completeness. This 
possibility is now removed from us, and even the refuge of 
ignorance is of no avail to the satisfaction of our desire 
to engage with our world in as vigourous a manner as 
before, because, as David Kolb writes: "The transcendental 
conditions Hegel deals with do not have to be known in 
order to be in force.”72 This is because of the primacy of 
thought for Hegel: the end of history can only be realised
72 David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel.
Heidegger, and After. (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1986). p. 7^8.
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in the most radical sense. The effect of the •force* of 
•transcendental conditions' is to situate, and thus limit, 
the possibilities for human endeavour: "What becomes clear
. is not an endless future of ever new forms for 
thought and action but the limited rational forms for human 
action."73 I describe this end of history action as
activity, and its limited rational forms as *the novel.' 
Activity is the working out of the infinite mediations or 
perspectives within a limited whole. The novel is the 
changing configurations of that substance which is only now 
truly at hand. Kolb writes: "There may be infinite amounts 
of empirical detail to be studied, but there are no
different overall structures of time and space or of
history and the state. Otherwise the self-transparency of 
spirit would be compromised. In an important sense, 
Hegel's world is finite."74 Action created the new which 
was other-directed? activity establishes the novel which is 
perspective-dependent. Hegel, as Kolb observes, "is 
elevating our awareness of our own existence to an
awareness of our full necessary conditions and context. 
There is no move from inside to outside."75 This is the 
essential difference between modernity and the progress of 
history.
The French Revolution was the vanguard, the first 
emergence into the post-historical epoch? all there is left
73 Kolb, Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 79.
74 Kolb, Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 91.
75 Kolb, Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 87.
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to 'do, * from the Hegelian standpoint, is to bring the rest 
of the world into line with what was realised by it: the 
political order based solely on rational principles. Post- 
historical activity does not introduce unthought of 
freedom: it makes our theoretical freedom a reality. Barry 
Cooper writes: "Contemporary modes of human liberation are 
all historical successors to the emancipation of the 
European bourgeoisie."76 French Revolutionary values become 
European values, become Western values, become universal 
values. Elaboration, not introduction, characterises the
post-historical epoch. To elaborate Reason in the case
of politics, to install the universal and homogeneous
State is the activity of mankind at the end of history:
"'From the authentically historical point of view' world
wars and their accompanying revolutions simply brought 
peripheral and backward areas into line with the position 
that Europe in principle had achieved."77
But each successive liberation whether of slaves, of
serfs, of the workers, or of women is not, since the
paradigmatic French Revolution, an historical change, not 
a real progress, not a creation of the new. If history has 
shown that all human beings are free, then the fact that 
groups of them realise and assert their- freedom adds 
nothing to history. What actual liberation does is 
reaffirm history, authenticate the past, make the meaning 
of history real and obvious. But it takes place at the end
76 Cooper, End of History, p. 283.
77 Cooper, End of History, p. 280.
X
125
of history, when all possibilities have been realised, a 
time of reflection upon the whole of what has gone before.
The end of history is a model for understanding the
intersection of many ideas in Hegel's philosophy. As it
has been shown in several examples above, it is a 'coming 
together' of several key notions. Eternity and time 
converge in a curious condition which is temporal, yet in 
which there is no strong change, no transition which breaks
the completed pattern not unlike the cycles of nature.
The world and man meet in self-consciousness, which
pertains to both the individual and to humanity as a whole. 
Subject and object regard one another in pure Being-in-and- 
for-itself: a rationally complete objective and subjective 
certainty of self; which has revealed itself to itself.
It would be a mistake to conclude from these 
observations that everything simply disappears into the 
One. However, this mistake is one which the nihilist
makes, as will be seen later. The reason that the unity at 
the end of history is not a 'simple' unity is because 
history itself was the introduction of mediation within 
Being. To 'natural* man is added historical experience. 
Hegel says that Spirit is this instillation of mediation: 
the life-force which transforms simple, pure Being into 
pure Being-in-and-for-itself. Spirit instilled in man is 
the quickening of his self-consciousness. In the final 
unity, the differentiation, or separation, or 'gap' between 
each of the concepts listed above is not destroyed. 
Rather, it is bridged, or overcome, in such a way that the
X
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Access' of each to the other is pure, true, or direct.
The whole  Being is differentiated, and the
particulars,* or aspects of it, appear to themselves as 
they are in themselves. The end of history is a true 
reflection (meant in both senses as an accurate self­
revelation of reality, and an undistorted contemplation of 
thought). What is involved here is not final destruction, 
but rather ultimate synthesis: "The final definition of the 
Concept of the Sage was that he (or she) was a Synthesis of 
the Particular and Universal, not an annihilation but a 
supersession. "78
Only the human world can have an end of history, 
because history is purely a human thing. What is not human
 what does not make itself continues, because its
•movement* through time was not a progress which could have 
an end. Nature is not for anything (unless man makes it 
something for himself) : '*The end of history was not a
natural or cosmic disruption. Nature, being independent of 
time, necessarily would 'survive* it.”79 History may end, 
the dialectic may be completed, but time does not stop, and 
life goes on: "The end of history was not the end of the 
cosmos. All that 'happened' was that there came into being 
a world without negativity."80 A world without negativity 
is one in which there is no longer a radically opposed 
other to appropriate, to take into oneself. Negation, the 
overcoming of dialectical tension, persists, but there no
78 Cooper, End of History, p. 231.
79 Cooper, End of History, p. 241.
80 Cooper, End of History, p. 274.
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longer persist incomplete moments, false consciousnesses of 
Spirit, which have not yet succumbed to relentless Reason. 
Nietzsche, as we shall see, knew himself to inhabit such a 
world, knew that his essential activity was, as he wrote, 
Mto remove antitheses from things after comprehending that 
we have projected them there,"81 i.e., to eliminate residual 
outside-directedness. The •survival* of nature, of time, 
and of life beyond the end of history is that aspect of the 
post-historical epoch to which Nietzsche would direct his 
attention.
Hegel shows that the dialectic, in its historical 
form, as the overcoming of unsatisfactory moments of Being 
towards that state of self-consciousness which is both 
recognised and recognising, is complete. What is left is 
the ongoing, ahistorical dialectic: the continuing tension 
of subject and object within Being that is purely mediated. 
All that *happens* is the continual positing and resolution 
of the dialectical tensions which have already been 
resolved in principle. Hegel writes: "The goal, Absolute 
Knowing, or Spirit that knows itself as Spirit, has for its 
path the recollection of the Spirits as they are in 
themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their 
realm.*'82 The 'in themselves' of the Spirits are the 
moments of the dialectic as comprehended by the Sage. The 
'organization' of their realm is history. History is 
recollected by wisdom. It cannot resume in the same way as
81 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 76.
82 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 493.
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before, because it is now, through the realisation of 
reason, a spent force.
It would seem that the end of history, being complete, 
rational, free and so on, is a desirable state of affairs. 
Why, then, should our experience of it be unsatisfactory? 
Why is the end of history the context for widespread 
nihilism? The answer begins with the recognition that the 
post-historical epoch is meaningful only as the end of 
history, with reference to that process for which it is the 
essential result. Freedom and recognition are desirable 
states of affairs only to those who want them, i.e., do not 
already have them. If man is a desiring creature, then his 
essence has two foments1: to desire and to be satisfied. 
To be satisfied, one must necessarily lose the experience 
of desire. The problem with the end of history is that it 
is a complete whole. Were one to be completely satisfied, 
one would lose all desire. To not want to be anything 
other than what one is runs counter to the nature of 
humanity which started the dialectic in the first place. 
It is for these reasons that human beings come to 
experience their existence in the post-historical epoch 
with ambivalence.
Apart from affirming the freedom of the individual, 
the essential activity of the post-historical epoch is 
educating the individual to the standpoint of wisdom: to 
the subjective realisation of what is at hand, objectively. 
The speech of the Sage is a revelation to the unwise, 
although nothing changes from the standpoint of realised
Reason. Instead of repeating history, which we can never 
authentically do, its moments are recollected through 
education. Hegel writes in the Phenomenology: "In the
child*s progress through school, we shall recognize the 
history of the cultural development of the world traced, as
07 • • •it were, in a silhouette." An awakening consciousness m  
the post-historical epoch does not have to wait upon events 
to progress to self-consciousness: history as thought is as 
real a dialectical development as history as action. The 
'recollection of the Spirits' is, for the individual, the 
same as all of history was for mankind. Again in the 
Phenomenology. Hegel writes: "The series of configurations 
which consciousness goes through along this road is, in 
reality, the detailed history of the education of 
consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science."84
What we sought to achieve by history we actually did 
achieve, but with this has come the loss of the experience 
of achieving. Because we have grasped the end of history, 
because we feel and know the unity of which we are a part, 
we cannot progress rationally to a next, higher step. We 
cannot let go of the end of history, once it is grasped, 
once it is realised. The end of history is not an event, 
but a condition into which we have entered. What we would 
like to do is to re-enter history, now that we know what it 
is about, but because we do know what it was about, in its 
entirety, we cannot return in the same way: we cannot
83 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 16.
84 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 50.
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authentically re-engage in the same kind of process, we can 
only reconstitute its moments, we can only reflect. Our 
knowledge has taken us irrevocably beyond what we sought to 
know. To act within history, and to know the meaning of 
those actions, are two conditions we together want, but the 
latter always marks the decline of the former.
Also, the end of history as the projection of an ideal 
future from within history does not match the end of 
history as the realised reality of the post-historical 
epoch. What liberation was for does not match how freedom 
appears; what philosophy sought does not match what wisdom 
attains. Cooper writes; "What is indicated by the term 
‘crisis1 . . .  is the disproportion between the vision or 
model and the experienced reality of everyday modern 
life.*'85 With the gain of completeness comes the loss of 
incompleteness: and this 'wanting* or 'lack' within the
self turns out to be something essential to human being. 
Nietzsche describes this as 'life,1 or as 'will to power,' 
or as 'the urge for increase.' That this does not go away 
as a result of completed reason shows that there is 
something not grasped by history, something pre-rational, 
something pre- (and post-) Hegelian.
The end of history is meaningful only to history. In 
itself, the end of history does not mean anything: there is 
no necessary consequence which proceeds rationally out of 
the end of history? it is a moment for which there is no 
future. Because the end of history does not project a
85 Cooper, End df History, p. 13.
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future, does not provide a temporal beyond as a reference 
for present action, it is the context for widespread 
nihilism. Actions lose their vital force, their outer- 
directedness, their widening, expanding power. All that is 
left is activity, the life of a reflective consciousness: 
"With the end of history has come the end of action in the 
strong sense of the term, namely the introduction of new 
consequences."86 The end of history can be the context for 
nihilism, but it cannot be said to be the cause of
nihilism, for nothing comes rationally of the end of
history.
Reason dictates that the opposite of nihilism should
be the result of the end of history. Meaning has come
home, out of a distant future, out of an other-worldly 
beyond, into man's own consciousness. Meaning is made 
apparent as characteristic of a living, human world. 
Meaning belongs to man: we are ultimately responsible for 
the 'for what' of our lives. Cooper writes: "When one no 
longer understands oneself as dependent upon God or nature 
or any sublimated substitute, one necessarily understands 
oneself as responsible for whatever meanings actually
exist."87
So how can it be that essential meaningfulness is
existentially nihilistic? How can meaning depart at the 
moment it is realised? The Sage is wholly and rationally 
satisfied, yet nihilism is a condition of profound
86 Cooper, End of History, p. 299.
87 Cooper, End of History, p. 284.
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dissatisfaction. To be satisfied means that one is no 
longer alienated from the object of one's desires. 
Overcoming of alienation means elimination of the object*s 
otherness, its characteristic as a given. What at first 
appeared as the other is taken into oneself by negating 
action: it becomes a moment in oneself, for oneself.
Satisfied man has no *outside* beyond, and no *lack* 
within. Any context for action by such an individual must 
necessary proceed from out of his own being: the value of 
absolute freedom, which such an individual enjoys, is 
purely self-referential. Hegel avoids the pitfall of 
simple identity by showing that the self is a wider thing, 
that what it is essentially is what it is for another. In 
other words, a human being is an individual only in a human 
community. What it enjoys is a situated freedom, both 
subjective and objective, not absolute freedom. But 
existentially, the post-historical epoch has abolished the 
•outside' and the 'lack' which pertained to historical 
individuality, but has not yet evolved the consciousness of 
the situated self which pertains to end of history 
individuality. What we have is not 'actual' freedom, but
'absolute' freedom a distortion of Hegel's ideal.
Charles Taylor writes: "Now this freedom without situation 
is what Hegel called 'absolute freedom.' It was a 
conception of freedom which was sterile and empty in his 
eyes in that it left us with no reason to act in one way 
rather than another; and it was destructive, since in its 
emptiness it drives us to tear down any other positive work
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as a hindrance to freedom.1,88 Paradoxically, absolute 
freedom, the unrestricted power to act and to define the 
value of action by oneself, leaves one incapable of 
exercising this freedom in any genuine way: "Complete
freedom would be a void in which nothing would be worth
• 89doing, nothing would deserve to count for anything.
Absolute freedom is not post-historical freedom. For 
Hegel, it is the penultimate moment, the form of freedom 
which, by its appearance, "has removed the antithesis
• • • • • 90 • •between the universal and the individual will.” This is
the same as saying that it marks the appearance of the
particular will; the situated self? the individual in
community. Hegel identifies absolute freedom with the
Terror of the French Revolution: the wiping away of all
horizons, and the feeling of absolute dread, which, by its
experience, returns consciousness to its proper sphere, to
where it "knows this being which is enclosed within self-
consciousness to be essential being in its perfection and
completeness."91 Hegel defines absolute freedom as follows:
It [absolute freedom] comes into existence in 
such a way that each individual consciousness 
raises itself out of it allotted sphere, no 
longer finds its essence and its work in this 
particular sphere, but grasps itself as the 
Notion of will, grasps all spheres as the essence 
of this will, and therefore can only realize 
itself in a work which is a work of the whole. 
In this absolute freedom, therefore, all social 
groups or classes which are the spiritual spheres 
into which the whole is articulated are 
abolished; the individual consciousness that
88 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, p. 153.
89 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, p. 157.
90 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 363.
91 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 363.
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belonged to any such sphere, and willed and 
fulfilled itself in it, has put aside its 
limitation? its purpose is the general purpose, 
its language universal law, its work the 
universal work.92
So absolute freedom is a dialectical extreme, the return
from which marks the appearance of the actual freedom of
self-consciousness.
Man needs, therefore, a context, a community and a 
history, for him to act in a genuine way. This context is 
the material upon which freedom works: it is the originator 
of desires, and the forum in which accomplishments are 
revealed. The condition of humanity in such a context is 
an ambivalent one between satisfaction and dissatisfaction. 
Were man to be completely satisfied, then he would be 
absolutely free to do anything possible, since all 
possibilities would reside wholly within him. But in fact, 
this is only true of Absolute Spirit, of Being-as-subject, 
as it appears in itself, to itself. Man remains in a world 
of appearance, but he knows, objectively, that the nature 
of his activity is not relentless, not inaccessible to his 
actual freedom. Wisdom in itself (that is, without the 
capacity to enlighten the un-wise) is an impasse. As 
Alexandre Kojeve writes: "The Wise man must reduce his
existence to simple contemplation freines Zusehen) of the 
Real and Being, and of their 'dialectical movement.1 He 
looks at everything that is and verbally describes 
everything that he sees: therefore, he has nothing to do,
92 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 357.
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for he modifies nothing, adds nothing, and takes nothing 
away.1*93 The Sage knows himself to be part of a unity where 
the Real, or the actual, fully comprehends the whole of 
Being. The truth which is now in the world is eternal, 
unchanging, and so too is the kind of man who knows it.
At the end of history, nothing really happens, because 
the appearance of things cannot be taken to be without 
precedent: "The Real . . . will remain eternally identical 
to itself, and its entire History will forever belong to 
the past."94 Man's activity at the end of history should, 
according to Hegel be a cultural projection: given by the 
community of free individuals. If the post-historical 
epoch is characterised by nihilism, it is not because of 
Hegel, but in spite of him. Charles Taylor writes: "If the 
radical freedom of self-dependence is ultimately empty, 
then it risks ending in nihilism, that is, self-affirmation 
through the rejection of all 'values.' One after the 
other, the authoritative horizons of life, Christian and 
humanist, are cast off as shackles on the will."95 In the 
case of this radical, or absolute freedom, with nothing 
outside of itself to 'negate* or overcome, the only thing 
left for it to affirm is the emptiness left behind. 
Situated freedom, on the other hand, begins with the 
realisation that there is no real 'outside': with the
knowledge that Being, although infinite, is bounded.
Hegel recognises that with the completion of the
93 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. p. 175.
94 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. p. 194.
95 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, p. 159.
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dialectic comes the disappearance of an ’outside,* of any 
situatedness of life which is fixed. There can be no 
external world for freedom to work upon and for thought to 
know. This is because the end of history is the 
realisation that the True is the whole, that self and world
are one moments in a unity which is differentiated. To
experience the end of history, to know oneself and one's 
world in this way, is to become inward-looking. Hegel 
likens realised Spirit to a 'night of self-consciousness': 
"As its fulfilment consists in perfectly knowing what it 
is, in knowing its substance, this knowing is its 
withdrawal into itself in which it abandons its outer 
existence and gives its existential shape over to 
recollection. Thus absorbed in itself, it is sunk in the 
night of its self-consciousness."96
As we shall see in the consideration of Nietzsche, man 
has realised his freedom, but does not exercise it except 
in historical, incomplete forms. He is wise (has 
appropriated Reason), but continues to speak of truth as a 
reference to a true world. He is responsible for the 
meaning of his life, but he continues to expect that 
meaning to emerge from beyond that life. In short, man is 
unprepared for the reality of the end of history. The 
beyond within life is the truth which both Hegel and 
Nietzsche teach, in different forms, yet it is a truth 
which the humanity to which it applies does not accept. 
Man persists in what Hegel has condemned as the proaressus
96 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 492.
137
in infinitum, and falsely projects a beyond outside of
life, an 'ought to be' which is at odds with Being. The
lesson of history, the end of history, is that the 'is' and
the 'ought to be' are a harmony, encompassed by the dynamic
whole of Being. Hegel writes, in the Logic:
But this harmony between the 'is' and the 'ought 
to be' is not torpid and rigidly stationary. 
Good, the final end of the world, has being, only 
while it constantly produces itself. And the 
world of spirit and the world of nature continue 
to have this distinction, that the latter moves 
only in a recurring cycle, while the former 
certainly also makes progress.97
The end of history is the continual presencing of the Idea,
at hand, everywhere, all the time. What it is taken to be,
though, by dislocated post-historical humanity, is the
emergence of things in the historical sense. This
conflict, this dislocation, is the crisis of modernity.
Instead of seeking to re-engage in what is past, Hegel 
sees the completion of history as the opportunity for a new 
beginning. The wisdom which belongs to man at the end of 
history does not help him make new choices, because that 
wisdom is reflective: it does not project a new value, a 
new future. The only difference between man the natural 
being before history and man the self-conscious being at 
the end of history is the instillation of experience. 
Post-historical man starts afresh, but at a 'higher' level. 
This higher level is the 'eternal now,' the ongoing 
presencing of Spirit, which is the post-historical epoch. 
The end of history is a collapse into the present: all the
97 Hegel, Logic, p. 291.
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past moments are brought home to realised Reason, and there 
is no future which progresses rationally out of this state. 
Hegel writes, in Reason in History; "Whatever is true
exists eternally in and for itself not yesterday or
tomorrow, but entirely in the present, 'now, ' in the sense
no # m 0
of an absolute present.” The end of history is higher, 
yet the same as the origin and process of its achievement. 
The whole has been elevated to the level of truth, by 
losing its character as 'mere' appearance. Hegel writes in 
the Logic: "We have now returned to the notion of the Idea 
with which we began. This return to the beginning is also 
an advance. We began with Being, abstract Being: where we 
now are we also have the Idea as Being: but this Idea which 
has Being is Nature."99 The Idea is made actual, real, and 
obvious by history, and so the end of history is both a 
return and an advance. Now man knows himself as being 
self-conscious through mutual recognition, he knows himself 
as being free in the universal and homogeneous State. 
Hegel writes in the Phenomenology: "In the immediacy of
this new existence the Spirit has to start afresh to bring 
itself to maturity as if, for it, all that preceded were 
lost and it had learned nothing from earlier Spirits. But 
recollection, the inwardizing. of that experience, has 
preserved it and is the inner being, and in fact the higher 
form of the substance."100
98 Hegel, Reason in History, p. 150.
99 Hegel, Logic, p. 296.
100 Hegel, Phenomenology. p. 492.
The end of history is a paradigm, a model. It should 
not be taken to be some physical world, a twilight zone 
beside the human world. Rather, it is a model for under­
standing our condition as modern what we mean when we say
that we are essentially different from our predecessors, 
that we are something they were not. We left history the 
realm of action in order to know what we were doing. Thus, 
we created history the discourse about action. To compre­
hend all of history (action) we had to create a completed 
history (discourse). But in doing this, we realised (both 
in the sense of 'made actual' and 'knew fully') history 
(both action and discourse), and so found ourselves at the 
end of history. We cannot re-engage in historical action 
as we knew it. because we cannot forget our historical 
know-ledge, and pretend that what we are doing will lead to 
anything we do not already have, or will put us into any 
state of human being which we have not already realised. 
So the problem is: how do we act, talk, and know, in a new, 
creative, spontaneous, and genuine way, without simply 
replaying the circle, articulating the whole of history as 
it was before Hegel? We begin, by understanding our real 
condition as post-historical humanity, and abandon any 
nostalgia for a now-impossible world. The paradigm of the 
end of history is the framework upon which we build the 
authentically new world: "End and beginning are not states 
of affairs but symbols that make less unintelligible our 
experience of wonder by providing a direction for our 
questioning to take as it is attracted to, or measured by,
the end."101
History is ended. The actions of humans beings in 
time are the means to the satisfaction of desires. Actions 
realise that satisfaction in the end to which they are 
directed, in the object which they seek to obtain. The 
meaning of historical action, then, what it is for, lies in 
its end. And its end is present within history as its 
directedness, as its purpose. This is Hegel’s teleological 
understanding of history. But what is true of each of the 
actions of individuals within history is true also of 
history as a whole: history, and not just its discreet
moments, is ended. Hegel sees individual acts as evidence 
of particularity: as the movement of the self towards
integration, towards becoming a self-consciousness. But 
self-consciousness as such is also a subject: this is the 
dialectic in its universal aspect. Self-consciousness 
seeks to articulate its own completeness, to make explicit 
its being, by manifesting itself upon humanity, which to it 
is the introduction of mediation within itself. Human 
history leads to individual freedom and individual wisdom. 
But history as the phenomenology of Spirit leads to 
universal freedom and universal wisdom. So while man’s 
historical actions have ends, world history has an end. 
Being, the world and man together as subject, realises 
itself as something higher (but not other) than it was at 
the beginning. This realisation of the end of history is 
what Hegel’s philosophy of history is all about. In
101 Cooper, End of History, p. 340.
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articulating the moments of history through a phenomenology 
of Spirit, Hegel realises this end.
Modernity, the post-Hegelian epoch can assuming
Hegel to be correct be also called the post-historical
one. If Hegel* s elaboration of history in word is 
complete, then history itself is completed in Hegel*s 
discourse. Modern existence is, in this way, radically 
different from that of men who were immersed in history. 
The post-historical epoch is discontinuous with all 
previous, historical ones, yet it belongs to each of them 
as their meaning and end. The paradigm of the end of 
history constitutes the essence of modernity: it is the way 
we, as moderns are, in principle. We are participants in 
a dynamic whole, and aware of this as well. Our situation 
is realised: made actual and brought to consciousness.
The end of history is, essentially, an overcoming of 
the separation between subject and object, knower and 
known, thinking and reality. Overcoming means 'bridging
the gap,' 'making the connections,' between ideality and 
reality, through thought, word, and deed, so that by this 
mediation the truth is revealed. That truth is the nature 
of the world-composed-of-selves, and of selves-in-the- 
world. But in this process, 'distance' is maintained,
'difference' is recognised. The end of history is the
realisation that the tension, the balance, between 'world'
and 'self' is wherein lies the essence of the whole: the 
overcoming is, in the end, pure, direct, and true.
For Hegel, the end of history means the possibility of
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wisdom, but arising with this possibility, unforseen by 
him, comes the spectre of nihilism. This real possibility, 
latent in the post-historical epoch, means that the attack 
on nihilism must issue from other than Hegelian grounds. 
The post-historical epoch is also the post-Hegelian one, 
because the Hegelian circle is closed with the end of 
history. Post-Hegelian thinkers have both the luxury of 
starting from the standpoint of self-consciousness, and the 
dilemma of being excluded from the development of it in the 
same way as before. Nietzsche is precisely such a thinker.
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Chapter Three 
Nietzsche and Nihilism
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Nietzsche as Post-Historical Philosopher
Considered negatively, the conclusion of Hegel*s 
philosophy of history is the destruction of the 
transcendent dualist world-view. This position is
Nietzsche*s starting-point. The combination of Hegel*s 
critique of transcendent dualism and his retention of 
objective values means this world must be found to be 
meaningful, and we must put ourselves in a proper relation 
to it to bring this to light. Because he starts out from 
this perspective of self-consciousness, Nietzsche accepts 
the impossibility of the historical attempt to fix values 
as references to an other-world. But he, too, is
interested in how one lives a meaningful life in the face 
of the seeming failure of the historical enterprise. For 
this reason, it is useful to perceive Nietzsche as a post- 
historical philosopher.
Nietzsche, starting out from the perspective of self- 
consciousness, proclaims the * death of God,' but is thereby 
saying something much more interesting than 'God does not 
exist. ' What Nietzsche implies is that God was once alive, 
but that He has somehow lost His vital and compelling 
power. Nietzsche cannot accept the easy Hegelian solution 
of adopting all the essential features of divine Being in 
a whole of which we are a part, while denying the absolute 
independence of this Being from the caprice and mutability 
of our actual lives. Nietzsche recognises that our
reaction to the difficulty of acting as if something were
the case, while at the same time knowing that it is really
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not, is in fact going to be nihilism, not the satisfaction 
of an inherently meaningful existence.
Therefore, Nietzsche concentrates on the immanent, 
human perspective. This is justifiable in Hegelian terms, 
because the death of God means at the same time that man is 
made divine: self-consciousness appears in the individual
 he is a person, a mutually recognised self, a citizen in
community. Continued reference to the 1 Absolute Spirit1--
once it has wholly appeared within Being, and exhausted its
nature completely is merely 'worship of the dead God. '
This is what the 'last Pope' does in Book Four of Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra. and it sums up Nietzsche's attitude 
towards the Sage: purely reflective self-consciousness is 
admirable because wisdom is a type of the higher man, but 
because it projects no future, it can be no guide.
The motivations of both Hegel and Nietzsche are 
essentially religious. Both philosophers are concerned 
with beyonds, with the situatedness of life in a context 
greater than that in which it immediately appears. Hegel 
believes that he has given divine Spirit substance and 
Being by describing it as wholly appearing in the world and 
time as history, as our actual experience of life. 
Nietzsche cannot accept this conclusion as sustainable, but 
he is forced to accept the need for such a philosophy 
because of the effective disappearance of the other-worldly 
alternative. Nietzsche, then, begins with a recognition of 
the practical state of affairs which was observed by Hegel. 
He shows that, because of the decline in force of the
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transcendent dualist world view, persistence in such views
 what Hegel would call incomplete or historical modes of
consciousness are effectively nihilistic. But 'man made
divine1 is the new potential of self-consciousness, of 
man's new-found freedom to make what he is. The projection 
of the self in this way, and the confrontation with results 
as a beyond similar to the process undergone in history, 
means that man is now responsible in a radical way. To 
affirm our actual condition is to find it inherently 
meaningful not because of anything behind or above it, but 
because the self is cast into a beyond within life: life's 
value is its 1 fatefulness' with regard to the future and to 
the community of selves.
The end of history is essentially what was meant by 
human action, understood by Hegel as the becoming of 
freedom and the becoming of self-consciousness. The value 
of this completion, and the value of the wisdom that goes 
with it, lies in its nature as reflection. The end of 
history is realised in the world as the regime of actual 
freedom and the community of mutually recognising 
individuals, and in oneself as wisdom, or fully rational 
speech. But the end of history has no consequence. If the 
end of history is the dialectical completion of the 
phenomenology, then there can be no next step, no 
progressive continuation of the process. In the world, or 
politically, there can be no further realisation of 
freedom, or, more broadly, revelation of one's humanity. 
In oneself, or philosophically, there can be no expansion
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of knowledge for the Sage, no dissatisfaction of reason 
which expresses itself in the need for further thought and 
speech. As an eternal moment within temporality, the end 
of history cannot act as a catalyst to action: there is 
nothing which one ought to do as a consequence of fully 
realised reason, and fully revealed Being.
The end of history is the value for history. To 
realise it is to affirm that history as a whole; for Hegel, 
each moment of history is essential to the True, to Being*s 
complete self-knowledge. And because the end of history 
has no consequence, it does not necessarily lead to any one 
course of action, and cannot be a sure guide for the 
future.
For the person engaged in history, value is a 
projection of the present moment: the meaning of action 
lies in the end to which it is directed. For the person in 
the post-historical epoch, value is at first looked for in 
the same way, but does not emerge: one cannot project
beyond the whole, beyond completion. With wisdom, then, 
comes the impossibility of acting in the same way as 
before, as if action were an outer-directedness. The only 
future possibility realised is reflection: inner-
directedness. The disjunction between fully rational 
completion and the human desire to act expansively, to 
manifest oneself outwards, is one aspect of the phenomenon 
of nihilism. One wants to reengage in history, but the end 
of history has been realised. One expects that value will 
be outside oneself and the world, but finds that it is in
fact a term of mediation within this whole of self- 
consciousness. The experience of this dislocation, of this 
gap between ideality and reality, is the experience of the 
post-historical consciousness. Nihilism is the dominant
theme of modernity the problem of the source of values.
This problem is a dominant theme in Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
writings, and it connects all of his ideas. I argue that 
Nietzsche is grappling with a problem which is present to 
modernity as a practical consequence of Hegel’s philosophy: 
the articulation of history as a whole which is ended. 
Nietzsche’s attacks on 'traditional* philosophy are his 
objections to those who persist in historically incomplete 
moments of consciousness, and who perceive values as 
essentially 'other,' as fixed in a beyond outside the 
temporality of human consciousness. And further, his 
attacks on modern nihilism are his objections to those who 
only partially realise Hegel's turning-point, who 
acknowledge that this other world does not exist, but who 
persist in the belief that such a world ought to exist to 
be the source of values, and who therefore deny the 
possibility of any values at all. Nietzsche attempts to 
make real values possible, by exposing both these positions 
as being nihilistic. His attempt at a revaluation of all 
values is the first serious attempt to come to terms with 
the post-historical epoch of which Hegel was the harbinger.
The success of Hegel's philosophy leaves Nietzsche 
incapable of authentically directing his 'life-affirming' 
impulses in any ways similar to those which Hegel has so
exhaustively described. As Tom Darby writes, "it is this 
claim to absolute knowledge and the attendant end of 
history that Nietzsche railed against."1 He 'rails against* 
this fate, but he does not deny it. The end of history is 
not erroneously described, rather it concludes, for 
Nietzsche, that the whole historical enterprise was in 
error in the first place. David Kolb points to the proof 
of this most radical condemnation as the failure of 
Hegelian closure: "There is a sense . . .  in which our
world results from failures in the reconciliation Hegel 
described as taking place."2 These * failures' I have 
illustrated as the reflective passivity of the Sage and the 
technology of the universal and homogeneous State. Thus, 
Nietzsche is at the same time enabled by Hegel's philosophy 
to realise the possibility of a grand reflection, and to 
direct the enormous immanent power of the post-historical 
individual.
In a sense, all of Nietzsche's philosophy 'rails 
against' Hegel. He condemns the modern types of humanity 
made possible by Hegel, the Sage and the Citizen, but he 
also accepts the 'new task' of making oneself and the world 
from out the most radically present substance of Being. 
But at first, one is left by Hegel only with nihilism. For 
both Hegel and Nietzsche, this is our necessary entree into 
the post-historical epoch. Tom Darby writes: "Hegel said
1 Tom Darby, "Afterword: On the Coincidence of Our Pre­
occupation With Nietzsche," in Nietzsche and the Rhetoric 
of Nihilism, edited by Tom Darby, Bela Egyed and Ben Jones. 
(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989). p. 195.
2 Kolb, Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 118.
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in the Preface to his Phenomenology that the appearance of 
the 'New World' engenders two attitudes: boredom and
frivolity. Boredom arises because one concludes that there 
is nothing left to do, and the frivolous attitude is 
adopted when it is further concluded that nothing really 
matters."3 It is no accident that Nietzsche's adopts 
aesthetics as his clarion-call to philosophy for modernity: 
it is a serious criticism of Hegel that the end of history 
is boring. The combination of boredom and the absence of 
a worthy, i.e. non-arbitrary, object for endeavour leads to 
nihilism.
The capacity for complete reflection with which we are 
now enabled, and the condition of nihilism from which we 
engage in such a reflection, leads to the condemnation of 
all of history as unworthy. But it also allows one to step 
'behind* the whole of history, or into a wider perspective: 
not in an Hegelian, dialectical way, because this 
possibility is not now open to us, but in Nietzsche's 
perspectival, even partisan, mode of philosophising. 
Nietzsche is able to trace the origin of the desire which 
'prompted' history, and the way in which history actually 
sought to satisfy that desire, by engaging in a genealogy 
of morals. Just like Hegel, he finds the origin of 
history, that is historv-as-progress. in the conflict 
between the master and the slave. The end of history is 
'true* with respect to its origins, but its origins lie in 
the slavish consciousness. And for Nietzsche, the slave
3 Darby, "Afterword," Rhetoric of Nihilism, p. 199.
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does not ultimately succeed in appropriating the 'moment'
of the master: this is the essential 'failure' of Hegelian
closure. Tom Darby writes:
The history of metaphysics, presented as a 
phenomenology of freedom, turns out to be a 
genealogy of slavishness. And as a result, what
was presented as absolute truth wisdom is
seen to be a ruse. It is a ruse because the 
whole truth turns out to be only the truth of the 
slave. Thus, the discourse about freedom that 
supposedly culminates in wisdom is mere rhetoric. 
It is rhetoric because like all rhetoric, it is 
a form of work: it is a means that anticipates an
end. But when the end freedom and wisdom is
reached, it is shown to be just that which 
provided the means itself, the negative. And in 
this nothing, it culminates: in nihilism.4
Nietzsche's stance with respect to Hegel is revealed in his
tracing of the genealogy of nihilism. He is Hegel's ally
in the attack on the transcendence of values in the dualist
tradition; he is Hegel's enemy in the attack on the actual,
non-metaphysical beyond which is projected as the end of
history. Nietzsche finds his opening against his
predecessor on the very Hegelian ground of completeness: he
takes Hegel at his word and engages in the task of post-
historical philosophy, which is affirmation, rather than
description. Nietzsche affirms master morality and the
eternal recurrence, not because these things are true, but
because they are possible: these are the aspects of
radically present Being to which Nietzsche directs his will
to power as most authentic, as the most serendipitous to
cure the malaise of nihilism at the end of history.
In reading Nietzsche, it is clear that he regards
4 Darby, "Afterword," Rhetoric of Nihilism, p. 199.
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himself as standing at the end of an historical enterprise. 
In some guises this is Christianity, in others it is 'herd 
morality,1 in others it is the Apollonian spirit. In any 
event, Nietzsche shows that he is able to engage in a 
thoroughly radical critique because preceding philosophical 
movements, even the course of history itself, is exhausted 
and spent. In Beyond Good and Evil. Nietzsche writes: "The 
long, real tragedy is at an end, assuming that every 
philosophy was in its genesis a long tragedy."5 Philosophy
is a 'long tragedy1 because its object wisdom is that
which destroys itself, destroys the dissatisfaction of the 
intellect which spurs it on. This tragedy is at an end 
because this object has been appropriated, as Hegel has 
shown. What was a transcendent ideal has become a 
realisable, historical and human goal; the 'kingdom of God' 
has been replaced by the end of history. Nietzsche 
recognises both movements, both goal-projections, as 
belonging essentially to the same movement. He writes, in 
The Will to Power: "The belief in progress towards the
ideal is the only form in which a goal in history is 
thought of today. In summa: one has transferred the
arrival of the 'kingdom of God' into the future, on earth,
in human form but fundamentally one has held fast to the
belief in the old ideal."6 Nietzsche's critique, as we 
shall see, is of the whole process of achieving the old 
ideal, whether posited as a transcendent beyond, or as an
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. (New York: 
Random House, Inc., 1966). p. 37.
6 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 186.
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immanent end of history.
Nietzsche also supports the Hegelian conclusion that
the thought ends the action that comprehension marks the
decline of a movement of authentic change. And total 
comprehension necessarily marks the end of an entire 
movement: the content of history is 'wrapped up' in post- 
historical wisdom. Nietzsche argues: "Isn't now precisely 
the moment when, insofar as we comprehend this, it is all 
over?" And later in the same passage of Bevond Good and 
Evil: "The text finally disappeared under the interpretat­
ion. "7 Such a momentous conclusion may be realised or 
achieved, but it is possible that this reality is not felt 
or lived. This is because, as Nietzsche writes: "The
greatest events and thoughts but the greatest thoughts
are the greatest events are comprehended last: the
generations that are contemporaneous with them do not
experience such events they live right past them."8 This
is how individuals in the post-historical epoch can cling 
to the old ideals, and hold fast to what Hegel called the 
prodressus in infinitum, despite the 'great thought' of the 
end of history. For Nietzsche, it is essential to 
comprehend what has happened, to realise the end of 
history. With this realisation will come the rejection of 
values as projections to an unreachable beyond, or to an 
open-ended future. On this point, Hegel would agree with 
Nietzsche. But Nietzsche further argues that post-
7 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil. p. 49.
8 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 227.
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historical wisdom will lead to the rejection of history
itself, and of the world which has been, so far, wrongly
inferred. The decline of strong action, of authentic
change, is proof, for Nietzsche, of the unfitness of the
historical and philosophical enterprise to date. The
•through and through* comprehension of the post-historical
epoch leads to the reflection that the end falls short of
the means, and the satisfaction does not meet the desire.
In The Will to Power. Nietzsche writes:
But now we have reached the opposite point?
indeed we wanted to reach it: the most extreme 
consciousness, man's ability to see through 
himself and history. With this we are
practically as far as possible from perfection in 
being, doing, and willing: our desire, even our 
will for knowledge is a symptom of a tremendous 
decadence. We strive for the opposite of that
which strong races, strong natures want--
understanding is an ending.9
There is nothing false about the end of history: it is true
with respect to the desire which posited it in the first
place, and man does achieve rational satisfaction in post-
historical wisdom. But the end of history does allow a
judgement to be made on the whole of history itself, and of
the world which that history has projected. Hegel posited
the origin of history in the existence of the desire for
human recognition, and Nietzsche, from the post-historical
'beyond within life,' reflects on the way in which that
desire was satisfied as being now a spent force, and
therefore persistence in this mode to be an example of what
Hegel would call false or incomplete consciousness.
9 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 44.
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Nietzsche also follows Hegel in the importance he 
attaches to the French Revolution as the concluding
movement of history as the most extreme attempt at
liberation, and at founding a state based solely on 
rational principles. This historical event is a concrete 
realisation of what was an abstract ideal. Hegel argues 
that the French Revolution is freedom made actual through 
liberation; Nietzsche agrees, but does not view it in the 
same, positive light. He writes in The Will to Power: "The 
French Revolution is the daughter and continuation of
Christianity its instincts are against caste, against the
noble, against the last privileges.1,10 Progressive 
liberation reaches a logical extreme in the French 
Revolution; in principle, no person is excluded from the 
regime of actual freedom. Nietzsche is far from approving 
of the historical movement whereby women, slaves, the poor 
and workers, and the *vice addicts* and the sick realise 
objective freedom, where "all this is moved into the 
foreground.”11 But he does agree with the Hegelian argument 
that this is the consequence of the last historical moment, 
the French Revolution. Just as Hegel follows the slavish 
consciousness towards the development of fully human self- 
consciousness, so too does Nietzsche witness the triumph of 
liberation, of the slave overcoming himself as such. But 
again, Nietzsche condemns this state of affairs, and so the 
whole course of history as progress towards this goal. In
10 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 111.
11 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 58.
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The Will to Power. Nietzsche writes:
Datum: the oppressed, the lowly, the great masses 
of slaves and semi-slaves desire power. First
step: they make themselves free they ransom
themselves, in imagination at first, they 
recognize one another, they prevail. Second 
step: they enter into battle, they demand
recognition, equal rights, 'justice.* Third
step: they demand privileges ( they draw the
representatives of power over to their side). 
Fourth step: they demand exclusive power, and
they get it.12
One can easily find parallels to this passage in the
Hegelian dialectic. The first step is the moment of 
Stoicism: the first, abstract, freedom of the slave. The 
second step is 'Reason as lawgiver,' or the establishment 
of the State and the implicit recognition of the slave. 
The third and fourth steps are the French Revolution and
its consequence: the triumph of 'herd morality, ' or the
'revolt of the masses.' Hegel believed that this was 
ethical life, raised by Reason to the level of self- 
consciousness. Nietzsche denies the presence of the 
ancient Greek ideal in the universal and homogeneous State, 
finding only the nihilism of triumphant slave morality.
Nietzsche often adopts the perspective of the post- 
historical philosopher, one who is able to articulate the 
past in ways not previously possible. In The Will to 
Power, he writes: "In my own way I attempt a justification 
of history."13 A speech of justification concludes the 
moment, as Hegel argued, and is the content of purely 
reflective wisdom. Like Hegel, Nietzsche argues that "a
12 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 126.
13 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 43.
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matter that becomes clear ceases to concern us.”14 This 
clarity with respect to the past cannot function as a guide 
to the future, because "everything of which we become
conscious is a terminal phenomenon, an end and causes
nothing.1,15
The end of history, with its reflective wisdom, 'mere
activity,' and novel configurations of already present
things, leads to the decline of strong action, and new
emergences of things into the world. Nietzsche clearly
understood the nature of the end of history to be what
Hegel called the 'night of self-consciousness': the
absorbtion into self of Spirit. Nietzsche calls this the
'weakening of spontaneity,' and the cultivation of
'reactive talents':
A kind of adaptation to this flood of impressions 
takes place: men unlearn spontaneous action, they 
merely react to stimuli from outside. They spend 
their strength partly in assimilating things,
partly in defense, partly in opposition.
Profound weakening of spontaneity; the historian, 
critic, analyst, the interpreter, the observer,
the collector, the reader all of them reactive
talents all science!16
The substratum of human community, the on-going dialectic
of human desires, no longer lifts that community beyond
itself, to any state of Being which is not already present
to it. Nietzsche writes in The Will to Power: "When one
discovers the necessary conditions out of which alone
[culture] can grow, one no longer wants it.”17 The vital,
14 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 81.
15 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 265.
16 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 47.
17 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 95.
158
expanding force of the objective realm no longer widens or 
situates the individual if that individual has fully 
realised himself in it, and this is the case if he 
discovers the necessary conditions out of which his culture 
grew. Knowledge tells the inquirer how he belonged to his 
culture, but changes him into a person incapable of 
belonging in the same way again.
In learning about the world and one's place in it, man 
changes himself into a being no longer at home in that 
world. Nietzsche emphasises again and again the tragic 
nature of all knowledge; Section 277 of Bevond Good and 
Evil reads:
 Bad enough! The same old story! When one has
finished building one's house, one suddenly 
realizes that in the process one has learned 
something that one really needed to know in the
worst way before one began. The eternal
distasteful 'too late!' The melancholy of 
everything finished!18
The house to which Nietzsche refers is the edifice of
Reason, the historical dialectic, or the satisfaction of
the will to truth. What one needed to know was that the
foundation of this or any other 'house of metaphysics' is
a kind of life. Nietzsche argues that the kind of life
which seeks its satisfaction in Reason is weakened by the
attainment of this end, but also that from this decline
will emerge a new kind of life, a 'joyous, exuberant,
violent' kind of life. In The Will to Power. Nietzsche
expresses the nature of the post-historical epoch as both
a decline and a new emergence of a kind of life: "To
18 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 223.
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distinguish in every movement (1) that it is in part 
exhaustion from a preceding movement (satiety from it, the 
malice of weakness toward it, sickness)? (2) that it is in 
part newly-awakened, long slumbering, accumulated energy
 joyous, exuberant, violent: health.”19
Nietzsche, like Hegel, views himself not merely as a 
subject engaging in philosophy, but also as an object 
through which philosophy expresses itself. Shifts of 
perspective of this kind are as important to an 
understanding of Nietzsche as they are of Hegel. In Bevond
Good and Evil. Nietzsche writes: ”A thought comes when 'it'
• • 20 • wishes, and not when *1' wish.” For Nietzsche, as for
Hegel, no thought is out of season, and every insight is
more of a discovery than an invention. Concerning the task
of philosophers, Nietzsche writes: "Their thinking [of
philosophical concepts] is, in fact, far less a discovery
than a recognition, a remembering, a return and a
homecoming to a remote, primordial, and inclusive household
of the soul, out of which those concepts grew originally."21
Martin Heidegger, in his essay on Nietzsche, states the
following concerning Hegel and Nietzsche: "There exists
between the two an essential connection that conceals
itself in the essence of all metaphysics.1,22 ‘Essence1 is
understood by Heidegger as the ongoing presence of a thing,
19 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 523.
20 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 24.
21 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 27.
22 Martin Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God Is 
Dead,'" in The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays. (New York: Harper and Row, 1977). p. 59.
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the way in which it *holds sway' and prevails as whatever 
it is. Metaphysics, or thought-as-subject, 1uses'
philosophers, through their particular doctrines, to 
manifest itself: both Hegel and Nietzsche were conscious of 
themselves as moments of the destining of Being, as 
participants. and not merely instigators.
All individuals embody their culture, or history--
this is the context out of which an individual is able to
act, and speak, and be distinct. Just as, for Hegel, the
education of the individual consists of the recollection of
the spirits in him, so too, for Nietzsche, "every
individual consists of the whole course of evolution (and
not, as morality imagines, only of something that begins at
birth)."23 To affirm a moment, or to recognise a state of
Being, is to affirm all that is necessary for one's
condition? the interconnectedness of things which Hegel has
shown means that to affirm a part is to affirm the whole--
thus speaks post-historical wisdom. Nietzsche writes:
If we affirm one single moment, we thus affirm 
not only ourselves but all existence. For 
nothing is self-sufficient, neither in us 
ourselves nor in things; and if our soul has 
trembled with happiness and sounded like a harp 
string just once, all eternity was needed to
produce this one event and in this single
moment of affirmation all eternity was called 
good, redeemed, justified, and affirmed.24
In Nietzsche, the moment affirms eternity, so the related­
ness of things is considered temporally. Hegel's view 
leads to a more 'spatial' consideration: although history
23 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 200.
24 Nietzsche, Will to Power, pp. 532-533.
161
is the temporal manifestation of the whole through 
instantiation in 'moments,' the essential thing is the 
Idea, which is the universally self-same unity of Being and 
Nothing through Becoming or Reason. For Nietzsche, the
whole is eternally self-same spatial considerations seem
to imply for him the possibility of an overriding unity to 
things, which he specifically denies. But, as has been 
argued, this is not inconsistent with Hegel if one sees 
Reason as the effect of the working-out of the inner nature 
of things. And for both Hegel and Nietzsche, the potential
expanding-outwards of primaeval subjects whether viewed as
'desire' or as 'will to power' is ontological. To view
Hegel's Spirit temporally in appearance as history and
'in fact1 as the end of history allows one to consider
Nietzsche as a post- historical philosopher, giving content 
to the 'eternal moment': what Hegel looks at abstractly as 
the ongoing dialectic, or continuing presence of Absolute 
Spirit, Nietzsche views from inside, for 'us' and for 
meaning in life, as the eternal recurrence.
The post-historical philosopher is, in Hegel's view, 
the Sage, and Nietzsche's writings echo many of the same 
characteristics of the philosopher-become-wise. He writes: 
"Today the man of knowledge might well feel like God become 
animal."25 The reverse is also true: man as a merely 
natural being rises above himself, incorporating the 
transcendent beyond into himself. The Sage thus ends the 
history of his type, of the purely rational man. But, for
25 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 84.
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Nietzsche, this is not a goal sufficient for humanity, and
he cautions against choosing the Sage as the resting point.
In Bevond Good and Evil, he writes:
The objective man is an instrument, a precious, 
easily injured and clouded instrument for 
measuring and, as an arrangement of mirrors, an 
artistic triumph that deserves care and honour; 
but he is no goal, no conclusion and sunrise, no 
complementary man in whom the rest of existence
is justified, no termination and still less a
beginning, a begetting and first cause, nothing 
tough, powerful, self-reliant that wants to be 
master.26
The Sage projects no future because he is an effect, and 
not an affect. Nietzsche is concerned that we 'move on' 
from this type of humanity, that although the Sage is the 
crowning achievement of an age, that age is completed in 
him, and so has lost the vitality of emergence into new 
states of affairs. New goals, and a new end-type of 
humanity, is required, and this Nietzsche describes as the 
Overman. The perspective of self-consciousness, which is 
the perspective of the higher man, allows one to project
this Overman: this perspective is our 'new height' the
standpoint at which we have arrived through our experience 
of time as history. By being self-conscious, we replay the 
'eternally present things' in creative, expansive, and 
human ways. This means to project and confront an 
'objective' world from out of the 'overabundance' of our 
mere subjectivity. These self-aware obstacles are the 
beyond within life. Nietzsche writes: "The highest man, if 
such a concept be allowed, would be the man who represented
26 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 128.
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the antithetical character of existence most strongly, as 
its glory and sole justification.1,27 Nietzsche's philosophy 
can be said to be not so much against the Sage, against 
reflective wisdom, but against the possibility of content­
ment in this condition. We cannot choose to ignore the 
continual emergence of desires, of the need not merely to 
reaffirm our condition, but to do so in ever-changing ways: 
one must re-engage, but one can never repeat.
Finally, to conclude the parallels to Hegel's end of 
history which are found in Nietzsche, the latter also noted 
the homogeneity of the post-historical epoch: the influence 
of the State (or ethical life, or Reason embodied) in every 
aspect of life. Nietzsche is most interested in the 
cultural and moral implications of this homogeneity. In 
Bevond Good and Evil, he writes: "In all major moral judge­
ments Europe is now of one mind, including even the 
countries dominated by the influence of Europe."28 
Nietzsche refers to this great levelling, to this 
applicability of one moral code to all spheres of life, as 
'herd morality. ' Herd morality is merely one type of 
morality among others, but it is, according to Nietzsche, 
the type that resists all others. This, precisely, is its 
homogenizing nature. The result of this moral universalism 
is to produce a kind of man who is at home everywhere, 
which is the Hegelian universal and homogeneous State. 
But, paradoxically, the man at home everywhere is at home
27 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 470.
28 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil. p. 115.
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nowhere: he lacks what Nietzsche calls a 'determinate
milieu': "The Europeans are becoming more similar to each 
other; they become more and more detached from the 
conditions under which races originate that are tied to 
some climate or class; they become increasingly independent 
of any determinate milieu that would like to inscribe 
itself for centuries in body and soul with the same 
demands."29 Nietzsche argues that the lack of a determinate
milieu leads to nihilism to the most radical
manifestation of homelessness, and so it is to this that we 
must now turn.
Other-Worldly Values
At the outset, a separation needs to be made between 
the traditional definition of "nihilism," and the special 
sense in which Nietzsche also uses this term. A difference 
exists between these two types of nihilism because each is 
based on a different view of what ought to be the source of 
values. I shall call the 'traditional' form of nihilism 
"philosophical nihilism," and the stronger, 'end of 
history' kind of moral subjectivism, "radical nihilism."
Philosophical nihilism originates in a belief in 
other-worldly values. A conventional definition is given 
by Richard Schacht as follows: "'Nihilism1 in the
philosophical sense of the term may be defined . . .  as the 
doctrine that normative and evaluative principles have no
29 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 176.
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objective basis in reality.”30 In other words, to be a 
nihilist is to say that there are no objective values. The 
key word in this definition is "objective.” Traditionally, 
the objectivity of values lay in their external and alien 
character compared to whatever they measure. Now, the 
nature of values as 'objective* is the crux of the 
disagreement between Nietzsche and traditional philosophy. 
The dispute centres on the existence or non-existence of an 
objective world. The key question is: Are values objective 
because they are a reference to a true, transcendent, and 
eternal world? For Nietzsche, the answer is an emphatic 
"no"; for the kind of philosophy which Nietzsche 
criticises, the answer is "yes." Hegel is the
turning-point, for, contrary to traditional philosophy, he 
posits objectivity within Being, as being an attribute of 
mediation within a whole. Values are objective for Hegel, 
but they are not a reference to an objective realm. For 
Hegel, previous philosophies, which posited objectivity in 
a realm apart from the changeable human world, were
necessary moments in the revelation of Being it was
important that man think and behave as if there were such 
a world. But, with the end of history, such incomplete 
moments are superseded. Nietzsche's criticisms of these 
philosophers are based on his recognition that their time 
is past, their 'as if* is out of tune with the truth about 
Being made manifest in modernity. Because Nietzsche denies
30 Richard Schacht, Hegel and After: Studies in Continen­
tal Philosophy Between Kant and Sartre. (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975). p. 177.
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the existence of objective values as references to an 
objective world, he has been called a nihilist. But the 
Hegelian revolution, taken most seriously by Nietzsche, 
results in the realisation that values are not in fact this 
kind of reference. So, before we can properly consider the 
question of nihilism, we must consider the question of the 
source of values: in what sense they are, or can be,
objective.
In light of previous philosophy, Nietzsche is a 
nihilist because he denies value in a true, essential world 
apart from the human world of appearances. But Nietzsche 
charges this philosophy with nihilism, the effect of which 
is to deny value in human life. The question of the source 
of values can therefore be put as follows: Are values a
reference to ideal essence or to actual existence, to an 
objective world or to the actual human world? And 
Nietzsche puts these further questions: Which source ought
values to have, if such a choice can be made? Are we to 
choose truth-affirming values, or life-affirming values? 
And does either choice thwart the problem of nihilism?
The view of philosophy up until Hegel has been that 
values must have their source in an objective world in 
order for the activities of measuring, of evaluating, and 
of judging to be even possible. Values are references, 
guides, and most importantly according to this view, fixed 
principles which stand against, or object to human thought, 
speech, and action. Values are true by merit of belonging 
to an objective realm; this in distinction to Hegel*s idea
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that values ultimately reveal the True through their nature 
as mediation within a whole, as that which objectifies 
Being. Objectivity is an effect of evaluation, and not the 
other way around. Previous philosophy would have it that 
the measurement is secondary to the hard reality of the 
logically and temporally prior objective ideal. 
Nietzsche's 'grand reflection' is that this view arose 
because of the way in which man chose to know the world: he 
made it his maxim that truth must be eternal, and that 
because the human world is radically temporal, defined by 
its rootedness in history and mortality, the truth cannot 
belong in it. If truth is eternal, then it cannot 
originate in so ephemeral a subject as human being, and so 
it was posited in a world beyond temporality, a world 
beyond our human one. And further, truth was made a value 
above human being. The human world is not only 
unessential, but judged worse by making truth a value, the 
goal for which human being obtains.
The truth, as fixed principles of value, was taken to 
be essential, as articulating the real nature of things. 
And the enquiring mind quickly discovers that the human 
world is indeed a world of appearance, a tableau, or 
representation. There must be something hidden which is 
appearing, which is presenting itself to us, so the 
argument goes. This essential, in-itself quality of things 
is veiled by the merely apparent, by the phenomenological. 
The truth must, by this argument, lie beyond the 
existential world in an essential world. This is what is
x
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meant by saying that the truth is transcendent. And so the 
urge for truth which impels philosophy has led to the 
discovery of an eternal, transcendent world. But Nietzsche 
argues that this world was not discovered, but rather was 
invented by philosophy, in order to satisfy its pre- 
rational desire for truth. The philosophers wanted to 
preserve their notion of truth when they discovered that 
the human world was a world of appearance. Nietzsche 
points out that in light of this eternal world's existence, 
the human world is by definition transitory and merely 
apparent. The value of our world subsists solely by 
reference to a remote, alienated and alienating true world. 
In itself, the human world is valueless. Not only is this 
traditional view wrong, in Nietzsche's view, but it is a 
terrible slander against humanity. What is its crime? The 
existence of the true world devalues life. Nietzsche 
asserts that life in itself is the source of values. This 
is why he attacks traditional philosophy: its urge for
truth is revealed as being nihilistic in the very moment of 
its triumph. Its actual incompleteness in the face of its 
proclaimed completeness is felt in the diminishment of pre- 
rational and pre-historical 'life.'
Nietzsche himself used the term "nihilism” in several 
ways, but when he discusses traditional philosophy, with 
its objective world system of values, he basically is 
conveying two senses. In the first sense, he says that he 
himself is a nihilist, in that he denies the values posited 
by 'other-worldly' religion and philosophy. In the Preface
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to The Will to Power. Nietzsche describes himself as a
nihilist, and also clearly outlines his own character as a
Sage, as the reflective philosopher, at sea with regard to
the future, with only the 'recollection of the spirits'--
to use the Hegelian phrase for a guide. Section 3 reads:
He that speaks here, conversely, has done nothing 
so far but reflect: a philosopher and solitary by 
instinct, who has found his advantage in standing 
aside and outside, in patience, in procrastinat­
ion, in staying behind; as a spirit of daring and 
experiment that has already lost its way once in 
every labyrinth of the future; as a soothsayer 
bird-spirit who looks back when relating what 
will come; as the first perfect nihilist of 
Europe who, however, has even now lived through 
the whole of nihilism, to the end, leaving it 
behind, outside himself.31
By the terms of reference of traditional philosophy,
Nietzsche is correct in his self-appellation, because he
denies that values are objective in the sense of being
references to a true, external world. But the second sense
in which Nietzsche uses the term "nihilism" is to call
those same transcendental thinkers nihilists, because their
truth-centred values actively deny what he considers to be
real, life-centred values. Nihilism, in this sense of
denying truth-centred values is not, according to
Nietzsche, sheer negativity, because it makes possible the
emergence of life-affirming values. Nietzsche's target is
philosophy in the service of the truth, which for him is
simple negativity.
The apparent nihilism of Nietzsche is a necessary 
first step, an attack on 'true' values so that 'life'
31 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 3.
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values can emerge. Much of Nietzsche*s work consists of a 
sustained critique of the philosophy of transcendence, on 
'ideal,* 'other-worldly' positors of value. For him, as 
Stanley Rosen writes in his book Nihilism: "The projection 
of an ideal, supersensible world as the locus of value 
serves to drain the physical or physiological world of its 
creativity."32 Nietzsche does not abandon the notion of 
'ideal,' but he does condemn its use throughout history. 
In Will to Power, he writes: "The ideal has hitherto been 
the actual force for disparaging the world and man the 
poisonous vapour over reality, the great seduction to 
nothingness."33 This 'nothingness' is nihilism: not just a 
philosophical outlook, but also a feeling of pessimism, of 
decline, of the ebb of life. Nietzsche writes: "The
declining instincts have become master over the ascending
instincts The will to nothingness has become master over
the will to life!"34
For Nietzsche, wisdom begins with the rejection of a 
beyond of truth removed from the life of the individual. 
This is no objection to Hegel, and in fact reinforces the 
'beyond within life' which is the object of thought in the 
post-historical epoch. Nietzsche writes: "The sage as
astronomer. As long as you still experience the stars as
something 'above you' you lack the eye of knowledge;"35 this 
passage could easily have been written by Hegel. Nihilism
32 Rosen, Nihilism, p. 144.
33 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 210.
34 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 217.
35 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 80.
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is caused by the belief in a remote world of truth, and the 
failure of reason to fix its categories by reference to it.
If philosophy has discovered that such a world is a
fiction, then the categories of reason cannot be such
references otherwise they are anchored to nothing, and
persistence in belief in them is nihilism. It is reason as 
reference to the remote beyond that Nietzsche attacks, not 
reason itself. In Will to Power, he writes: "The faith in 
the categories of reason is the cause of nihilism. We have 
measured the value of the world according to categories 
that refer to a purely fictitious world."36 The goal which 
was given by superhuman authority is replaced by what 
Nietzsche calls conscience, or reason, or the social 
instinct, or history; but the goal is still taken to be 
removed from one's life, and not yet given for oneself.37 
On the other hand, all goals are given from out of a kind 
of life being led, even remote, alienating ones. This 
realisation, though, makes impossible an authentic belief 
in a fixed objective realm, so we are left with trying to 
project sustainable goals from out ourselves, and our 
actual life.
The result of this realisation is that the objective 
realm disappears in the remote, autonomous sense, but one 
is left with the need for an object, the need to project 
horizons of meaning, to situate the self in context. To 
know that the objective realm is an invention is less
36 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 13.
37 Nietzsche, Will to Power, pp. 16-17.
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satisfying, less stable, than the belief that it was 
detached from the life of the individual. The Hegelian 
revolution is inescapable for modernity, as Nietzsche fully 
realised. He writes, in Will to Power;
moral judgements are torn from their 
conditionality, in which they have grown and 
alone possess any meaning . . . .  The great 
concepts 'good' and 'just* are severed from the 
presuppositions to which they belong and, as 
liberated 1 ideas,' become objects of dialectic. 
One looks for truth in them, one takes them for 
entities or signs of entities: one invents a
world where they are at home, where they 
originate 38
Thought, as Hegel realised, is a term of mediation within 
a whole; it is the variegation of Being. Thought is not a 
value; rather it is the means of valuation, the way in 
which a kind of life projects itself beyond its immediacy. 
Again, Nietzsche takes to heart the Hegelian conclusion: 
"The fundamental mistake is simply that, instead of 
understanding consciousness as a tool and particular aspect 
of the total life, we posit it as the standard and the 
condition of life that is of supreme value: it is the
erroneous perspective of a parte ad totum [from a part to 
the whole]."39
The starting point for Nietzsche is Hegel's 
conclusion: nothing exists besides the whole; values are 
distinctions within; the objective realm is a beyond within 
life. For Nietzsche, this is only cause for nihilism for 
the backward-looking mind, for one only at home in
38 Nietzsche, Will to Power, pp. 234-235.
39 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 376.
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reflective wisdom; he sees it, rather, as a new beginning
(Hegel's 'higher yet the same'), and a return to man's
primaeval life-force, his will to increase, or 'innocence of
becoming.' He writes:
There is no place, no purpose, no meaning, on 
which we can shift responsibility for our being, 
for our being thus and thus. Above all: no one 
could do it; one cannot judge, measure, compare 
the whole, to say nothing of denying it! Why
not?  . . . because nothing exists besides the
whole--And, to say it again, this is a
tremendous restorative; this constitutes the 
innocence of all existence.40
Nietzsche does not reject an external world of meaning 
because he believes that meaning can be easily found in 
this world. The world may be 'apparent, ' but that does not 
mean that values are. Values are not, nor can they be, 
immediate between things and man. In fact, values are this 
very mediation. In this, Nietzsche and other philosophers 
do not disagree. But for transcendental philosophers, the 
important mediation is between the essential world of truth 
or values (or Forms, or Ideas, etc.) and the world where 
these things appear, our world. For Nietzsche, the 
important mediation is between man himself and his world. 
"World" is to be understood here both spatially and 
temporally: man's 'space' is his social context, human
community; man's 'time' is his temporality and his 
mortality. The mediation between man and world takes the 
form of speech and action. Speech and action are 
themselves meaning-creating, value-positing, or horizon- 
building. Man goes beyond appearances when he sets about
40 Nietzsche, Will to Power, pp. 402-403.
exploring the dynamic relationship between himself and his
world, between subject and object a continuing dialectic
between desire and its satisfaction which is mediated by
speech and action. Nietzsche, like traditional
philosophers, sought beyond appearances. But unlike them,
he believed that one does not escape, nor can one escape,
the merely apparent by creating a fixed, eternal world of
value. Johan Goudsblom writes:
Nietzsche concurred unequivocally with the view 
that the world in which we live is a world of 
appearances and that its true meaning remains 
hidden from us. But, he wondered, did that 
necessarily imply the existence of another world, 
on which we can know, an objective world capable
of releasing us from all the constraints of this
one? Right from the start his reply was 
negative.41
According to Nietzsche, the history of philosophy has 
been succeeding perceptions of truth as homage to this idea 
of the true world. But if truth were to reside in this
true world, then it would be irrevocably alienated from
this one; the value of this world would exist only insofar 
as it is a reflection of the true one. Life becomes, in
this view, of secondary importance and unessential. In
itself, life would be false: there would be no truth in it, 
only of it. And if truth is affirmed as a positive good, 
then life is not only false, but unworthy. How can mortal 
life compare to immortality? History to eternity? The 
phenomenal to the essential? It can only compare 
negatively: life is depreciated by the existence of a
41 Johan Goudsblom, Nihilism and Culture. (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1980). p. 25.
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transcendental true world. To search for objective value 
is itself a denial that value lies within, is rooted, in 
actual human life. If, as Nietzsche argues, the only world 
is this one, the world of living men, and if values are 
possible, then those values must exist within. be a quality 
of as well as for this world.
Nietzsche sees his task as turning man's perspective 
towards himself and his world, and away from the other- 
world of truth. This is in many ways a return to the 
beginning of Hegel's dialectic: for Hegel, what is
different now is man's self-consciousness, and his 
appropriation of Reason. Man now has a past, the 
experience of the dialectic, recollected for him now in its 
entirety. Nietzsche, as well, sees man on the threshold of 
a new beginning, of re-engagement with himself and his 
actual life, but this time 'hardened in the discipline of 
science':
To translate man back into nature . . .  to see to 
it that man henceforth stands before man as even 
today, hardened in the discipline of science, he 
stands before the rest of nature, with intrepid 
Oedipus eyes and sealed Odysseus ears, deaf to 
the siren songs of old metaphysical bird catchers 
who have been piping at him all too long, 'you 
are more, you are higher, you are of a different
origin! ' that may be a strange and insane task,
but it is a task.42
If humanity goes about seeking a higher world of 
values as the measure of this life, without recognising 
this construct as a sometimes useful invention, then this 
search is not only hopeless, but detrimental to the
42 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. pp. 161-162.
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searcher himself. As Hegel argued, such a search was the 
'as if' of history, which led ultimately to the realisation 
of truth as a quality within the whole of man and his 
world. But with the end of history, the will to truth, 
solely as a seeking elsewhither, is superseded. In 
Nietzsche's eyes, to persist in the other-worldly view is 
to turn away from the challenge of modernity: philosophical 
nostalgia which runs counter to creativity, and thereby 
life. The insight of wisdom is that what man asserts when 
he asserts value in a higher, true world is the precise 
opposite of what he intends: he asserts nothing, the null 
value. And this is what nihilism is: as Nietzsche says, it 
is "when the highest values devalue themselves." He 
continues this thought, in The Twilight of the Idols, thus: 
"The criteria which have been bestowed on the 'true being' 
of things are the criteria of not-being, of naught."43 
Nietzsche believed, as Gilles Deleuze writes, that "life 
takes on a value of nil insofar as it is denied and 
depreciated."44 Nietzsche perceives the 'depreciation of 
life' to be evidence of the falsity of all evaluations 
hitherto, but this is an objection he can make only by 
establishing a new kind of meaning-giving horizon. Again, 
Nietzsche is both limited and liberated by the claim to 
completeness of the Hegelian revolution.
The defence against nihilism is made by establishing
43 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in The 
Portable Nietzsche. edited and translated by Walter 
Kaufmann. (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1954). p. 484.
44 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy. Translated by 
Hugh Tomlinson. ^London: The Athlone Press, 1983). p. 147.
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a world-view in competition with the other-worldly view.
Nietzsche believes that the ‘truth' of his view is its
timeliness; the force it gains by its felt merits for
disillusioned modernity. The intuitive appeal of an
immanent beyond seems to provide the ability to forestall
nihilism: "The world might be far more valuable than we
used to believe; we must see through the naivete of our
ideals, and while we thought that we accorded it the
highest interpretation, we may not even have given our
human existence a moderately fair value."45 Nature, in
itself, has value and dignity for Nietzsche: man's natural
being is nothing to be despised, yet this precisely is the
result of measuring man's humanity solely with reference to
a remote beyond. In Will to Power. Nietzsche writes:
Consider the damage all human institutions 
sustain if a divine and transcendent higher 
sphere is postulated that must first sanction 
these institutions. By then growing accustomed 
to seeing their value in this sanction (e.g.., in 
the case of marriage) , one has reduced their 
natural dignity, in certain circumstances denied
it Nature has been ill-judged to the extent to
which one has brought into honour the anti­
naturalness of a God. 'Natural' has come to mean 
the same as 'contemptible,' 'bad' 46
Nietzsche argues that the other-world of truth does 
not exist, and so reference to it is reference to nothing. 
This is so even on the Hegelian view: we are saved from 
nihilism only by the limitation of our historical 
incompleteness, but this refuge no longer avails us. 
Nietzsche's objection is that other-worldly evaluation is
45 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 22.
46 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 141.
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an unauthentic projection: to believe in such an object, 
in view of what he believes to be its patent disappearance. 
is to find false comfort, which can shield one from 
nihilism only so long as one's ignorance remains 
unenlightened. The embodiment of values in nothing cannot 
long stand: this is the source both of Nietzsche's
confidence, and his annoyance at the persistence of these 
kinds of projections. He writes: "Very few are clear as to 
what the standpoint of desirability, every 'thus it should 
be but is not* or even 'thus it should have been, ' 
comprises: a condemnation of the total course of things."47 
Nietzsche, like Hegel, affirms the total course of things: 
to desire otherwise, particularly with reference to the 
whole of Being, is to reach for nothing, and effectively 
succumb to nihilism. Nietzsche writes, in Will to Power: 
"It is a miserable story: man seeks a principle through
which he can despise men he invents a world so as to be
able to slander and bespatter this world: in reality, he 
reaches every time for nothingness and construes 
nothingness as 'God,' as 'truth,' and in any case as judge 
and condemner of this state of being."48
The insight of the end of history, which is open and 
taken by Nietzsche, is that other-worldly philosophy is 
nihilistic. Nietzsche writes: "The antithesis of the
apparent world and the true world is reduced to the
• • # AOantithesis 'world' and 'nothing.'" Nevertheless,
47 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 180.
48 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 253.
49 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 306.
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Nietzsche recognises that some kind of reaching beyond the 
self is essential to life and knowledge. But such 
projections are 'as ifs': they are distortions which are 
necessary for the intelligibility of Being. They were not 
distortions for Hegel, because the dialectic persistently 
revealed a wider, and hence 'truer' level of reality. But 
this possibility is not open to Nietzsche: the legacy of 
Hegel is that all projections now are self-conscious: in a 
sense, they are wilful illusions, adopted and discarded to 
reveal aspects of a radically present world. Awareness of 
the 'as if1 nature of objective knowledge distinguishes 
post-historical knowledge from the other-worldly kind: one 
is aware of one's own manipulation in the wider context of 
the self. Hence, as Nietzsche writes, "all ideals are 
dangerous: because they debase and brand the actual? all 
are poisons, but indispensable as temporary cures.”50
Other-worldly philosophy not only believes in the 
existence of a fixed world of value, but further believes 
that values ought to be references to such a world. And if 
such a world cannot be found, and if one despairs of 
finding it, then one despairs of values altogether. This 
is radical nihilism, and it is the most extreme result of 
the failure of the desire to situate life by reference to 
an other-world of value. Against this, Nietzsche affirms 
the will to power, an all-embracing affirmation of life.
50 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 130.
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Radical Nihilism 
How, then, are we to choose between these two notions 
of the source of value? To choose either seems to leave 
open the charge of nihilism. If we choose life-affirming 
values then we ignore the urge for truth, for the eternal, 
for the transcendent. But if we choose truth-affirming 
values we thereby ignore the spontaneity, the creativity,
the vitality of human life. Neither choice if this stark
contrast actually obtains---seems satisfying. But
Nietzsche*s critique of philosophy is more thorough-going 
than this, and he does not simply assert a new choice of 
values. According to Nietzsche, other-worldly objective 
values denigrate human life, which is the only ’real' 
source of values. Because this perspective devalues value, 
it is nihilistic. But a stronger attack which Nietzsche 
makes on his predecessors is that their assertion of a true 
world of value has in fact led to the most radical form of 
nihilism: not just to the belief that there are no
objective values, but to the view that there are and can be 
no values at all. Philosophy has trodden the path of
reason to its fullest extent this is the conclusion of
the end of history argument. But if philosophy persists in 
the true world view, despite Hegel*s elaboration of the 
nature of wisdom as a quality within Being, then reason is 
not only complete, but totally removed from man. The 
demands of reason become impossible to meet if it is a
perfected ideal alienated from the mutable reality of human
being. The extent to which the notion of a true world has
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persisted in philosophy is the extent to which wisdom, as 
completed reason, has been thought to be an unreachable 
beyond, something approachable but not realisable. 
Paradoxically, the triumph of the urge for truth, what 
ought to be the final revelation of meaning for man, has in 
fact made possible the most complete form of nihilism.
This radical nihilism may be stated as follows: 
Nihilism is "a consciousness that there is no meaning or 
truth to be found at all.”51 Meaning cannot be found quite 
simply because it is not there. It is the nature of the 
world as valueless which dictates the impossibility of 
making true statements about it: “There is and can be no 
such thing as 'truth* where reality is concerned, since
reality is such that nothing whatsoever except this fact
is true about it."52
Nietzsche defines "nihilism," in The Will to Power, as 
follows: "What does nihilism mean? That the highest values 
devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; 'why?' finds no 
answer."53 The aim is lacking in both of its historical 
senses: the supersensible beyond has lost its effective
power, and also the temporal end of history has faded in 
the moment of its realisation. Both the 'kingdom of God' 
and the oroaressus in infinitum no longer satisfy the
inquiring mind it has already found its satisfaction in
them, and so they are no longer the object of desire. But 
because the whole enterprise of meaning was interwoven with
51 Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 22.
52 Schacht, Hegel and After, p. 177.
53 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 9.
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these objects, it appears, at first, as if meaning itself 
has disappeared with them. This is the radical nihilism 
observed by Nietzsche: "One interpretation has collapsed; 
but because it was considered the interpretation it now 
seems as if there were no meaning at all in existence, as 
if everything were in vain."54 The failure of the old 
interpretation gives Nietzsche the opportunity to turn the 
activity of evaluation towards a new object, towards life 
itself. Not to take this opportunity, in fact, leads to 
the devaluation of this life: "A nihilist is a man who
judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and 
of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist."55 
This is the practical consequence of persistence in 
historically incomplete moments of consciousness, in 
holding to the other-worldly view, despite its failure, 
and, as Hegel argues, its supersession in the post- 
historical epoch.
It is one of the key demands of philosophy that "we 
must be prepared to discuss and examine the reasons why we 
act the way we do."56 Yet it is increasingly our experience 
that no arguments by which we may wish to justify our 
judgements and decisions can withstand critical analysis. 
Radical criticism undermines not just a particular 
judgement but the possibility of any judgement at all, 
because the very basis of judging is discredited, and so we 
cannot even begin to go about doing it. No measures can
54 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 35.
55 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 318.
56 Goudsblom, Nihilism and Culture, p. x.
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therefore be rationally applied to human conduct, so values
collapse and nihilism is the result. The dogged attempt to
ground the whole of human experience in principles which
are purely rational has led to the complete disillusionment
which is nihilism. Johan Goudsblom writes:
For him all existing values, whether orthodox or 
revolutionary, are defunct. He knows that every­
thing is in vain, that life has no objective, 
that any purpose which we attribute to existence 
is no more than our interpretation of it, false 
and untenable. The realization that reality is 
completely pointless is paralysing.57
Why should this realisation be paralysing rather than
liberating? Is this not the actual freedom of which Hegel
was speaking, where the act counts for all because it is
what generates the object, the goal to which it is
directed? No, it is merely absolute freedom, lacking the
necessary determination of self by Spirit, the putting-
into-context of the act by a wider human community and
history, which makes freedom meaningful. Our experience of
'pointless reality,' is the realisation merely of absolute
freedom, and it is paralysing because we are unable to make
distinctions between courses of action on purely rational
grounds. Affects, the desires which lead to action,
continue to be the motor of history: reason, meanwhile,
cannot lose its character of reflection to become a cause
of new states of human being.
Nietzsche's particular discovery or invention, his 
position within metaphysics, is in part the elaboration of 
radical nihilism: "Nietzsche defines nihilism as the
57 Goudsblom, Nihilism and Culture, p. 11.
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situation which obtains when ’everything is permitted.' If 
everything is permitted then it makes no difference what we 
do, and so nothing is worth anything.”58 If nothing is
worth anything, then any so-called reasons for something--
which purport to be statements of the worth of the thing--
are meaningless. Because any reason is worthless, all 
reasons are equivalent: there can be no difference between 
ascribing one reason to ascribing another. But speech, in 
order to be meaningful, must make discriminations, it must 
separate a thing from its significance, an act from its 
reasons. To the nihilist, speech does not make 
distinctions, and it cannot do so. Effectively, then, the 
language of justification is, in the ears of the nihilist, 
the same as noise or silence, and "speech that is
indistinguishable from silence is nihilism.”59
It is worth noting that nihilism emerges from 
considerations of speech. of the reasons or justification 
for action. The purpose of meaningful speech is to make
distinctions, to demonstrate the value of things. Where
speech fails to evaluate, where it fails to separate a 
specific act from all other acts, then the result is 
nihilism. A collapse in meaning is just that: Meaning, the 
demonstration of value, fails to be rationally compelling. 
What is involved is not some failure of reality, but the 
loss of the perceived ground of reality: "Nihilism emerges 
not because the problem of existence generates greater
58 Rosen, Nihilism, p. xiii.
59 Rosen, Nihilism, p. xix.
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unease than before, but because all justification for 
existence has been discredited.60 So nihilism is not an 
existential predicament, not a product of the nature of 
things. What is involved is the perceived failure of 
reason to provide a foundation for reality, to be the truth 
of the world. Nihilism is not a thing discovered in the 
world, it is a thing invented in the process of exploring 
the world. The genesis of nihilism is in man, not in the 
world.
If nihilism is not a 'given* problem, but one arising 
from the dynamic of man and world, then it follows that the 
source of values must also be this dynamic. Real values 
can only come through evaluation, through the placing-in- 
context of human being. They are not so much within 
things, in-themselves, as they are between things, for- 
themselves and for-others. But the realisation that value
is not a 'substance' within things themselves which
realisation is the end of history has led to nihilism.
Nietzsche agrees with the conclusion of Hegelian wisdom: 
things-in-themselves have no value, but he goes on to point 
out the error of saying that because this is the case there 
can be no values at all. The error lies in the failure to 
properly perceive value as being a quality descriptive of 
the dynamic relation between humanity and its context, 
human being within the horizons of meaning. Specifically, 
this means man within political culture and within history. 
Radical nihilists have tried and failed to fix meaning in
60 Goudsblom, Nihilism and Culture, p. 29.
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an unchangeable object, the supersensible, eternal realm 
which transcends our perceived, historical one. Because 
values fail to emerge from where they ought to appear, the 
radical nihilists conclude that no values are possible at 
all. While the radical nihilists have tried and failed, 
philosophical nihilists persists in a search for meaning in 
the same way. For Nietzsche, both perspectives effectively 
devalue life, and this, for him, is the essence of 
nihilism. Furthermore, the consciousness of the failure of 
this 'as if1 of meaning has extended well beyond the 
debates of philosophers: the malaise spreads because the 
possibility of a cure is denied. According to Nietzsche, 
hitherto all ascriptions of meaning have been nihilistic.
The world is a world inferred Nietzsche is firmly in the
metaphysical tradition in the primacy he attaches to 
thought? but thought directed towards the objective realm, 
away from life, is thought which is unauthentic and false. 
He writes, in Bevond Good and Evil: "Whoever takes this
world, along with space, time, form, movement, to be
falsely inferred anyone like that [e.g., Nietzsche
himself!] would at least have ample reason to learn to be 
suspicious at long last of all thinking."61 His attack on 
the transcendental view of values is, from the perspective 
of that thinking which has hitherto falsely inferred the 
world, the destruction wrought by a nihilist. But for 
Nietzsche, it is the first authentic attempt to bring 
meaning back into the world. In his terms, it is the
61 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, pp. 45-46.
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renewal of the Dionysian spirit, when the Apollonian spirit 
is weakened and spent.
Nietzsche's rejection of metaphysical dualism plus a 
desire to affirm values in life is a revolutionary turn to 
philosophy, but a necessary one in order to rise above 
modern, radical nihilism. He begins by recognising that 
objective values are impossible in the other-worldly sense: 
such concepts as the true, the real or being are not 
*given1 outside our experience? they are descriptions of 
and part of actual human life. It is these concepts, not 
human life, which are contingent or secondary. To assert 
these concepts as being fixed in any sense is nihilistic: 
"Being, the true and the real are the avatars of nihilism 
Nietzsche has no more belief in the self- 
sufficiency of the real than he has in that of the true: he 
thinks of them as the manifestation of a will, a will to 
depreciate life, to oppose life to life.”62 Nietzsche says 
as much when he writes in The Twilight of the Idols: "Any
distinction between a 'true1 and an * apparent1 world--
whether in the Christian manner or in the manner of Kant
(in the end, an underhanded Christian) is only a
suggestion of decadence, a symptom of the decline of 
life."63
It was an error to believe that truth exists 
independently of the knowing subject: an error expressed by 
Hegel as 'moments of incompletion.' Truth ought to be way
62 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 184.
63 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, p. 484.
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of considering the outcome of the process of man revealing 
the world and the world revealing man through thinking and 
speech. It is not something which is waiting to be 
discovered, some entity like an island, fixed in the sea 
whether man has sailed to it and put it on a map or not. 
Nietzsche recognises that thinking is a two-fold process, 
that the exploration of the world is also the introspection 
of man. These two are inseparable: the binding, the
connection, the mediation between them is what values are. 
The belief that values rest on a fixed point is a vain 
hope, and a destructive, life-depreciating, nihilistic one 
at that: "Before any steps away from nihilism can be taken, 
one must first escape the error that there is a stopping 
point which can be found and occupied by means of 
investigation; truth does not rest on anything.1,64 The 
failure to find meaning 'out there,' 'in the world,' is 
thus the failure of man to also look for meaning within 
himself, or, more precisely, to reveal the meaning which is 
the relation between himself and the world. The 
traditional search for value is itself nihilistic because 
it erroneously focuses on the object of the search, without 
paying attention to its subject, man the searcher engaged 
in this quest.
For Nietzsche, this problem of radical nihilism does 
not arise from not having pushed far enough along the road 
of reason. This road has been followed and its destination 
reached: the idea that man ought to give a rational account
64 Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 39.
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of himself and his world has triumphed. Reason finds, in 
the end, that the realm of truth projected by history is in 
fact a nothingness. Reason has succeeded: it has
completely realised itself. But the urge for truth which 
impelled reason has failed: the place to which it directed 
reason was void. In Nietzsche*s metaphorical language, 
where it sought God, reason found a corpse. To continue in 
the perspective directed towards transcendent, other­
worldly Being (and not towards transcendent aspects within 
Being) is to manifest the *will to nothingness*: nihilism.
Nietzsche writes: **To sacrifice God for the nothing this
paradoxical mystery of the final cruelty was reserved for 
the generation that is now coming up.**65 This is a 
* paradoxical mystery* because man now has a more worthy 
object at hand: his own life, raised to the level of
self-consciousness, as Hegel has shown. Martin Heidegger 
writes: "The pronouncement *God is dead* means: The
suprasensory world is without effective power. It bestows 
no life. Metaphysics, i.e., for Nietzsche Western 
philosophy understood as Platonism, is at an end."66 This 
destination has simply turned out not to satisfy the desire 
which prompted the journey in the first place. That desire 
was to find the truth, the value, the essence, or the 
reality within things themselves, but the process of 
satisfying this desire, the road of reason, has in fact led 
to ontological nihilism, to the realisation that value does
65 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 67.
66 Heidegger, "Word of Nietzsche," in Question Concerning 
Technology, p. 61.x
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not reside within things at all. And this has also led to 
transcendental nihilism: the failure of the attempt to
relate things to an unchanging beyond. Briefly, the 
development of nihilism may be stated as follows: At first, 
man seeks to satisfy his desire to know the essence of 
things; by attempting to do so (by developing reason) he
soon discovers that things-in-themselves have no value--
this is ontological nihilism. So then he looks to relate 
things to the desired essence in an external world? and the 
result of this development of reason is either to discover 
that such a world does not exist, or that it is hopelessly
remote and unknowable this is objective nihilism.
Finally, with the realisation that essence is not 
subjective, not within things, and not objective, not 
independent of things, we get modern, radical nihilism: the 
belief that there is no essence at all. Nothing is worth 
anything.
The cause of this whole metaphysical journey was the 
pre-rational urge for truth. And Nietzsche himself 
followed this process to logical extremes, to the extent of 
questioning the value of this urge in the first place. 
Nietzsche came to realise that the origin of reason lies in 
this desire, that, at ifcs root, there is no reason for 
reason. His relentlessness in taking seriously the demand 
of philosophy to give a wholly rational account of the 
world can lead one to plausibly claim that "Nietzsche 
invented nihilism.”67 By this, one means that Nietzsche
67 Goudsblom, Nihilism and Culture, p. 138.
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brought together those elements already present in culture 
to show how they culminate in nihilism, much as a physical 
inventor brings together principles which have always 
existed, but which only come together in his act of 
invention. Hegel would describe this coming-together of 
elements present in culture as a "world-historical moment.” 
It is an 'instantiation of Being' or 'presencing of Spirit' 
which is apprehended by the philosopher through whom it 
occurs. Heidegger writes: "In every phase of metaphysics 
there has been visible at any particular time a portion of 
a way that the destining of Being prepares as a path for 
itself over and beyond whatever is, in sudden epoch of 
truth."68 Just as Hegel articulates the whole of history, 
Nietzsche articulates the 'eternal moment' which is its 
end. He recognised that the movement which Hegel described 
has been accomplished, that what was truth as a goal is now
truth as a manifest reality a truth which has turned out
to be very different as a result than it appeared as a 
projection, as a reality than a dream. Again to quote 
Heidegger: "Nietzsche's thinking sees itself as belonging
under the heading 'nihilism. ' That is the name for a 
historical movement, recognized by Nietzsche, already 
ruling throughout preceding centuries, and now determining 
this century. Nietzsche sums up his interpretation of it in 
the brief statement: 'God is dead.'"69
68 Heidegger, "Word of Nietzsche," in Question Concerning 
Technology, p. 54.
69 Heidegger, "Word of Nietzsche," in Question Concerning 
Technology, p. 57.
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To realise the nihilism inherent in the other-worldly
view is the necessary first step to authentic valuation in
the post-historical epoch. According to Nietzsche, "we
must experience nihilism before we can find out what value
these Values' really had."70 I argue that what we realise
is the Hegelian revolution, that we come to the
understanding that values are projections within Being, a
whole which is divided into subjects and objects by this
very activity. With this realisation comes the decline of
strong mediation or negation, since their resolution is
already present to them. The post-historical epoch is the
1 twilight of the idols, ' but also a new beginning, since we
now know what we are about when we engage in valuation,
when we speak, act, and think. The end of history is
therefore a period of profound nihilism, but only out of
this can * crucial and most essential growth* begin anew.
Nietzsche writes:
Actually, every major growth is accompanied by a 
tremendous crumbling and passing away: suffering, 
the symptoms of decline belong in the times of 
tremendous advances; every fruitful and powerful 
movement of humanity has also created at the same 
time a nihilistic movement. It could be the sign 
of a crucial and most essential growth, of the 
transition to new conditions of existence, that 
the most extreme form of pessimism, genuine 
nihilism, would come into the world.71
From the transcendent dualist world-view, Nietzsche is 
a nihilist. But in the face of the collapse of this view, 
and the need for objective values, Nietzsche is an 'arrow 
of longing for the Overman,' making real values possible.
70 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 4.
71 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 69.
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Chapter Four 
The Affirmation of Life
X
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The Will to Power
Nietzsche*s critical philosophy is his attack on 
existing values. His positive philosophy is concerned with 
how nihilism is overcome, or how real values assert them­
selves, which is the same thing. Nietzsche believes that 
real values arise from the * affirmation of life1, that life 
is 'will to power', and that affirmation is the result of 
'perspective': the act of a human individual within a
determinate milieu. Nietzsche's positive philosophy, as it 
concerns nihilism, is summarised by Heidegger as follows:
"Value [is] . . . the condition having the character of
point-of-view of the preservation and enhancement of
life, and also . . . life [is] grounded in becoming as the 
will to power, the will to power is revealed as that which 
posits that point of view."1 To will is, implicitly, to put 
into relation one's immediate self and one's wider self, a 
desire and its satisfaction. The mutual 'regard' of each 
aspect of individuality is 'recognition,' and so is bound 
up with the notion of perspective.
The will to power, for Nietzsche, ontological. He 
states: "life simply is will to power."2 Life takes pride 
of place in Nietzsche's philosophy because of his rejection 
of a transcendent world of Being. Being is therefore 
becoming; as Stephen Houlgate writes, "what is real for 
Nietzsche is 'becoming' flux, multiplicity, change."3
1 Heidegger, "Word of Nietzsche," Question Concerning 
Technology, p. 74.
2 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 203.
3 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 49.
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Life is our real and concrete experience of the rather 
abstract notion of ‘becoming.' If life is will to power, 
then, Nietzsche writes, "as a reality it is the primordial 
fact of all history."4 Life, as will to power, is primor­
dial : it is Nietzsche's step back from history into a wider 
tableau. The will to power, considered alongside the amor 
fati expressed in the doctrine of eternal recurrence, is 
for Nietzsche as the Idea is for Hegel. And, if Hegel is 
right about the coincidence of wisdom with the end of 
history, then will to power is Nietzsche's particular 
understanding of the Idea: it is a mode of the on-going
presence of Spirit, no longer understood in the old meta­
physical sense, but now as an immanent beyond.
If we look at the idea of the 'origin' of values in an 
Hegelian way, as a somewhat arbitrary starting-point for 
the understanding, then the source of values is will to 
power. Life, as will to power, is the foundation of 
perspective, the grounding of the 'from-to' directedness 
that is the content of evaluation. Nietzsche writes: 
"There is nothing to life that has value, except the degree
of power assuming that life itself is the will to power."5
If there are no values apart from consideration of the 
'degree of power,' then the intelligible character of the 
world is simply a determination of this: the world is a
world inferred, and can be said, therefore, to be the 
effect of the will to power. Nietzsche writes: "The world
4 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil. p. 204.
5 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 37.
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viewed from inside, the world defined and determined
according to its * intelligible character* it would be
*will to power* and nothing else.**6 The world is a world 
viewed from inside: the conclusion of Hegelian wisdom is 
that Being is Being perceived, hence intelligibility is the 
result of perspective. Perspective is the logos of Being, 
the structure and utterance of a differentiated whole.
The term "will to power" isolates that aspect of life 
which Nietzsche most admires. This is the tendency of 
living beings to exert their strength, to make their 
presence felt in the world, to impose their singular 
character upon a wider tableau, to be greater than what 
they are. In Bevond Good and Evil. Nietzsche writes: "A
living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--
life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one 
of the indirect and most frequent results.117 Will to power 
is more fundamental than the instinct for survival, for 
Nietzsche. Mere endurance is a consequence of the drive of 
life, but not that drive itself.
Value consists of mediation, of turning one's atten­
tion from one thing to another thing, and making a com­
parison. What is essential to evaluation is not either of 
these things in themselves (i.e., not an objective realm, 
or a self-sufficient subject), but the middle term. The 
middle term is the *life' or 'force* or 'power* which 
exists between things, holding them together and keeping
6 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 48.
7 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 21.
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them apart. For Hegel, this was Spirit as Reason. For 
Nietzsche, this is will to power. And so, Nietzsche 
writes, in Will to Power: "What is the objective measure of 
value? Solely the quantum of enhanced and organized 
power."8 'Objective* is to be understood here as the post- 
historical object, as a beyond within life. 'Life' encom­
passes what posits and what is posited. The tendency of 
all things to 'manifest themselves* is will to power. 
Because origins are implied in ends, life is re-confirmed 
by its 'outer-directedness,' and no longer denigrated by a 
beyond thought to be outside actual life. According to 
Nietzsche: "'Willing': means willing an end. 'An end'
includes an evaluation."9 An end includes an evaluation 
because it only has meaning with reference to its origin, 
to the desire (or manifestation of the will to power) which 
projected it in the first place.
The inseparability of the notion of 'end' from the 
notion of 'willing' means that Nietzsche's will to power is 
much more than merely a drive, or a natural force.
Nietzsche states clearly that the essence of will is not
• • • • 10 •craving, instinct, or desire. However, it is desire in
the special Hegelian sense: the desire which projects a
future, which anticipates its satisfaction in a state of
affairs not yet at hand, which seeks to expand the self to
encompass the desired object, and so engage in the dialec­
tic, or in negation. If we introduce the notion of end to
8 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 356.
9 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 150.
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‘mere1 desire, then we understand Nietzsche*s will to 
power. He writes, in Will to Power: *'*Willing* is not
'desiring,' striving, demanding: it is distinguished from 
these by the affect of commanding. There is no such thing 
as 'willing, ' but only a willing something: one must not 
remove the aim from the total condition.''11 Willing is 
commanding, and so it is an affect. An affect is a desire 
which leads to action. Action directs the self towards an 
end, towards a rapprochement with its goal. The goal is 
the effect which completes or satisfies the affect, and 
thereby enhances the self in whom that affect occurred. 
Will to power is the self-enhancing expansion of life.
Will to power is not mere wilfulness. Nietzsche 
avoids the charge of radical subjectivity by insisting on 
the importance of ends to willing, of the apparent outer- 
directedness of the act of the individual. So when 
Nietzsche talks about the 'feeling' of the enhancement of 
power, this feeling depends upon a reference to an object. 
The feeling itself is important merely as the reflective 
proof of authentic engagement with the world, and with 
life. This is how Nietzsche can write that "the criterion 
of truth resides in the enhancement of the feeling of 
power,"12 because this feeling can only be 'enhanced' when 
the self acts authentically, when it involves itself in a 
wider context, when it directs itself to real objects
10 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 52.
11 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 353.
12 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 290.
beyond its singular existence, albeit within the realised 
whole of Being, or ‘life.*
So the subjective experience of the individual is only 
part of the equation of the will to power. The beyond 
within life surrounds the individual, situating it, making 
it a determinate self, or a person, or someone-in-par- 
ticular. To look for meaning solely in the desire, in the 
origin, is to miss the fatefulness of every act: the myriad 
of consequences extending beyond the individual into the 
future and into the community or culture. Indeed, as 
Nietzsche comments, the contribution of the thinking, 
feeling self to the matrix of meaning is relatively small: 
"Sensations and thoughts are something extremely insig­
nificant and rare in relation to the countless number of 
events that occur every moment.'*13 Each event is a manifes­
tation of the will to power, and is therefore an end- 
directed occasion, or moment, or destining of Being. 
Nietzsche writes: "The will to power [is] not a being, not 
a becoming, but a pathos.1,14 Walter Kaufmann, in his note 
to this passage of Will to Power, writes the following on 
the meaning of "pathos": "Occasion, event, passion, suffer­
ing, destiny are among the meanings of this Greek word."15 
Will to power, therefore, is enhancing or expansive because 
it reaches beyond the singular self in this way. It is not 
'being' because it is not static; it is not 'becoming'
13 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 357.
14 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 339.
15 Walter Kaufmann, ed. , Nietzsche's Will to Power, p. 
339.
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because it is not mere wilfulness. It is not the standard, 
but the logos of evaluation: the substance of the projec­
tion of the self into its wider situation, and the descrip­
tion of the fatefulness or destining of the post-historical 
Being-as-becoming. Nietzsche writes: "The will to power 
interprets . . .  it defines limits, determines degrees, 
variation of power."16 Will to power is the Correct1 post- 
historical concentration on the moment of mediation, rather 
than the becoming-other1 which was the old metaphysical 
notion of values.
Like Hegel, Nietzsche emphasises the importance of the 
experience of desiring over the desire itself, and over its 
satisfaction. Will to power is concerned with * feeling* or 
1 experience* or 'consciousness. ' Will to power is a wav, 
or as Nietzsche sometimes puts it, an across. Ends, or 
'effects,' and origins, or 'affects,' are essential as 
anchors to its appearance, but the mind's eye must focus on 
the moment of mediation to find perspective, or the truth 
about Being. Nietzsche writes: "Pleasure is only a symptom 
of the feeling of power attained, a consciousness of a
difference ( there is no striving for pleasure: but
pleasure supervenes when that which is being striven for is 
attained: pleasure is an accompaniment, pleasure is not the
motive )."17 In fact, man does not desire happiness.
What he desires is to manifest his will to power: he wants 
to engage himself in the wider world, to come up against
16 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 342.
17 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 366.
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things which obiect to his subjectivity, and to overcome 
them. The experience of desire as a lack within is not the 
lack of the feeling of pleasure. Rather, it is the dis­
satisfaction of being merely a self, and this is overcome 
by engagement, by acting, and thereby finding oneself in a 
context, as being not merely alive, but a part of life. 
Nietzsche writes: ”The feeling of pleasure lies precisely
in the dissatisfaction of the will, in the fact that the 
will is never satisfied unless it has opponents and resis­
tance. 'The happy man*: a herd ideal.”18 The 'herd ideal1
is the other-worldly beyond in this case, the man who is
happy, and who therefore is the condemnation of the man who 
relies upon his dissatisfaction of the will to be truly 
alive, and truly human.
Finally, will to power is the measure of freedom. 
Freedom is to be understood here in the Hegelian sense. A 
person is only free when he is a situated self, an individ­
ual, or a particular self-consciousness. Implied in all 
this is the situation, or the community, or Self-Conscious­
ness as such. The will to power consists of such a shining 
forth, and such a reflecting back. In Will to Power. 
Nietzsche writes: "The degree of resistance that must be
continually overcome in order to remain on top is the 
measure of freedom, whether for individuals or for
societies freedom understood, that is, as positive power,
as will to power."19 The degree of resistance overcome is
18 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 370.
19 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 404.
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the measure of will to power, a test of the exuberance of 
life. The sense in which will to power is a standard can 
be found only in the difference of degrees of power, in the 
amount of strength: values, it will be recalled, reside in 
comparisons. Truth is found 'in the enhancement of the 
feeling of power,' and so truth is a function of one's 
contact with reality, or one's engagement with life, or 
one's meeting with and overcoming of obstacles. Stephen 
Houlgate writes: "Nietzschean strength, therefore, is
measured both by how much reality and life one can endure, 
and by the extent to which one can give diversified and
• t • • 2 0  • •creative interpretations of that life." To reject reality 
and life in favour of an other-worldly beyond is, in 
Nietzsche's eyes, to betray weakness, and the poverty of 
one's will to power. The end of history has shown that 
'reality and life* is the whole of existence, and so, as 
Heidegger writes: "The reality of the real, now explicitly 
experienced, i.e., the will to power, becomes the origin 
and norm of a new value-positing."21
Life-Centred Values
Nietzsche's positive philosophy explicitly criticises 
traditional philosophy for the untimeliness of its meta­
physical dualism. Implicit in it also is a condemnation of 
the Hegelian solution of contentment in rational complete­
ness. Nietzsche finds the refutation of the former, and an 
on-going impediment to the latter, in life:
20 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 72.
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Life itself is to my mind the instinct for 
growth, for durability, for an accumulation of 
forces, for power: where the will to power is 
lacking there is decline. It is my contention 
that all the supreme values of mankind lack this
will that the values which are symptomatic of
decline, nihilistic values, are lording it under 
the holiest names.22
The 1holiest names* are *truth* and * reason,' which, when
they are attached to the notion of a fixed, other-world,
are in fact the means to devalue life, to depreciate our
actual existence. Life is a force against this fixity of
purpose: it is a force for variation and dynamism. Growth
implies a change in the subject, but towards a result which
is not a condemnation of the original, but an enhancement
of it. Growth is a projection of the beyond within life.
As Nietzsche writes in Will to Power: "Life is only a means
to something; it is the expression of forms of the growth
of power.**23
Gilles Deleuze writes that, for Nietzsche, "the world 
is neither true nor real but living."24 The flow of life 
affects even the attempt to separate oneself from it in 
order to assess it. This does not mean that some separa­
tion is not possible; in fact, it is entirely necessary for 
knowledge to be even possible. But to separate oneself 
completely, to be an independent observer, to attain purely 
objective knowledge, is impossible. Therefore, nihilism in
21 Heidegger, "Word of Nietzsche," Question Concerning 
Technology, p. 95.
22 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, in The Portable 
Nietzsche, translated and edited by Walter Kaufmann. (New 
York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1954). p. 572.
23 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 375.
24 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 184.
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its historical manifestation was correct: there are no
objective, other-worldly values. But modern, radical 
nihilism will only be avoided if values attached to life, 
connected to that which they measure, can be created by 
man. Man must turn away from values superior to life, what 
Nietzsche has called above 'superior values,1 and undertake 
the task of transvaluation. or changing the grounds of 
evaluation, changing what man perceives himself as doing 
when he ascribes values. Rather than believing he is 
comparing an image to its original, comparing life to the 
truth, man must create values of life within life. These 
life-affirming values are within life because life is the 
subject: man is the meaning-creator. They are of life
because life is the object: the living world which is
meaningful. The kind of meaning creation grounded in life- 
affirming values is the way of Nietzschean transvaluation, 
embodying his desire to affirm standards without succumbing 
to the nihilism which results from the metaphysics of 
transcendence and dualism. An absolute distinction between 
values and human life is impossible, and undesirable even 
if it were not. Yet distinctions must be made through 
thinking and speech, and this is how real values come 
about.
Real values are of life, and are from life: the flow 
of human thoughts and actions in a living world is the 
well-spring of its own measure. Life is its own answer. 
This ground of values, while not 'fixed' or 'independent' 
like historical, other-worldly values, is nevertheless
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fundamental in Nietzsche*s philosophy. Richard Schacht 
writes: *'He holds that there is a single, ultimate, abso­
lute value, by reference to which the value of everything 
else can and should be determined: namely, the quantitative 
and qualitative enhancement of life.*'25 This absolute can 
only be understood non-metaphysically if it is taken in an 
Hegelian sense: as the all which, when pushed to its
limits, cannot be distinguished from nothing; the whole 
grounded in a context of nihilism? the articulation of the 
inarticulable. Life is absolute because it is primordial: 
an ontological substance which is beyond metaphysics only 
because it is essentially negation. The ultimate failure 
of the attempt to separate the force of life from its
manifestation as the pathos of history to separate the
dancer from the dance is the only * proof' Nietzsche
offers for his ontological postulate. Any separations 
which are made are, in Nietzsche's universe, distortions 
which serve intelligibility, and only by this are they 
accorded the epithet 'true.' Like Hegel, Nietzsche hopes 
by his exhaustive affirmation to escape the 'charge' of 
engaging in metaphysics. Through Hegel, we can understand 
the possibility, and indeed necessity, of Nietzsche's claim 
to a non-metaphysical ontology? again to quote Richard 
Schacht: "This absolute value is grounded in the very
nature of things. It is not divinely ordained but neither 
is it a mere human convention or invention. It derives 
directly from a consideration of the very essence of life
25 Schacht, Hegel and After, p. 192.
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as Nietzsche conceives it, namely, as ’will to power.1”26 
Will to power is the means of evaluation which arises out 
of and reflects back upon life. Schacht writes: "This
standard is not external to life and the world, deriving 
instead from a consideration of what they fundamentally 
are.”27
Nietzsche cautions against over-reliance upon the 
objective spirit as a guide to value-creation. His em­
phasis upon the individual, upon the 'affects,* and upon 
the feeling of the increase of life, or will to power, is 
his attempt to redress the balance, to undertake trans­
valuation, or the restoration of perspective to evaluation. 
Complete reliance upon the objective spirit is, in fact, 
other-worldly transcendence. Nietzsche emphasises the self 
in the process of evaluation, the subject which reflects 
upon the object, or the living person considering his
living community and history. Nietzsche writes in Beyond 
Good and Evil: "However gratefully we may welcome an
objective spirit . . .  in the end we also have to learn 
caution against our gratitude and put a halt to the exag­
gerated manner in which the 'unselfing1 and depersonaliza­
tion of the spirit is being celebrated nowadays as if it 
were the goal itself and redemption and transfiguration.1,28 
In Hegelian terms, we must not become blinded by the
realised universal of the end of history: the participating 
subject is equally essential. Offsetting the will to unity
26 Schacht, Hegel and After, p. 192.
27 Richard Schacht, Nietzsche. (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1983)^ p. 396.
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must be the will to difference: coming together and falling 
apart is the essence of the ’recollection of the spirits' 
in the post-historical epoch. Nietzsche recognises the 
life-force, or will to power, to be most manifest in the 
will to difference, hence the emphasis of his writings: 
"The greater the impulse toward unity, the greater the 
impulse towards variety, differentiation, inner decay, the 
more force is present."29 Hegel himself realised that the 
great synthesis of the end of history was a moment of the 
decline of strong action? Nietzsche carries on this thought 
by stating that all great movements of this kind are 
accompanied by profound nihilism. In Twilight of the 
Idols, Nietzsche writes: "The danger that lies in great men 
and ages is extraordinary; exhaustion of every kind, 
sterility, follow in their wake. The great human being is
a finale? the great age the Renaissance, for example is
a finale."30 The realisation of objective spirit, which is 
found in Hegelian wisdom, is such a great age. To 
emphasise the will to power, the force of the living 
subject, is Nietzsche's tonic to the malaise of nihilism 
which is our first reaction to the post-historical epoch.
The value which is from life is the following: The 
measure of an act or thought or speech is the extent to
which it enhances life, the extent to which it affirms
life. This is what is 'true,' this is what there is: the 
enhancement and affirmation of life. Affirmation is not
28 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. p. 126.
29 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 346.
30 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, p. 548.
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simply ‘yea-saying1 to the vicissitudes of life; it should 
not be thought of as blind acceptance. Rather, it is what 
man does when he separates himself from the flow of life 
through thinking about it and speaking about it. To affirm 
is to evaluate, to force an excess into an aspect of one’s 
experience of life. All acts distinguish man from life, 
but will not alienate him from it only if they are rightly
perceived to be ultimately self-referential. Evaluation--
not truth-allocating or reality-ascribing is the way of
the value revealer. Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good and
Evil: "Is not living estimating, preferring, being
unjust, being limited, wanting to be different.”31 In other 
words, evaluation is differentiation: in Hegelian terms, 
Being is a whole, but it is only made intelligible by 
making distortions within it, by taking one part and 
excluding others. Evaluation is the appreciation of 
difference within life? where the seeking elsewhither of 
perspective is directed outside its context, there is 
nihilism. Gilles Deleuze writes: "To affirm is still to 
evaluate, but to evaluate from the perspective of a will 
which enjoys its own difference in life instead of suffer­
ing the pains of the opposition to this life that it has 
itself inspired."32
To affirm life is to recognise that values originate 
in the living subject. Values must still project an object 
beyond the immediate self, but this mediation or evaluation
31 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. p. 15.
32 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 185.
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is thereby reflective proof of the essentiality of the 
human self. Nietzsche writes: "We have to realize to what
degree we are the creators of our value feelings and thus
capable of projecting •meaning* into history."33 Our 'value 
feelings' are not wholly subjective, nor are they wholly 
objective: hence the 'degree' of which Nietzsche speaks is 
the self-as-origin, as the vantage-point of perspective in 
the task of evaluation. 'Feeling' is our experience of 
evaluation of our engagement in mediation, to use Hegel­
ian terms. Nietzsche writes: "Value words are banners
raised where a new bliss has been found a new feeling."34
The phrase 'new bliss' expresses the awareness of the 
'increase of power,' or of a greater intensity of life, or 
of a wider self. The act where such a feeling occurs is 
the act which posits values, the act which affirms life.
Affirmation is not merely acceptance, but, for 
Nietzsche, this was the essential nihilism of consciousness 
alienated from its 'higher' nature by metaphysical dualism. 
From the perspective of the consciousness which fixes its 
values in a transcendent beyond, the truth is a 'brute
fact,' reality 'simply is,' and values are 'fixed 
measures.' Nietzsche says this divided world of life and 
values is nihilism because its object is a chimera.
Hegel's success exposes the failure of the metaphysical 
enterprise to 'enhance life.' All life is affirmation, but 
what was affirmed historically was merely self-reference,
33 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 523.
34 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 380.
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and this amounts to mere acceptance for Nietzsche. Like 
Hegel, Nietzsche seeks the beyond within life, but unlike 
him he does not believe this can be done by Completing1 
transcendent dualism through an exhaustive non-metaphysical 
account. But Nietzsche*s conception of life as will to 
power adopts Hegel's negative conclusion: life is not an 
unalterable fact, but a comprehensive process of thinking 
about and ascribing value to, or speaking about, action. 
"Affirmation conceived of as acceptance, as affirmation of 
that which is, as truthfulness of the true or positivity of 
the real, is a false affirmation,"35 as Gilles Deleuze 
writes, but affirmation as will to power, as the enhance­
ment of life is the way to overcoming nihilism, to assert­
ing real values. There is nothing static about affirma­
tion. Because it is evaluative, it is essentially the 
appreciation that life is creative. To affirm life is 
therefore not to observe a fact, but to will a change, to 
become a creator. And this is Nietzsche's will to power. 
But affirmation includes acceptance as amor fati. as a 
selective test of the health of will to power. This is why 
Nietzsche's philosophy is a refutation of metaphysical 
dualism, but a much more subtle challenge to Hegel: for
Nietzsche, history may have been a terrible mistake, but it 
happened. and its legacy is to establish the limits of 
possibility in nihilism. Nietzsche must overcome his 
resentment of Hegel for being right: he must make more of
being imbued with absolute Spirit than the will to nothing
35 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 184.
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he perceives in the reflectivity of the end of history.
The act of overcoming nihilism begins with the rejec­
tion of the historical search for meaning in a true world 
alienated from life. With this change not only in perspec­
tive but the ground of perspective, life ceases to be 
merely the effect of principles which are more real than 
itself. Human life, human history, becomes a different 
thing for us in the light of this transvaluation: it was 
not just the manifestation of reason, but the development 
of a kind of life. For Nietzsche, history describes a life 
driven by the urge for truth, a slavish consciousness which 
transcended rather than defeated the master by changing the 
rules of the struggle. Hegel provides the slave's ultimate 
triumph, but precludes a future for him by the destruction 
of transcendent dualism. The 'true world* confounded the 
master, but its disappearance-by-immersion takes with it 
the slavish consciousness as such. What is left for 
Nietzsche is to authentically realise the Hegelian pos­
sibility. Hegel's 'what' provides no answer for Nietzsche; 
but he effectively follows Hegel's 'how' of emphasising 
Being as becoming: the life which makes radically present 
Being more than an empty field of limitless possibility. 
Excess. rather than accurate description, is the nature of 
transvalued values. Only thus do appearances reach 
'beyond' themselves: not outside to nothing, but back to 
themselves as something more, something 'higher yet the 
same.' Schacht writes: "With the abolition of the idea of 
a 'true world' apart from the actual world, the actual
X
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world ceases to seem merely to be an apparent world and 
comes to be recognised as reality; for it was only by 
contrast to the fictitious other world which was regarded 
as the 'true world' that the actual world was taken to be 
merely apparent. ”36
To perceive all values as emerging from the flow of 
life involves not just a change in values, choosing better, 
'truer' ones to replace inadeguate, false ones. It invol­
ves a change in the ground from which value judgements are 
made: transvaluation. One not only evaluates anew, but
even does so backwards, changing the meaning of history for 
life. Historical, dualist, alienated and alienating 
valuations could not have been simply wrong, for even these 
must have emerged from life, though they falsely posited 
their activity beyond that life. If will to power is 
ontological, then all statements of value, even truth- 
affirming ones, take on the nature of the actual life being 
led. Positing the truth of the world in a beyond must 
therefore emerge from a decaying, declining life. For man 
to change the ground of his valuations now would therefore 
be more than a new beginning: history itself will thereby 
change its character, it will have been a different process 
in light of Nietzschean transvaluation. This is because 
all values, whether affirmative, creative ones, or depreci- 
ative, nihilistic ones, spring from life. Nietzsche 
writes, in Twilight of the Idols:
36 Schacht, Hegel and After, p. 190.
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When we speak of values, we speak with the in­
spiration, with the way of looking at things, 
which is part of life: life itself forces us to 
posit values; life itself values through us when 
we posit values. From this it follows that even 
that anti-natural morality which conceives of God 
as the counter-concept and condemnation of life
is only a value judgement of life but of what
life? of what kind of life? I have already 
given the answer: of declining, weakened, weary, 
condemned life.37
Nietzsche's project is therefore more radical than 
replacing insufficient values with 'better' ones. Man is 
incapable of perceiving values in the way he expects. 
Nihilism cannot be seen merely to be a failure by man, 
because it is constitutive of reality. Man must therefore 
change himself, not just his thinking (falsely perceived as 
a function external to living), for meaning to be even 
possible. Nihilism cannot be overcome by progress, by man 
reaching for higher, truer values: man is fundamentally 
incapable of achieving what he perceived to be his goal 
within history, which was to find the truth of his life 
elsewhere, and to find his true home in removed from his 
actual life. A change in man himself, and not merely the 
orientation of his thinking, is needed to overcome nihil­
ism. Tracy Strong writes: "The present structure of human 
understanding forces men to continue searching for that 
which their understanding tells them is not to be found. 
This is the epistemology of nihilism."38 The error which is 
nihilism is in man, and not in the nature of values them­
selves: Strong continues: "That men continue to believe
37 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, p. 490.
38 Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 77.
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that the world should be meaningful, though unable to 
discover anything they might recognize as a satisfactory 
meaning, is the consequence of their inability to admit 
that the problem lies in themselves.”39
The 1 fatal flaw1 in man is his tendency to depreciate 
life, which he does by searching for the meaning of that 
life elsewhere. Deleuze writes: ”Ressentiment and bad
conscience are constitutive of the humanity of man, nihil­
ism is the a priori concept of universal history. This is 
why conquering nihilism, liberating thought from bad 
conscience and ressentiment means the overcoming and 
destruction of even the best men.”40 The tendency to 
depreciate life, decadent will to power, ressentiment and
bad conscience this kind of life is what is behind
history as the manifestation of reason directed towards the 
other-worldly beyond, according to Nietzsche. This is why
he attacks history itself the direction we have taken--
and not the nihilistic reaction to the end of history. 
This reaction is correct, because history hitherto has been 
the development of nihilism: Nietzsche thinks of it as a 
wrong turning which never had the possibility of reaching 
its destination. Reason was developed to satisfy the urge 
for truth, and it did do so: as Hegel shows, modernity is
the outcome for which history was necessary. But Nietzsche 
follows the Hegelian road to a greater extent, and per­
ceives nihilism as the reflective proof of the unworthiness
39 Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 77.
40 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 166.
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of the will to truth for life. Historical perceptions of 
value were, as Hegel says, incomplete, and not really 
engagements of they kind they thought themselves to be, 
i.e. with an other-world of truth. But Nietzsche further 
argues that the whole of such perceptions, even when seen 
correctly as affirmative, reflective, beyonds within life, 
do not meet the test which even Hegel sets for them.
History's ultimate recovery of its object succeeds, but 
still man fails to find himself 'at home' in the world: his 
rise to self-consciousness has not satisfied his desire to 
belong, 'at a higher level.' Reason leaves nothing out of 
account, and this is precisely why it both meets and fails
the need set for it: the nothing at the edge of the whole
elevates it in Hegel's view, and is its condemnation for 
Nietzsche.
Nietzsche is far from being an anti-rationalist, 
though. In Beyond Good and Evil. Nietzsche refers to
"reason, meaning 'good Europeanism;'"41 he considered 
himself a 'good European, ' and into this we can read a 
consciousness of the more universal character of his and
our times what Hegel called the State. For Hegel, the
false consciousness of truth-seeking Reason is overcome by 
history, when the opposition between the apparent world and 
the true world is resolved by the realisation of the whole, 
of differentiated Being. A return to self, but moreover 
the elevation to a situated self, is the result of the 
dialectic. Nietzsche also looks for the concrete result of
41 Nietzsche, BeVond Good and Evil, p. 174.
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reason, even reason which was set to the fool's task of
discovering the true world, and finds it in our becoming
more humane. Section 115 of The Will to Power reads:
If anything signifies our humanization a
genuine and actual progress it is the fact that
we no longer require excessive oppositions,
indeed no opposites at all we may love the
senses, we have spiritualized and made them 
artistic in every degree; we have a right to all 
those things which were most maligned until 
now.42
In his note to this section, Walter Kaufmann writes: "Our 
becoming more humane, is the only thing worthy of being 
considered genuine progress, and it consists in spiritual­
izing . . . the senses instead of condemning them as evil. 
The naivete of postulating opposites where in fact there 
are only differences in degree is also condemned in 
Nietzsche's books."43 The disappearance of opposites and 
the recognition of differences in degree is the precise 
nature of the post-historical epoch: the historical dialec­
tic of apparently absolute oppositions is complete, and 
only the on-going dialectic persists. In Will to Power. 
Nietzsche writes: "There is no struggle for existence
between ideas and perceptions, but a struggle for dominion: 
the idea that is overcome is not annihilated, only driven 
back or subordinated. There is no annihilation in the 
sphere of spirit."44 The parallels to Hegel are obvious in 
this passage. The elevation of man, or the way in which he 
is 'higher yet the same,' is, for Hegel, his self­
42 Nietzsche, Will to Power, pp. 70-71.
43 Walter Kaufmann, ed., Nietzsche's Will to Power, p. 71.
44 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 323.
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consciousness? for Nietzsche, who is concerned more with 
will to power as the kind of life being led, man's eleva­
tion consists in his becoming more humane.
The premise of the history of philosophy has been that 
the progress of reason will reveal the true world, but the 
effect of progressing towards this unrealisable goal has 
been to imply that life is false, and to effectively 
devalue it. Nietzsche, in contrast, condemns the notion 
that life is a process which is directed towards the 
realisation of anything other than itself. Life is a forum 
in which reason appears: reason can manifest itself pro­
gressively, but the primordial life which is its medium 
cannot do so. Life is like Spirit in that there is no real 
change for it; it remains self-same regardless of any 
changes within. Historically, reason influenced its medium 
so as to depreciate it by directing it outside itself to a 
nothing, to the true world. It is Nietzsche*s hope that 
reason in the service of life can affirm its context, can 
appreciate human life. Life must no longer be devalued, 
must no longer be identified indissolubly with the effect 
of its activity, with the object which the exercise of 
reason projects. The failure to make this distinction is 
precisely what nihilism is. Reason as the search for truth 
was thought to be the meaning of life, but in fact it was 
the effect of a particular kind of life, a depreciated,
depreciating kind. Nietzsche laments: "The *beyond* why
a beyond, if not as a means for besmirching this world?"45
45 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, p. 535.
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As long as meaning is thought to reside in ends like the
true world rather than towards ends like life-affirming
goals then an irremovable artificiality will persist
about the very prospect of evaluation. Such evaluations 
are antithetical to life itself. As Nietzsche writes: "We 
have invented the concept of 'end1: in reality there is no 
end."46 To invent an end is to project a future, to will a 
change: this is the reality of ends, of values, not a
remote true world. So the triumph of reason in history has 
turned out to be unsatisfying with respect to the desire 
which brought it about in the first place, the desire to 
know the real, essential nature of things. Deleuze writes: 
"The goal itself is missed, fallen short of, not because of 
insufficient means, but because of its nature, because of 
the kind of goal that it is. If it is missed it is not 
insofar as it is not reached but rather insofar as it is 
reached it is also missed."47
According to Hegel, the kind of goal which Reason 
projects is satisfaction in a fixed, true object. The kind 
of goal which Reason actually obtains by history is the 
purely rational satisfaction of the Idea, of the realisa­
tion of the mediated whole of Being. But, as Nietzsche 
points out, man remains emotionally dissatisfied because 
what he finds is not what he looked for. He has not yet 
changed his perspective to the enjoyment of the feeling of 
the increase of self by engagement in process, through the
46 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, p. 500.
47 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 168.
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projection a beyond within life. Nietzsche writes, in Will 
to Power:
In fact, man does not want ‘happiness1 [i.e., 
satisfaction]. Pleasure is a feeling of power: if 
one excludes the affects [i.e., desires which 
lead to action], then one excludes the states 
that give the highest feeling of power, con­
sequently of pleasure. The highest rationality 
is a cold, clear state very far from giving that 
feeling of happiness that intoxication of any 
kind brings with it.48
Reason fails us in the face of nihilism because nothing is 
beyond its grasp. Nietzsche*s discussion of nihilism is 
post-Hegelian in that it is a consideration of two kinds of 
grasping at nothingness. The first is the ‘true world,* 
which was at best an incomplete understanding of the 
situatedness of life. The second is the inarticulable 
excess, the beyond within life, of vibrant will to power. 
Hegel leaves us in the 'cold, clear state' of rational 
satisfaction which finishes the first kind of nihilism as 
anything 'healthy' or life enhancing, and Nietzsche cir­
cumscribes the second kind of nihilism as the way of 
directing the 'affects' away from the malaise of their 
post-historical ennui.
Nihilism is the limit of sense: the ultimate self­
reference, and hence 'failure' of every act. Nietzsche, 
like Hegel, emphasised that to consider the moments or 
aspects within a whole of affects, action, and goals is to 
distort reality for the sake of intelligibility. In fact, 
the 'origin' of an act can be found in the 'end,' or in 
that which it anticipates; the 'means' are nothing without
48 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 238.
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reference to the before and after states of the self which 
acts. Nietzsche writes: "An action is never caused by a 
purpose? . . . purpose and means are interpretations
whereby certain points in an event are emphasized and 
selected at the expense of other points.”49 "Event” 
describes the whole process, in Nietzsche's sense of 
pathos. Values emerge from the event: they do not cause 
the event. Nietzsche believes that the contrary belief is 
the result of a confusion of affect with effect: the affect 
is will to power, the effect is the evaluation after the 
fact. For him, values as causes is a metaphysical rever­
sal.50 The action is affirmed by the value? a kind of life 
shows itself through the values which emerge from its 
activity. Nietzsche writes: "'How should one act?' is not 
a cause but an effect. Morality follows, the ideal comes 
at the end."51 For Nietzsche, morality is the "becoming­
conscious of the values by which one acts,"52 and, as Hegel 
observed, the moment of the rise to consciousness is the 
moment of the decline of the act. So values are the effect 
of action, the affirmation and not the cause of a kind of 
life.
Transvaluation 
Transvaluation is, for Nietzsche, the re-founding of 
values in proper perspective. To perceive the real nature
49 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 351
50 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 308
51 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 228
52 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 228
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of evaluation is to engage in movement between modes of 
existence as temporary resting points for the mind*s eye. 
For Nietzsche, perspective is the rootedness and also the 
1 outer1-directedness of the human self in life. Heidegger 
defines Nietzsche*s perspectivism as follows: "The essence 
of value lies in its being a point-of-view. Value means 
that upon which the eye is fixed.”53 A perspective in 
itself, having its origin in a unique self-consciousness, 
is necessarily only one among many, and therefore not 
invariable, which was the traditional emphasis of the truth 
of values. But all perspectives project a common object, 
which is life, or the whole, or Being. Herein lies the 
truth of transvalued values: that the multiplicity of 
perspectives affirms a single object, but one which is 
thereby multiple in its variations within. A limited 
infinite is what is indicated, or traced from within, by 
Nietzsche, since he forswears the now-impossible task of 
rising to truth in a remote (transcendental) or wider 
(Hegelian) perspective. Alexander Nehamas describes 
perspectivism as "Nietzsche*s famous insistence that every 
view is only one among many possible interpretations, his 
own views, particularly this very one, included.1,54 
Nietzsche emphasises what Hegel would call the particular, 
because this is what one can do: speech about the whole is 
so all-inclusive, leaving only * nothing* out of account,
53 Heidegger, "Word of Nietzsche," Question Concerning 
Technology, p. 71.
54 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985).
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that it amounts to silence. So the self as the 'origin* 
of perspective must be left to imply the whole. We are to 
'bear the burden' of the consequences of a multiplicity of 
selves in the one world. Perspective is nothing without 
the affirming self, but it is also nothing without the 
context affirmed.
One of Nietzsche's own definitions of perspectivism 
can be found in The Will to Power: "All evaluation is made 
from a definite perspective: that of the preservation of 
the individual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a 
faith, a culture."55 Like Hegel, if we can consider an 
evaluation as something the individual does about his 
surroundings, we can also consider it as something the 
surroundings do through the individual. But Nietzsche's 
arguments rail against Hegelian closure: the universal
perspective is in fact a danger called nihilism. We can 
only stave off such a living death by tragedy, by affirming 
the limitations of the self: its temporal mortality and its 
spatial isolation. Nietzsche's 'step back' is in fact a 
step within.
Nietzsche denies the possibility of truth as the 
attainment of knowledge of things-in-themselves, but he 
does assert the possibility of knowledge about things. 
Truth is no longer eternal substance, but eternal novelty: 
it is speech about the infinitely varied relations within 
the limited substance of Being. The 'thing itself,' and 
the person-in-himself, are both necessary fictions for
55 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 149.
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knowledge to be possible, but what is 'essential1 is
perspective. Truth describes 'movement' from one pole to
another, the reciprocating and influencing relatedness of
parts within a whole. Truth is mutual recognition.
Nietzsche expresses the requirement for perspective to
truth as follows:
The biggest fable of all is the fable of know­
ledge. One would like to know what things-in- 
themselves are? but behold, there are no things- 
in-themselves! But even supposing there were an 
in itself, an unconditioned thing, it would for 
that very reason be unknowable! . . . Coming to 
know means 'to place oneself in a conditional 
relation to something.'56
The conclusion that there are no things-in-themselves is 
the end of history. To emphasise objects as projections of 
a thing called the self is a distortion which Nietzsche 
makes for the sake of intelligibility. Nietzsche's im­
moderation is only argued for by contrasting it to the 
nihilism of post-historical Wisdom. He injects an over­
abundant exuberance into the 'conditional relation of 
things' to project a beyond within life, which is the 
possibility for meaning-creating activity left open to us 
by Hegel in the post-historical epoch.
The truth which emerges from this kind of activity and 
evaluation consists of the persistence of the object, or 
the continuity of the world, or the universal context which 
we all share. Truth is not found in this object, but 
rather, it is found in referring to this object, through 
our 'conditional relation* to it. The various and even
56 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 301.
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contradictory nature of these truth-references is not proof 
of the falsity of reality, but instead, it is an affirma­
tion of its actual nature: reality is a whole which is
perhaps infinitely diverse richly differentiated through
its components, which are individual human self-conscious­
nesses. Alexander Nehamas puts Nietzsche*s notion of *the 
real' as follows: "Reality is not something behind appear­
ance but simply the totality of these various arrange­
ments.”57 The world is a world of appearance, and because 
it is nothing but a world of appearance, we cannot get 
above it or behind it through a metaphysical move: this is 
nihilism. But nor can we any longer make the Hegelian move 
of following the development of this appearance, since the 
* totality of the various arrangements,* the universality 
and homogeneity of pure mediation, is upon us.
Nietzsche chooses not to emphasise the notion of truth 
in his philosophy, but this is not because he believes it 
does not exist; it does, as a description of one’s contact 
with reality, of one’s * endurance* of the real. But the 
notion of truth has been tied up for so long with the 
other-worldly beyond, with the faith in a fixed object, 
that he feels this stigma is all but irremovable. And so, 
as Stephen Houlgate writes concerning Nietzsche: "His goal 
is no longer simply to state in propositions what he holds 
to be true, but rather to promote and embody a strong, 
expressive mode of being.*'58 The quality or degree of
57 Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, pp. 45-46.
58 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, pp. 76-77.
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strength of one's relatedness to Being, and not the
'either-or,' 'true-false' nature of this relation, is what
is important for Nietzsche. This is because the notion of
truth is too attached to the notion of the in-itself, to
the other-world? Nietzsche writes: "The concept 'truth' is
nonsensical. The entire domain of 'true-false' applies
only to relations, not to an 'in-itself.'"59 The locus of
truth shifts, by transvaluation, from the object-in-itself
to the moment of relation. All values, even other-worldly
values, are in fact the result of perspective, but with the
end of history, and with Nietzsche, evaluation becomes
authentic: one knows that one is affirming a relation,
'giving name' to a process, when one engages in evaluation,
and has lost the false belief that one is aspiring to a
beyond which is removed from one's actual existence.
Nietzsche writes in The Will to Power:
From the standpoint of morality, the world is 
false. But to the extent that morality itself is 
a part of this world, morality is false. Will to 
truth is a making firm, a making true and dur­
able, an abolition of the false character of 
things, a reinterpretation of it into beings. 
'Truth' is therefore not something there, that
might be found or discovered but something that
must be created and that gives a name to a pro­
cess, or rather to a will to overcome that has 
in itself no end.60
What Nietzsche calls the 'reinterpretation of it into 
beings' is the very necessary activity of making distinc­
tions within Being. Paradoxically, Being as a whole is 
affirmed when falsifications are made within it, when
59 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 334.
60 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 298.
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'beings' or discrete elements are isolated within it, and 
the rest excluded from consideration, all for the sake of 
knowledge, and for the self-consciousness of Being through 
the thinking of self-conscious humans within it. Truth 
rests on nihilism because in-itself it is a nothing, wholly 
dependent on what are taken to be subjects and objects for 
its sake. Like Hegel, Nietzsche argues that claims of 
truth are meaningless: only active engagement, following 
the movement of thought, reveals circumstantially the 
nature of reality.
Most importantly for Nietzsche, perspectivism returns 
the essence of evaluation to the living subject, and 
thereby makes truth something essential to man, rather than 
removed from him. The over-emphasis on the 'objective 
spirit,' which results in nihilism, is corrected by 
Nietzsche by this transvaluation. He finds that it is not 
the case that values ought to come from a definite and 
defining perspective, but instead that all values do in 
fact arise in this way. This revelation Nietzsche finds 
invigorating, because it restores the creativity and 
spontaneity of human subjects to the hitherto lifeless 
process of evaluation. Nietzsche writes: "Every centre of
force and not only man construes all the rest of the
world from its own viewpoint, i.e., measures, feels, forms, 
according to its own force."61 So not only living subjects 
 human beings find their essentiality through trans­
valuation, but also the living object: Nietzsche's life-as-
61 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 339.
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context, or Hegel*s Being which is higher yet the same.
The will to difference, as against the will to unity, 
is the essential, life-appreciative force, according to 
Nietzsche. The ability of ontological will to power to 
divide against itself is the concrete result of history: 
the achievement as a result of which *the whole* is higher, 
yet the same. As Hegel has shown, Being is a whole which 
is a unity, and this can only be known by an exhaustive 
exploration of it from within. Being is *put to the 
torture' of being broken up into subjects and objects so 
that it may reveal itself, to itself. Nietzsche is making 
a more modest claim than that of 'truth': beliefs are
useful fictions because they serve life? we elevate them 
only because we want to make the world intelligible. We 
must behave as if the part of the whole under consideration
is really distinct, when it is in the end inseparable
from the universe. We do this to avoid the nihilism of 
'real truth': ultimate self-reference. And so, Nietzsche 
writes in Will to Power: "A belief can be a condition of 
life and nonetheless be false."62 It is false in the sense 
that a belief wilfully leaves out from consideration most 
of the case (Being) , so that some particular aspect (a 
being) stands out in relief, and is thereby known. The 
necessity of beliefs to life means that there is some 
criterion to evaluation higher than truthfulness? as 
Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good and Evil: "For all the
value that the true, the truthful, the selfless may
62 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 268.
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deserve, it would still be possible that a higher and more 
fundamental value for life might have to be ascribed to 
deception, selfishness, and lust.”63 The higher need of 
evaluation is its dependence on the tension between clarity 
and opacity, between revealing and veiling the world. If 
truth is contact with reality, our 'pure mediation,' then 
'untruth' is the break in this contact: our desires which 
are our 'thrown projects' into the future. This wider 
perspective of evaluation goes beyond the mere will to 
truth, and is not without its difficulties: "To recognize
untruth as a condition of life that certainly means
resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way."64 
Nietzsche thus recognises that the 'as if' of a variegated 
world is a falsification of actual unity which is essential 
to life, making it humane and multifarious, and man as an 
instance of life someone-in-particular.
According to Nietzsche, values are not merely truth-
references: because they are affirmations of a kind of
life, they involve both truth and falsehood, or both
knowledge and ignorance. He writes in Will to Power:
Knowledge and wisdom in themselves have no value? 
no more than goodness: one must first be in
possession of the goal from which these qualities
derive their value or nonvalue 'there could be
a goal in the light of which great knowledge 
might represent a great disvalue (if, for in­
stance, a high degree of deception were one of 
the pre- requisites of the enhancement of life; 
likewise if goodness were perhaps able to para­
lyse and discourage the springs of the great 
longing) 65
63 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 10.
64 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 12.
65 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 141.
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Knowledge and wisdom in themselves have no value because 
they represent rational and reflective satisfaction, and 
therefore they posit no future, and lead to no action. 
They therefore are not values: in themselves, they lack the 
'from-to* directedness which is the essence of evaluation. 
The 'goal from which these qualities derive their value or 
nonvalue1 is the kind of life, or the will to power, which 
posits and is posited by historical knowledge and wisdom.
Nietzsche emphasises the need for falsehood in evalua­
tion because he wants to make possible strong action. As 
we have seen with Hegel, strong action requires the feeling 
of involvement in process, and this, in turn, requires a 
certain amount of ignorance about ultimate goals, and one's 
'true' place in the scheme of things. Just as the thought 
ends the action, so too must an action end the thought? if 
wisdom marks the decline of strong action, then action
marks the decline of reflection but the consequence of
action will, upon subsequent reflection, be a more ex­
perienced, wider, or higher, human self. Nietzsche writes: 
"Once the decision has been made, close your ear even to 
the best counterargument: sign of a strong character. Thus 
an occasional will to stupidity."66 Action is the limit of
knowledge it is always a foray made in ignorance: beyond
the bounds of the known, into the unknown. Action requires 
an object, man requires a beyond to his immediate self. 
This is at hand in man's context, in mediated life: the
beyond is a beyond within life. But the 'as if* character
66 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 84.
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of the beyond within life depends on falsifications made
for action to be possible. As Alexander Nehamas writes,
ignorance is as essential to action as knowledge:
We do not, and cannot, begin (or end) with 'all 
the data.* This is an incoherent desire and an 
impossible goal. 'To grasp everything1 would be 
to do away with all perspective relations, it 
would mean to grasp nothing, to misapprehend the 
nature of knowledge. If we are ever to begin a
practice or an inquiry we must, and must want to,
leave unasked indefinitely many questions about 
the world.67
Nietzsche has great difficulty asserting his desire for the 
recovery of strong action because, with the manifest end of 
history, ignorance is inauthentic. This is why one must 
wilfully 'close one's ears to the best counterargument.' 
End of history wisdom is not possession of Jail the data,' 
but the assurance that we have the structures at hand which 
make all the data available for us. As David Kolb writes:
"There may be infinite amounts of empirical detail to be
studied, but there are no different overall structures of 
time and space or of history and the state. Otherwise the 
self-transparency of spirit would be compromised. In an
• • • • AAimportant sense, Hegel's world is finite." Nietzsche must 
avoid the trap of nihilism set by the combination of the 
self-transparency and the finitude of Being, which is the 
legacy of Hegel. Therefore, he must make an appeal to 
ignorance, but one not dependent on either our metaphysical 
inadequacy on the dualist view or on our dialectical 
incompleteness on the historicist Hegelian view. He finds
67 Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, p. 49.
68 Kolb, Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 91.
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it to be immanent in will to power as its fatefulness. and 
he expresses this at its extreme in the doctrine of the 
eternal recurrence.
Nietzsche's perspectivism means that the task of 
overcoming nihilism is the task of transvaluation. Finding 
real values to overcome nihilism is not achieved by chang­
ing merely the object of the search, from a beyond which 
has failed to ground, absolutely, our values, to a better, 
'truer' world. Nor is it waiting upon a further unveiling 
of a limitless context. Perspectivism 'diminishes' the 
subject to radical situation in a world of appearance, but 
also 'expands* the subject by its over-extension within 
this milieu. Transvaluation changes the emphasis of 
evaluation from discovery to evaluation. In terms of 
nihilism, this is the movement from the passive nihilism of 
transcendent values, to the active nihilism of Hegel's co­
terminous historical dialectic of thought and action, 
through to Nietzsche's uplifting of nihilism to tragedy by 
setting will to power within the horizon of eternal recur­
rence. As Gilles Deleuze writes, transvaluation means, for 
Nietzsche, "not a change of values, but a change in the 
element from which the value of values derives. Apprecia­
tion instead of depreciation, affirmation as will to power, 
will as affirmative will."69
Nietzsche posits, with admitted arbitrariness, 'life' 
as the origin of ontological will to power, because this 
perspective most successfully illuminates the 'natural'
69 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 171.
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desire of man to discover what he believed to be hidden: 
his belongingness in the world, which desire embarked him 
upon the historical enterprise of the development of 
reason. Reason, understood in this way, belongs to life as 
its revelation, as its self-understanding. Nietzsche*s 
Dionysian spirit is the progenitor of the Apollonian. His 
radical critique exposes this more fundamental grounding of 
life and philosophy. Ofelia Schutte writes, in Bevond 
Nihilism: "His advances over nihilism are rooted in the
notion that there is no need to invent a more perfect form 
of life (as in the notion of an afterlife) since life 
already has sufficient meaning and value. The Dionysian 
struggle against the Socratic approach to existence is 
based on the view that reason has exceeded its role when it 
purports to define the meaning of life in terms of reason 
itself.”70 In fact, reason is a manifestation of a kind of 
life: for Hegel, this was Spirit, or the coming-to-self-
consciousness of all things; for Nietzsche, the manifesta­
tion of a kind of life is will to power, the appearance of 
reason only one among many.
Nietzsche attacks the result of reason where that 
result is an unauthentic culture, an alienated world-view, 
homelessness and dislocation. He does not attack reason 
itself, or claim that its exercise inevitably alienates man 
from his world. But at the core of reason, as it has 
developed in history, there lies a pre-rational desire: the
70 Ofelia Schutte, Bevond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without
Masks. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). p. 
189. ^
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urge for truth. And Nietzsche argues that this urge in 
fact depreciates life. By its search for the essence of 
life, the urge to truth has 'discovered1 that life is 
appearance. Human life becomes phenomenal, and this is 
seen as a disvalue when compared to what was expected. 
This is why Nietzsche welcomes post-historical nihilism, 
but at the same time sees it as inadequate. Instead of 
seeking refuge in unreason, he sees his task in turning 
reason to the service of life, to found life anew, and give 
it a new origin. Only in this way can one avoid seeing the 
essential result of history as a colossal disappointment. 
He acknowledges that his will to power, his urge to the 
increase of life, is pre-rational like the historical urge 
for truth. The 'cause' of will to power cannot be reason; 
one is not compelled by the dictates of reason to embark on 
his programme. The cause of this new founding and new 
direction, Nietzsche hopes, will be will to power itself, 
the over-abundance of life which will use reason as a tool, 
instead of serve it as a master. Nietzsche wants to make 
the nihilism of reason in history very present to the 
modern consciousness, but he hopes that our reaction to 
this truth will be as to a Greek tragedy; rather than
despair, one will be uplifted confidence in one's own
vivacity will prompt one to undertake the necessary trans­
valuation. Johan Goudsblom writes:
For all his criticism of contemporary ideals, 
Nietzsche remains enough of a man of culture not 
to want simply a 'return to nature.' What he is 
looking for is the way back to a purified culture 
which does not generate inauthenticity, which 
confirms life rather than denying it, which
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demands no sacrifices of the reason or the intel­
lect but promotes the free development of all the 
faculties.71
The decision to advance life-affirming values and to 
attack life-depreciating ones does not eliminate nihilism. 
It cannot do so, because the 'reasons* for both value
systems true values and life values are rationally
equivalent. Reason itself is a process, and a process, in 
itself, is nothing. Only reference to origins and goals 
reveals meaning: only the immanent critique makes sense. 
The 'origin' of history in the desire to discover essences, 
to find the truth, has resulted in the realisation of 
reason. But this genesis is a mythical beginning: there is 
no reason for reason, there is just a desire for reason, 
the urge for truth. Nietzsche amplifies Hegel's conclusion 
that the whole metaphysical enterprise through history is 
nothing but a grand reflection: an exhaustive, through and 
through self-reference. But instead of seeking withdrawal 
or escape from this 'manifest destiny,1 which is recourse 
to nihilism, Nietzsche advocates tragic affirmation: a
combination of acceptance, conceived as 'bearing the 
greatest burden,' and directing the over-full force of life 
to transform Being's ultimate self-reference into something 
'higher yet the same.'
Strictly by the principles of reason one cannot prefer 
one course over the other. This equivalence of reasons, as 
has been argued, is nihilism. So nihilism is not eliminat­
ed by Nietzsche, but perhaps it is overcome. Nihilism is
71 Goudsblom, Nihilism and Culture, p. 176.
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constantly present to reason: the revelation of everything 
brings with it nothing. Nihilism is found in the two 
metaphors of the space between and the space outside. 
There is always a gap between desire and its satisfaction: 
that gap is the means by which it is satisfied. There is 
always a gap between a thing and its significance: that gap 
is the speech which reveals the thing and is revealed by 
that thing. There is always a gap between an act and its 
consequences: that gap is its temporal context (history) 
and its spatial context (community) . This gap is where 
meaning is ’found1: to value is to 'build bridges.' But in 
itself, the gap is a nothingness. To strive for value 
divorced from its context is therefore to engage in nihil­
ism. The goal of reason is to strive for unity of subject- 
mediation-object. The unifying activity of reason is to 
satisfy, to reveal, and to complete the appearance of 
Being. But the persistence of 'life' in pre-rational 
desires is Nietzsche's evidence against the passive reflec­
tivity of Hegel's on-going dialectic. Nietzsche's hope is 
in the failure of reason: its incapacity with respect to 
nihilism. Reason as logos is limited by life as ekstasis, 
and this limit, even if it is directly unspeakable, con­
founds nihilism.
Perspectivism, merely as moral subjectivism, is 
nihilism. Hegel's move away from this was to include 
Reason as subject. Nietzsche must reflect upon the whole 
of this movement as a completed thing, and he returns, as 
does Hegel, to the self, but no longer as a simple subject.
236
The self is only different if it is more of the same. 
Hegel has shown that the self now has immanent power, 
Actual1 and not 'abstract* possibility, but that it did 
not get this from elsewhere. Nietzsche's reflection upon 
this grand historical consequence leads him to posit will 
to power 'within' eternal recurrence as its implied 
horizon: its limit which does not limit.
Nihilism is the danger which lies in extremes. The 
first is absolute subservience to the 'objective spirit.' 
Should we achieve monistic unity with our world, and be 
mystically absorbed in the object of our contemplation, 
then we would cease to be subjects, and the world would 
cease to be our object. The unity of which we would be a 
part would be monolithic: it would be unspeakable, unknow­
able, and inconsequential because would contain no media­
tion, no relation of parts within it. Such a condition is 
meaningless because the One is not related to anything 
else; outside it there is nothing, so if it is related to 
anything 'other' then it is related to nothing. It is also 
meaningless because it has no qualities apart from its 
being: it has no aspects, no differentiations within it. 
Absolute unity is therefore a condition of nihilism, a 
condition of reason without life. To consider, similarly, 
the moment of unrealised desire: Absolute particularity,
or atomistic differentiation, is also a condition of 
nihilism for the above reasons. Parts exist, but they are 
unrelated, and there is no connectedness of elements, no 
whole of which they are parts. This is a condition of life
X
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without reason. Nihilism exists, then, in each moment of 
the dialectic considered exclusively, or in itself. Values 
exist in perspective, or in the movement of thought from 
subject, through mediation, to object.
Values are dependent upon limits, and the end of
history reveals not that limits do no exist, but that they
exist in nothing. The failure of Reason, or speech and
action, in the face of the nihilism which is essential to
a meaningful world, means that values can never be defined,
but can only be demonstrated. Being is infused with and
surrounded by nothing: the whole is defined negatively.
This is the great 'distortion* which is the 'truth' of
history for Nietzsche, and he is led to this by Hegel's
notion of Being as Becoming, as negated Being. This is why
nihilism is a thing to be overcome, and not a thing to be
eliminated. This is done by what Nietzsche sees as the
proper situation of perspective: its 'origin' is the self,
imbued with limitless will to power, but limited by its
tragic milieu of eternal recurrence. The enormous capacity
of the self to expand and increase is ultimately thwarted
by the impossibility of becoming other. As Stanley Rosen
writes in his book Nihilism:
As a microcosm, man possesses the capacity to 
'transcend' difference by a vision of unity, but 
this transcendence is constantly being suppressed 
by the difference it encompasses. To be a man is 
to be constantly falling apart and growing back 
together again. This means that nihilism is a 
perpetual danger, rooted in the very divisions 
which make speech, thought, and so completeness 
possible.72
72 Rosen, Nihilism. p. 197.
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Hegel does succeed in giving a wholly rational speech, 
but, nevertheless, there is a perceived failure of Hegelian 
closure with respect to something which was never within 
its terms of reference. The limit of Hegel*s discourse was 
always nothing, always the unspeakable, nonsensical * in- 
itself* of negation, *within* and ‘without* the whole. It 
is the immoderation of expectations compared to results 
which has put the end of history in the lap of nihilism: 
the desire to speak the unspeakable, to include the utterly 
alien. It is ironic but true that, as Rosen observes, "man 
is that paradoxical being, unique so far as we know, who 
strives for a perfection which, if attained, would al­
together deprive him of his nature.**73
The difficulty for Nietzsche is that although remote, 
alienated values may be attacked, even life-affirming 
values, in order to be appreciative, must in some sense be 
'beyond* the life they measure. Distinctions between 
things and their worth, act and their significance, must 
persist. What Nietzsche attempts to elaborate is a beyond 
which is not an outside, to project a non-metaphysical 
distance within which life has meaning. That he attempts 
to do so is a sign that he is not a nihilist in the radical 
sense: he wishes to salvage reason and authentic culture 
from the wreck of metaphysics.
Authentic evaluation avoids nihilism when it ap­
preciates life. Nietzsche wants to do this by connecting
73 Rosen, Nihilism, p. 214.
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our value-feelings with affirmative will to power. At work 
in the whole articulated by Hegel is both the urge to 
achieve unity and the urge to introduce difference. 
Nietzsche*s * everything* more consciously acknowledges 
'nothing* as well, and gives content to that healthy 
ambivalence which is the only remedy to nihilism. Rosen 
writes: "Human existence is a harmony of desire and speech, 
or of union with and distance from things."74 Man will 
continue to strive for unity and completeness, but he can 
never do so immediately. But Nietzsche's objection is that 
the resultant mediation will never be as 'pure' as Hegel 
imagined, and that this is actually a good thing. There is 
nothing between ourselves and our objects, and there is 
also nothing outside the whole of these relations. But 
this nothing is not a simple absence of a thing: as Hegel 
has shown, it is the negation of the immediacy of all 
things. This is the lesson of the end of history which 
Nietzsche took so completely to heart.
"One cannot create except by forgetting the authority 
of the past; at the same time, one must remember how to 
create, or what it means to be a creator, and therefore a 
certain memory of the past is indispensable. In a healthy 
or non-nihilistic society, the discontinuity of remembering 
and forgetting is overcome by tradition.m75 The beyond of 
values is within life through its present and available 
history. A history of acts and their consequences is the
74 Rosen, Nihilism, p. 213.
75 Rosen, Nihilism, p. 230.
context for present action. This forum, the horizon of 
meaning, is the fatedness of our situation. In this sense, 
it is the 'fixed* reference from which the future is 
constructed. Hence Nietzsche's amor fati. his 'willing 
that it have been so. ' What is beyond the limit of the 
control of the self is seen as fate. Despite the fact that 
there is 'nothing' which is actually inaccessible, at the 
same time there appears to be 'something' which is beyond 
the capacity of 'over-abundant' will to power. It is the 
singular and temporal 'origin' in the self which implies 
the presence of a limit, and Nietzsche describes this 
horizon as fate. This tragic dimension of freedom is the 
beyond within life. Fate constantly deals up the conse­
quences of past action, providing "the unending dialectic 
of the human psyche as desire articulated by speech.'*76 The 
question is not, therefore, "from where do values come?", 
because values continually emerge as the projected realisa­
tion of desires. What they project, though, is not another 
world, but a future, a possibility, ultimately inaccessible 
as 'fate' only because of the 'failures' of our mortality 
and our isolation. Heidegger writes: "Nietzsche recognizes 
that despite the devaluing for the world of the highest 
values hitherto, the world itself remains? and he recog­
nizes that, above all, the world, become valueless, presses 
inevitably on toward a new positing of values."77 This 
dialectic gives rise to authentic culture: "By paying heed
76 Rosen, Nihilism, p. 233.
77 Heidegger, "Word of Nietzsche," Question Concerning 
Technology, p. 67.
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heed to vital impulses or cherished cultural commands one 
vanquishes the nihilist problematic* One finds a solution 
but no answer? the theory is not refuted."78 Because values 
are a cultural projection, and not merely an individual 
one, the community provides a different kind of object for 
the acting self, one which is wholly human, yet beyond the 
capacity of one individual to control: it is the beyond
within life. For Nietzsche, the Overman is heroic because
he articulates a peoples*s culture, creating from it higher 
goals. Such goals are growth: a projection out of life to 
a higher, but re-confirming (and so, ultimately reflective) 
state of affairs. The will to power is therefore not
political domination, (as Heidegger observes, "the essence 
of overman is no license for the frenzy of self-will"79) but 
the articulation of wider, more abundant, more exuberant 
life: a quantitative and qualitative increase in the
intensity of our experience of reality.
The Higher Man 
For Nietzsche, meaning is a wav and not an end. He 
shows this through a metaphor in Thus Spoke Zarathustra:
"Man is a rope tied between beast and overman a rope over
an abyss. A dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking 
back, a dangerous shuddering and stopping. What is great 
in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be
78 Goudsblom, Nihilism and Culture, p. 195.
79 Heidegger, "Word of Nietzsche," Question Concerning 
Technology, p. §8.
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• 80loved in man is that he is an overture and a going under."
The abyss he refers to here is nihilism that into which
man will fall should he lose his balance, his poise, his 
tension: should he forget his nature as a between. The 
rope, or more precisely the tension in the rope, is meaning
 it is and gives man's directedness; it is and gives him
right relation with respect to origins and destinations. 
And the overman is what provides a new telos, a beyond and 
an end which anchors our going-across, which is to say that 
it is a foundation of our meaning. The other foundation is
our past another beyond, yet still one wholly within
life. It is for these reasons that Nietzsche writes that 
"the overman is the meaning of the earth."81
Dionysian philosophy recovers what Apollonian philo­
sophy abandoned when it commenced the history of reason,
when it began to satisfy the urge for truth and to 'work
out1 reason in human life. Nietzsche's Overman gives 
substance to the Hegelian Sage: the Sage is wise and free, 
but the Overman knows how to love life: "There are things 
that the higher man does not know how to do: to laugh, to 
play and to dance. To laugh is to affirm life, even the 
suffering in life. To play is to affirm chance and the
necessity of chance. To dance is to affirm becoming and
• • 82the being of becoming."
80 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. in The 
Portable Nietzsche, edited and translated by Walter Kauf- 
mann. (New York: Viking Press, Inc., 1954). pp. 126-7.
81 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. p. 125.
82 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 170.
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The Overman re-engages in vital action, through his
mastery of tradition what Rosen calls the ’discontinuity
of remembering and forgetting.1 End of history wisdom
allows one to 'recall the spirits' and so to perceive
oneself as a result? but also to realise one's freedom to
project a future and so to perceive oneself as a means to
the 'higher man': the object of growth in and of oneself. 
There are aspects of the dialectic, even when 're-played' 
at the end of history, which retain their vital contact 
with reality, their expanding power over life. These 
Nietzsche affirms as 'life,' 'chance,' and 'becoming,' 
according to Deleuze, or as 'flux,' 'multiplicity,' and 
'change,' according to Houlgate. All possibilities are 
realised through the dialectic, but not all have been lived 
through by man. Nietzsche returns the activity of recon­
figuration, the 'eternal novelty' of the end of history, to 
the feeling of strong action, but without its now-inauthen- 
tic transcendence and historicism. The 'self' injects 
spontaneity, as it is essentially chaotic: a determinate 
nothingness. Mediation is putting-in-perspective, the 
ordering activity of Reason. And the beyond-within-life is 
non-metaphysical objective 'realm': the community and the 
future as the 'thrown project' of will to power, the 
affirmation and growth of the self through which it is both 
situated and elevated.
For Nietzsche, 'laughter, play, and dance* is a way to 
the affirmation of life. In the light of Hegel's end of 
history, it is the excess in reflection, through which
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Being ‘transcends* the circle of its phenomenological self- 
identity. These inarticulate affirmations are means by 
which the rationally complete self can grow: through this 
kind of activity, man at the end of history projects and 
becomes a higher man.
The higher man is the essential nature of the self--
not all selves, but only selves which grow, which expand, 
which manifest will to power. Similar to Hegel, the 
subject finds itself in its object: both philosophers are 
principally concerned with subjects in movement, in tran­
sition to higher states of being. Both philosophers 
emphasise ‘higher1 as more rather than other. Nietzsche 
states that the higher man ‘gives direction*: the example 
of his life lifts self-consciousness beyond simple self- 
identity, but not so far as to overstep the precipice of 
nihilism. He writes, in Will to Power: “Order of rank: He 
who determines values and directs the will of millennia by 
giving direction to the highest natures is the highest
83man." Man's own projection of the future, that state of 
being to which he aspires, is a goal for himself, and so 
his higher nature is his essential self.
This higher man is further a goal for others, an 
example for those not imbued with the same 'degree of 
power.' The context of what Nietzsche calls 'the herd' is
a meaning-giving horizon greater situation for the
manifestation of will to power. The higher man is a goal
83 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 519.
245
for himself, and a goal for others: "The 'higher nature' of 
the great man lies in being different, in incommunicabil-
ity, in distance of rank, not in an effect of any kind--
even if he made the whole globe tremble.”8* So meaning does 
not lie in any effect, in what the higher man does, but
rather in what he is relative to others. Values are a
potential, a possibility, and a capability.
'The herd' is also the context out of which the higher
man arises. It is one of the higher man's burdens, towards
which he must demonstrate his amor fati. The herd is as
essential to the higher man's nature as is his future-
possibility in the Overman. So Nietzsche does not aspire
to elevate all men, as this erosion of difference would
expose the nihilistic dangers of immediacy and simple self-
identity. He writes: "Not to make men 'better' . . . but
to create conditions that require stronger men."85 When
the herd is an object for itself, nihilism is the result.
This, in the light of Hegel, is stagnation in the end of
history moment: the fatigue of freedom merely re-affirming
itself, without the worthy object of a desired future. In
Bevond Good and Evil. Nietzsche writes:
This degeneration and diminution of man into the 
perfect herd animal (or, as they say, to the man 
of the 'free society'), this animalization of man 
into the dwarf animal of equal rights and claims, 
is possible, there is no doubt of it. Anyone who 
has once thought through this possibility to the 
end knows one kind of nausea that other men don't 
know but perhaps also a new task!86
84 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 468.
85 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 513.
86 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 118.
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This new task is the transvaluation of all values: this is 
the beyond within life, which, with reference to the herd, 
is the higher man. The tension between the way in which 
man is the same as his kind (the equality of free individu­
ality) and the way in which he is different from others 
(the rich variation in the ways in which freedom is made 
manifest) is the substance of meaning. Nietzsche argues 
that the higher man seizes upon this tension most strongly, 
and grasps most truly the more-and-less nature of meaning­
ful life. He writes: ”1 believe that it is precisely
through the presence of opposites and the feelings they 
occasion that the great man, the bow with the great ten­
sion. develops.1,87 More than Hegel, Nietzsche stresses dif­
ference and opposition, because self-consciousness the
realised metaphysical project is his starting point.
Rather than aspire to the herd as an ideal, then, Nietzsche 
proclaims the Overman from out of the herd. For him, man 
in a state of mutual recognition (the equality of free 
individuality) is no longer a goal, but the origin of a new 
goal: the higher man. He writes, in Will to Power:
In opposition to this dwarfing and adaptation of 
man to a specialized utility, a reverse movement 
is needed the production of a synthetic, sum­
marizing, justifying man for whose existence this 
transformation of mankind into a machine is a 
precondition, as a base on which he can invent 
his higher form of being.88
Nietzsche inherits the problem set by Hegel, to turn the
ultimate dialectical synthesis self-conscious humanity
87 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 507.
88 Nietzsche, Will to Power, pp. 463-464.
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 into a new subject, a 'precondition', a not-merely-
self-referencing force whose instability forces movement 
in a new dialectic. For Nietzsche, the man who is merely 
a citizen of the universal and homogeneous state is a herd 
animal. What he seeks to do is to give content to the 
'eternal novelty' of the post-historical epoch, and this is 
his 'arrow of longing for the overman,' or the projection 
of the higher man: a beyond within life.
That the higher man is a beyond within life is shown 
by Nietzsche's continued use of words such as 'higher,' 
'over,' or 'super.' Only situated in context do these 
terms have vital force, and therefore meaning. The essence 
of the higher man does not lie in his 'transcendence,' his 
'autonomy,' or any kind of alien nature which is removed 
from the whole which is life. Being is elevated, but not
essentially changed this is Nietzsche's lesson as well as
Hegel's. The meaning of things is not found in simple 
self-reference, nor in any kind of other-reference. An 
'aristocracy' which emerges from differences in degrees of 
power, in zest for life, is Nietzsche's ideal. He writes: 
"Their [the aristocracy's] fundamental faith simply has to 
be that society must not exist for society's sake but only 
as the foundation and scaffolding on which a choice type of 
being is able to raise itself to its higher task and to a 
higher state of being." So equality, for Nietzsche, is a
matter of peerage, the recognition of equal standing it
cannot be said to be a fundamental principle. He writes,
89 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil. p. 202.
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in Will to Power; "Once one has achieved a certain degree 
of independence, one wants more: people arrange themselves 
according to their degree of force: the individual no
longer simply supposes himself the equal of others, he
• • • * • onseeks his equals he distinguishes himself from others."
Nietzsche accepts Hegel*s notion of mutual recognition, but 
he doubts and mistrusts its universality and homogeneity.
The fundamental principle which results in equality 
among peers is will to power. When the self manifests 
itself in a wider context, when it imposes its nature on 
*the world,1 then it raises itself to a ‘higher state of 
being.1 To do this is to value, to project meaning. One 
is * equal* only with those others who manifest the same 
degree of life, the same will to power. Nietzsche writes 
that a genius is "one who either begets or gives birth, 
taking both terms in their most elevated sense."91 Great­
ness lies in the potential, and not so much in the act--
Nietzsche recognises that everything is already rationally 
present within Being. To *beget* or to *give birth' is 
simply to show outwardly the true nature of the inner self.
The great man is a microcosm of Being as a whole in this
way he is the 'meaning of the earth, ' as Nietzsche 
describes the Overman. In Bevond Good and Evil. he writes: 
"'Precisely this shall be called greatness: being capable 
of being as manifold as whole, as ample as full.'"92 
Nietzsche's comment on 'greatness' here is the very thought
90 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil. p. 125.
91 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 412.
92 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil. p. 139.
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which Hegel articulates regarding Being as a whole: it is 
the content of end of history wisdom. The way in which
Being is higher at the end of history is that it is a
realised and differentiated unity? the higher man is 
•higher* because he embodies this.
The higher man is true to nature when he commands,
when he wills a change, when he projects values. Nietzsche 
writes: 11 In a person, for example, who is called and made 
to command, self-denial and modest self-effacement would 
not be a virtue but the waste of a virtue: thus it seems to 
me."93 To live authentically is *the Good,* according to 
Nietzsche, as he writes in Will to Power: "There is nothing
better than what is good and good is having some ability
and using that to create, Tuchtiokeit or virtu in the
• • QA • cItalian Renaissance sense.” An 'ability* is the merely 
subjective side of man's 'higher' nature. What is needed 
further is 'to create.' The coupling of 'ability' with 
'creation' links fate with freedom. The lesson of the end 
of history is that there is nothing beyond one's ability a 
priori, but the lesson of 'life' is that the self is a 
fatally flawed vessel for the burden of limitless capacity.
The activity of the Nietzsche's higher man is very 
much akin to that of Hegel's Sage. Both are types of 
humanity which project values out of themselves? Nietzsche 
writes: "Genuine philosophers . . . are commanders and
legislators.n95 Both the higher man and the Sage embody the
93 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 149.
94 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 48.
95 Nietzsche, BeVond Good and Evil, p. 136.
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qualities each philosopher most admires: for Nietzsche, the
higher man embodies will to power the expanding, creative
force of life; for Hegel, the Sage embodies reflective
wisdom the comprehension of world history. Nietzsche*s
notion of the * genuine philosopher' as opposed to the
'other-worldly philosopher,' for whom he has nothing but
contempt can be seen as a connecting term here. In this
passage from Bevond Good and Evil. Nietzsche is effectively 
describing the end of history type of humanity: that person 
for whom all possibilities are finally 'at hand.' He 
writes:
Perhaps he himself [the genuine philosopher] must 
have been critic and sceptic and dogmatist and 
historian and also poet and collector and travel­
ler and solver of riddles and moralist and seer 
and 'free spirit* and almost everything in order 
to pass through the whole range of human values 
and value feelings and to be able to see with 
many different eyes and consciences, from a 
height and into every distance, from the depths 
into every height, from a nook into every ex­
panse. But all these are merely preconditions 
of his task: this task demands something dif­
ferent it demands that he create values.96
In other words, the genuine philosopher is no longer
immersed in a process: his ability to reflect back upon the
whole of history enables him to pick and choose, to define
himself, or the anchor of 'self' within perspective.
Ontological will to power functions, for Nietzsche, much as
does ontological Reason, for Hegel. As we have seen,
Reason is, for Hegel, both a faculty of human minds which
is enhanced by progressive appropriation of the world, and
a description of that world Mind which enhances itself by
96 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. pp. 135-136.
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1working out* its differences within itself. The will to 
power works in much the same way for Nietzsche. Both 
philosophers see 'the world' is a world posited, a world 
inferred. Thought is indistinguishable from its object in 
any absolute sense. In the end, philosophy is much a cause 
as it is an effect of its presumed object. Nietzsche 
writes: "It [philosophy] always creates the world in its 
own image? it cannot do otherwise. Philosophy is this 
tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, 
to the 'creation of the world,' to the causa prima."97 We 
can only understand a world which is liable to understand­
ing, which means that, as Nietzsche writes, "we can com-
Qft
prehend only a world that we ourselves have made."
This does not mean that our object, the world, is 
something wholly 'made up, ' that it is nothing but a 
fiction for capricious belief. This is Nietzsche's 'abyss' 
of nihilism, seen when ultimate self-reference is perceived 
as 'simple.' A belief can only be true when it draws 
strength or sustaining power from its contact with reality
or life. And only if that reality or life is a unity--
despite its multitudinous variations within can truth be
'objective' (i.e., not wholly dependent on discrete sub­
jects). The 'feeling' of strength in a belief is not proof 
of its truth. Nietzsche makes it clear that this feeling 
or 'happiness' is merely reflective proof of something more 
fundamental: the contact of a belief with ontological will
97 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 16.
98 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 272.
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to power. He writes: "'No matter how strongly a thing may 
be believed, strength of belief is no criterion of truth.1 
But what is truth? Perhaps a kind of belief that has 
become a condition of life?"99
Nietzsche is a type of the Hegelian Sage because the
history of developing Reason preconditions his philosophy.
The task of comprehending the world is begun anew for
Nietzsche because he stands at the end of a metaphysical
journey. Man stands before grand results: his own self-
consciousness and his thoroughly mediated world. And
Nietzsche finds that, despite all changes within, Being
remains self-same as a whole. The only difference is
nothing: the negation of Being which reveals the gaps
within and the void without. The feeling, within history,
that things are apparently being introduced into the world,
is replaced by the feeling, at the end of history, that
what one accomplished was a reshaping or transformation of
the world. A world made, as opposed to a world found, is
the new starting point for humanity. Nietzsche writes:
This is the greatest error that has ever been 
committed, the essential fatality of error on 
earth: one believed one possessed a criterion of
reality in the forms of reason---while in fact
one possessed them in order to become master of 
reality, in order to misunderstand reality in a
shrewd manner And behold: now the world became
false, and precisely on account of the properties 
that constitute its reality: change, becoming, 
multiplicity, opposition, contradiction, war.100
So the immediate reaction to the realisation that Reason is
a way to 1misunderstand reality in a shrewd manner1 (what
99 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 289.
100 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 315.
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I have called the awareness of distortions within? perspec­
tive) is nihilism. But for Nietzsche, the world is a 
'world become false' only when Reason is taken to be the 
cause of the world. In fact, as Hegel has shown, the
immanence of Reason or what Nietzsche would prefer as the
inseparability of speech about from logos within means
that it is neither wholly a cause, nor wholly an effect. 
Reason 'appropriates' the structure of reality through the 
happy coincidence of both aspects of speech or Reason. 
Only when it is perceived as something 'primordial' or, at 
the other extreme, imposed upon reality, is nihilism the 
result. For Nietzsche, the proper conclusion of Reason can 
only be to reveal the truly primordial aspects of multi­
plicity and change within Being.
For Hegel, to those who look at the world rationally,
the world looks rationally back. Nietzsche, as well, holds
that one finds in things only the explicit appearance of
what one already has, implicitly, in oneself. He writes,
in Will to Power:
Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what 
he himself has imported into them: the finding is
called science, the importing art, religion,
love, pride. Even if this should be a piece of 
childishness, one should carry on with both and
be well disposed toward both some'should find;
others we others! should import!101
The 'finding' called 'science' is philosophy. From Hegel,
we know this to be reflective wisdom, or the articulation
of the moment which marks its decline. The 'importing' is
the activity of will to power; it is a 'childishness'
101 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 327.
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because its expansiveness is a 1useful fiction*: a distor­
tion of the world into subjects and objects, into lesser 
and higher states of Being, all for the sake of man being 
true to his nature as that being which overcomes itself, 
which projects its own beyond within life. Both the act 
and its comprehension are essential to meaningful reality: 
both are terms of the mediation within Being which allow it 
to be a thing higher yet the same.
Nietzsche takes on the realisation of the end of 
history by insisting that one is responsible for oneself 
and one's world in a radical way. Nietzsche expresses this 
as the need for affirmation: ultimately, for the need to 
affirm the whole. One does make the world in one's own 
image. Knowing this, the world can be either meaningless 
or vital depending upon the manner of one's engagement with 
it. Nietzsche's appeal for vital engagement, for the 
exercise of expansive will to power, is an appeal to cast
the world in the strongest possible light  to throw into
relief all aspects of Being through a most thorough-going 
affirmation. He writes: "The desire to bear the entire and 
ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to 
absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance and society
involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui
• 102 •[self-caused thing]." To take ultimate responsibility is
to find oneself in an inherently meaningful world--
radically rooted in Being which is a limited whole contain­
ing infinite possibility.
102 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 28.
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To take ultimate responsibility is sometimes called by 
Nietzsche his amor fati. or love of fate. This fate is not 
something imposed from without, but rather the effective 
result of a history of free choices within a living com­
munity. For Hegel, freedom is determined by Reason, but 
is not any less 'free' for all that. In fact, an undeter­
mined freedom is an unsituated freedom it is empty and
abstract, and therefore unsatisfying. For Nietzsche as 
well, only when freedom has some 'given* substance to work
upon in his case, an apparently fated world is freedom
real and concrete. A history of acts and their consequen­
ces, and one's involvement in a community of similarly free 
individuals, means that one will be incapable of controll­
ing all aspects of one's condition. But, in fact, this 
'fatedness' of reality makes possible meaningful activity. 
Nietzsche is not an extreme individualist, as he shows in
a passage from Will to Power: "Entry into real life one
rescues one's personal life from death by living a common
• 103life." Only the living of a common life allows such
things as fame and reputation qualities of an individual
which can transcend his own death. Further, the burden of
responsibility which we must either accept or descend
into nihilism is eased by living a common life. The
beyond within life whether it is the community or the
projected future of one's own life  is an anchor to our
'going across': to engagement in meaningful life.
103 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 114.
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion
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The Eternal Recurrence and the End of History 
The greatest affirmation of life, or the strongest 
will to power, is found in those who take ultimate respon­
sibility, and who bear the greatest burden, according to 
Nietzsche. To be both weighed down by fate and lifted up 
by freedom is the 'true' condition of humanity: this
contradiction is ontological and it is psychological; it is 
coincidentally the Real and the test of reality. This most 
radical of affirmations is made possible as a result of 
Hegel's end of history: the point of reflective wisdom is 
that one is able to recall the moments of history through 
a comprehensive speech, and the point of the regime of 
actual freedom is that one has entered into a condition 
which enables one to act out those moments. Hegel1s 
achievement makes possible, and even necessary, what 
Nietzsche calls the 'eternal recurrence.' If Being is a 
whole which is realised, as Hegel argues, then the only 
activity possible as a result of this knowledge is movement 
within. In fact, all of history was the outward showing of 
Being's inner self, but 'out' is now finally understood as 
projection/reflection. The 'on-going dialectic' must 
consist of this movement at a higher level than its 
'origin' in immediacy: this is the life of Self-conscious­
ness. To know the ultimate self-reference of reality, and 
yet to engage in life expansively and acquisitively, is the 
'new task' of which Nietzsche speaks. This kind of exis­
tence is found in the tension of seeming opposites, harken- 
ing back to Hegel, but a tension which is temporally
X
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irresolvable. Nietzsche's great advance, though, is that 
he does not abandon the requirement of closure: will to 
power is teleological, but this telos is non-external, and 
hence 'non-metaphysical,' by being projected onto the 
tableau of eternal recurrence.
The clearest and most interesting presentation of
Nietzsche's notion of the eternal recurrence is found in
the section 'On the Vision and the Riddle' in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. In this parable, Zarathustra describes his
ascent along a path up a mountainside:
Not long ago I walked gloomily through the deadly
pallor of dusk gloomy and hard, with lips
pressed together. Not only one sun had set for 
me. A path that ascended defiantly through 
stones, malicious, lonely, not cheered by herb or
shrub a mountain path crunched under the
defiance of my foot. Striding silently over the 
mocking clatter of pebbles, crushing the rock 
that made it slip, my foot forced its way upward.
Upward defying the spirit that drew it downward
toward the abyss, the spirit of gravity, my devil
and archenemy. Upward although he sat on me,
half dwarf, half mole, lame making lame, dripping 
lead into my ear, leaden thoughts into my brain.1
This 'spirit of gravity' draws Zarathustra towards the
'abyss,' which is nihilism. As I have argued, this abyss
is present in two senses: within, as the tendency of
collapse into simple, immediate self-reference; and
without, as the desire to make external, other-reference.
In the light of Hegel, the spirit of gravity is the danger
of dialectical incompleteness: 'sealing oneself off' within
a single, historical moment. Only when this weight is
thrown off, or more precisely overcome. does one adopt the
1 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. p. 268.
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wider and 'higher' perspective which refutes previous inodes 
of satisfaction as excesses of the subjective or objective 
spirit. The tension between satisfaction within the moment 
and ultimate dissatisfaction with regard to world histori­
cal goals is the engine of the dialectic for Hegel. For 
Nietzsche, the tension is between the spirit of gravity and 
the will to power: between the knowledge that every projec­
tion of the self eventually reflects back upon the self, 
and the drive which engages in such projection neverthe­
less. The resolution of this tension is the eternal 
recurrence: the inferred limit which sustains this ontolog­
ical contradiction. Nietzsche believes that man's will to 
power is tempered by the spirit of gravity, and its mere 
strength becomes courage in the face of the truth which the 
spirit of gravity utters, which is that "every stone that 
is thrown must fall," and which says to Zarathustra: "0
Zarathustra, far indeed you have thrown the stone, but it 
will fall back on yourself."2
As the parable continues, Zarathustra reaches a
gateway, and confronts the spirit of gravity as follows:
'Behold this gateway, dwarf!' I continued. 'It 
has two faces. Two paths meet here; no one has 
yet followed either to its end. This long lane 
stretches back for an eternity. - And the long 
lane out there, that is another eternity. They 
contradict each other, these paths; they offend 
each other face to face; and it is here at this 
gateway that they come together. The name of the 
gateway is inscribed above: 'Moment.' But who­
ever would follow one of them, on and on, farther
and farther do you believe, dwarf, that these
paths contradict each other eternally?'3
2 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. p.268.
3 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. pp. 269-270.
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When we read this passage in the light of Hegel, we can 
perceive the path as the progress of history, and the 
gateway 'Moment' as the realisation of the end of history. 
It is at this gate that Zarathustra looks back along the 
entire length of his ascent, in contrast to what was his 
perspective on the way up. There, his task was exhausted 
by studying his feet and debating the spirit of gravity: he 
was immersed in process, only seeing where his stones had 
fallen when he had ascended to a new height. Now, Zarathu­
stra can see the result of his casting up of stones: he is
higher he has reached the gateway 'Moment' yet he is
the same the path continues onward eternally. The
continuation of the path, beyond the gateway 'Moment,' is 
essentially the same, but for the fact that, in traversing 
upon it, he will have passed this gate, he will have 
experienced the looking back upon the whole. Now, when he 
casts up his stones, he knows beforehand what he will
find the gateway 'Moment,' eternally recurring, higher
yet the same. In a sense, Zarathustra begins all over 
again, but he cannot simply repeat, because his 'origin' 
now is the 'new height' of Self-Consciousness.
The contradiction of the paths at the gateway is the 
distortion or mediation of Being within itself. This 
contrast is apparent, emerging when one purposefully leaves 
out of consideration the whole. That the path continues
eternally that Being is an exhaustive whole despite any
changes within means that contradictions are overcome by
reflecting upon the whole, by realising the end of history.
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That changes are changes within a whole with infinite or 
eternal possibility, means that Being is eternally self­
same. Therefore, all things recur eternally, because of the 
two truths about Being which both Hegel and Nietzsche 
teach: one the one hand dialectical movement (Hegel) or
multiplicity, flux and change (Nietzsche) are constitutive, 
and, on the other hand, Being is a realised unity (Hegel) 
and no aspect of life is meaningful with reference to 
anything essentially other than itself (Nietzsche). The 
conclusion for Hegel is the end of history: the incorpora­
tion of all dialectical possibilities within a wholly 
rational speech and existential condition of actual free­
dom. The conclusion for Nietzsche is the eternal recur­
rence: a thoroughgoing affirmation of life, which includes 
life's drive for difference and change.
Zarathustra continues his observations upon the
gateway 'Moment' as follows:
'Behold,' I continued, 'this moment 1 From this 
gateway, Moment, a long, eternal lane leads 
backward: behind us lies an eternity. Must not
whatever can walk have walked on this lane
before? Must not whatever can happen have hap­
pened, have been done, have passed by before?
And if everything has been there before what do
you think, dwarf, of this moment? Must not this 
gateway too have been there before? Are not all 
things knotted together so firmly that this
moment draws after it all that is to come?
Therefore itself too? For whatever can walk
 in this long lane out there too, it must walk
once more!'4
Again, it is useful to look at this passage with reference
to Hegel. 'Before' history, before Zarathustra begins his
4 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. p. 270.
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ascent, Being simply is. However, even here, all the 
moments of history are nascent: they exist in potential
within the as-yet undifferentiated whole of Being. At the
end of history when Zarathustra beholds the gateway--
Being is in-and-for-itself: it is higher yet the same; it
is what it is, but not merely so now it is something
actual, something real, present, and known.
The difference between the changefulness of life and 
the ultimate self-identity of Being is the difference 
between temporality and eternity. The unity of these great 
conflicting movements is expressed by Hegel as Self-con­
sciousness at the end of history, and it is expressed by 
Nietzsche as eternal recurrence. Eternal recurrence 
incorporates all of Being, but it is not an imposed limit. 
It is a horizon of meaning which is not fixed, hence it is 
the self-sustaining (and self-subverting) definition of 
life.
The realisation of the gateway 'Moment' is the gaining 
of perspective. Fate is the appearance, before reflection, 
of one's situatedness in life, but the post-historical 
requirement that one reject imposition means that what is 
taken to be the accidents or caprices of history is known 
to be the workings of freedom: the immanent, that is,
temporally and spatially specific, result of potentially 
unlimited will to power, instantiated in the mass of selves 
which is humanity. Perspective, or where one 'finds' 
oneself, is the cumulative effect of one's 'casting up of 
stones,1 of one's willing changes/ or projecting a future#
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In Hegelian terms, all subsequent ‘moments' to the end of 
history are the manifestation of the freedom of the self to 
locate itself within a completed tableau of dialectical ap­
pearance, now present 'purely' (i.e., all-but-immediately)
before one. 'Moment' or where one finds oneself upon
reflection only appears to be the inevitable situation of
the self, as it was within history: now, perspective must 
be a self-aware distortion within Being for the sake of 
living a meaningful life. For Zarathustra, the gateway
marks a contradiction but only an apparent, or immediate
one. The eternal recurrence of all things is the resolu­
tion of this tension for reflective wisdom, but it does not 
take away the actual freedom of the self to 'cast its own 
stones.' In fact, an individual's will to power becomes 
something more than mere wilfulness, more than individual 
autonomy or dominance, because of eternal recurrence.
Hegel was able to avoid traditional metaphysics by 
thinking dialectically, and posit a whole which is mediat­
ed. Nietzsche can only do the same by thinking nihilisti­
cally, and posit a whole whose mediation and situation is 
the nothing. Nietzsche's position is more difficult than 
Hegel's because more possibilities are denied him as 
'false,' or more precisely inauthentic. Not only can he 
not make the transcendental move of other-worldly refer­
ence, but neither can he make the dialectical move of 
making a wider, more comprehensive speech about Being. 
What is left is nothing, and speeches about nothing are 
silences, and this is nihilism. As B61a Egyed writes,
X
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"nihilism . . .  is that which is unsayable in our language 
revealing itself at the limit only as a limit."5 Everything 
defined by nothing, without and throughout, is Hegel's end 
of history. To sustain this, in the face of the obvious 
incapacity of rational speech to define the ontological 
limits of Being in nothing, is Nietzsche's task.
The eternal recurrence is an affirmation, a kind of 
speech which pushes at the limits of Being in nihilism. 
Without such an affirmation, Nietzsche is 'merely' a 
nihilist, and will to power is just over-stated moral 
subjectivism. Stephen Houlgate advances this view, and 
arraigns Nietzsche on the charge of metaphysics. Nietzsche 
holds that metaphysics is imposition, and Houlgate holds up 
'life' as Nietzsche's particular imposition. It is sur­
prising, though, that Houlgate does not view eternal 
recurrence in a Hegelian light: indeed, he mentions it only 
twice in his book. In one place, he calls eternal recur­
rence a 'simplified vision of that creativity which we can 
bear.' Houlgate writes: "This is Nietzsche's aesthetic
justification of life: to see reality as creative, and at 
the same time to create a simplified vision of that creati­
vity which we can bear. The culmination of this project 
will be Zarathustra's ecstatic affirmation of the myth of 
the eternal recurrence, in which creativity is given its 
most 'perfect,' most 'beautiful' form."6 Against Houlgate, 
I think that Nietzsche is right to perceive the necessity
5 Egyed, "Tracing Nihilism" in Khstorlc of Nihilism, p,
6 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 62.
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of myth, and that this can be non-impositional depending 
upon its timeliness: the only possibility left for truth is 
as a thought-in-season. This is why Nietzsche must adopt 
an aesthetic critique: he is more concerned with the effect 
of proclaiming the eternal recurrence than its truth. 
Ultimate self-reference, and empty other-reference have 
subverted the usefulness of truth to life. The limit of 
sense is nonsense, and so the need is there somehow to 
express this horizon to avoid condemning life when thought 
turns back from the abyss of its own limit. Nietzsche's 
articulations of this useful and valuable 'nonsense' are 
expressed in his Dionysian philosophy: in that laughter,
play, music and dance which is the extra-rational logos of 
wholly immanent Being.
Nietzsche is relatively unconcerned with the truth of 
eternal recurrence. In a sense, it is a 'noble lie.' But 
this is so only because Nietzsche has demonstrated the 
inadequacy of 'truth' as a demonstration of value. This 
has emerged from his discussion of nihilism, and his 
demonstration of the defining character of 'nothing' to an 
immanent world of life and values. To say anything at all, 
Nietzsche must also utter 'nonsense': this is the only
more-comprehensive speech possible after Hegel. But it 
does make sense if, following Hegel, we move within 
Nietzsche's discourse. To do so is to perceive Nietzsche's 
philosophy as not merely self-subverting, but necessarily 
so, and useful to life for having affirmed itself.
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Houlgate remains rooted in the Hegelian circle, and 
does not put as much weight on Hegel1s admitted exhaustive­
ness, and hence culmination in the fatigue of the end of 
history. Nietzsche*s unconcern with 'literal, ontological 
truth* is seen as evidence of a metaphysical projection of 
an arbitrary beyond in the eternal recurrence. He writes:
To my mind, this idea [eternal recurrence] is to 
be understood as a conjecture or hypothesis 
constructed from Nietzsche's experience of the 
constantly changing character of life. Nietzsche 
is not attempting to say 'This is how the world 
really is, ' but rather 'This is how I must and 
will see the world. ' Nietzsche is thus not 
concerned with the literal, ontological truth of 
the teaching, but with its creative, interpretive 
•truth.'7
I reject the notion that eternal recurrence is an imposi­
tion on the part of Nietzsche, and assert that it is a 
necessary emergence to which he is led negatively, very 
much in the Hegelian manner.
I agree with Deleuze's view, distilled by Egyed when 
he writes: "It is nonsense to construe eternal recurrence 
as a return of the same"8 What recurs is the whole, and the 
whole is infinitely varied. That this whole is finite, as 
is shown by both Hegelian and Nietzschean closure, in no 
way requires recurrence of 'the same.' The metaphysical 
closure of Being, plus its Negation/Becoming or 'life,' 
does not equal repetition. This is because of the kind of 
limit to all things which both Hegel and Nietzsche project: 
both conclude that the whole is limited bv nothing, which 
is very different from saying that there are no limits to
7 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 85.
8 Egyed, "Tracing Nihilism," Rhetoric of Nihilism, p. 6.
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the whole. Eternal recurrence is this limit which does not 
limit.
Eternal recurrence is a necessary emergence because of 
the end of history. Nietzsche recognised the temporal 
exhaustion of the end of history (hence a need for a move 
onwards), but also the closed nature of Being, its ultimate 
self-identity (hence a need for recurrence). Being is not 
simply self-identical because it's essence is mediation. 
Both Hegel and Nietzsche demonstrate that the temporal 
appearance of a closed system cannot be repeated because 
difference-within is infinite. For Hegel, Self-Conscious­
ness is Being once-again, but Being articulated. For 
Nietzsche, life has precession. which is to say it is a 
return-to-self through itself, a movement which turns out 
to be expansive, but in a wholly immanent way.
For Nietzsche, the truth of eternal recurrence is a 
fading concern because of the limits to such a claim which 
he accepts. The truth of eternal recurrence cannot be that 
it is an underlying principle of reality, nor that it is 
it's over-riding structure. All it can be is the inferred 
limit of the mass of projections and reflections which make 
up the workings of will to power in life. Because 
Nietzsche makes no claim to the necessity of his assertion, 
he does not eliminate the nihilistic possibilities of 
collapse into the moment or empty reference to the beyond. 
Eternal recurrence is a test, a measure of the strength of 
will to power, and in this way it is a value. It is an 
'absolute' value only because it is the most extreme test,
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an impossible limit of the extent of will to power: that
one can bear all the consequences of all one's actions, for
all eternity. Bela Egyed writes:
First, it should be recalled that for Nietzsche, 
and for Deleuze, the eternal recurrence is a 
principle of selection in addition to being the 
thought of an ontological synthesis. As a prin­
ciple of selection it separates those who can 
bear life without 'truth' and 'eternal values' 
from those who cannot. But to affirm life con­
ceived in such a way is completed nihilism.9
Houlgate, in his brief discussion of eternal recur­
rence, writes that it is, for Nietzsche, the highest
• • 10expression of will to power. But because Houlgate
believes will to power to be an imposition, and hence 
metaphysical, it follows that eternal recurrence is the 
most extreme indulgence in metaphysics. On the contrary, 
I do not think we should be fooled by Nietzsche's object­
ions to the unity of the whole: this is not a rejection of 
closure as such, but a rejection of the old metaphysics. 
If we adopt a Hegelian perspective upon Nietzsche, and 
place ourselves within the horizon formed by will to power 
and eternal recurrence, then neither term marks an imposi­
tion: both are quasi-dialectical emergences through the
other. If eternal recurrence is a unity force, balancing 
will to power as a force for difference, then either term 
can be seen to be non-impositional only if we take 
Nietzsche's 'origin' of will to power as a thought-begin­
ning, not-quite-matching the reality it describes, which is
9 Egyed, "Tracing Nihilism,1 Rhetoric of Nihilism, p. 7.
10 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 85.
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a closed, but all-inclusive, whole. Even Houlgate would be 
led to this conclusion, were he to set aside his belief 
that 'life' is a metaphysical category for Nietzsche, 
because he writes: "What Nietzsche believes in is a con­
crete, internally differentiated totality, a sum of radi­
cally different but interrelating forces and activities. 
What-he rejects, however, is the notion of the ’unity1 of 
life which overrides that manifold differentiation and 
reduces life to a monotonous, uniform structure."11 This 
'sum' is the eternal recurrence: the expression of the
whole as a beyond within life, and not as an overriding 
unity. And if eternal recurrence reflects upon will to 
power as its highest expression, as Houlgate argues, then 
it would seem more useful to regard both it and will to 
power as what Nietzsche says they are: distortions for the 
sake of acting towards the future, 'wilful misunderstand­
ings' which serve life.
Nietzsche adopts an aesthetic critique, and his 
concern is more with the effect of proclaiming the eternal 
recurrence. This should not be objected to on Hegelian 
grounds, because the end of history makes authentic re­
engagement impossible. It is a non-arbitrary 'imposition' 
because it adheres to the only criterion left for truth: 
the continuity of contact with reality. Even Houlgate 
writes that the eternal recurrence is an imposition which 
is anti-metaphysical because Nietzsche holds that all
11 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 42.
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language is the creation of fictions.12 A fiction is not 
anti-truth, only if it rises to the level of myth, only if 
it is a noble lie. Eternal recurrence is Nietzsche's 
counterpart to Plato's allegory of the cave. Is it true? 
Only if its effect is to take the measure of life. And 
life is true to the extent that it approaches the eternal 
recurrence as the useful fiction of a beyond within life.
The eternal recurrence is the limit of will to power 
as the extreme of affirmation. The only 'absolute' beyond 
left which can situate the self is its own widest possible 
extension. This is 'true' because it is nothing other than 
the self, but it is 'myth' because all selves will fail to 
reach this standard. Eternal recurrence is a bevond within 
life because total responsibility, while it must not be 
impossible, is impractical. No one can assert his will to 
power with such vitality that he can control all the 
consequences of his actions in the community or in the 
future. Eternal recurrence is one of those ends which, 
insofar that it is reached, it is fallen short of. What is 
left is its effect upon the community of selves, which is, 
in Nietzsche's view, to reveal differences in degrees of 
power.
Nietzsche thus comes to terms most fully with Hegel's 
thought that things not only are, but that their nature is 
to appear as they are, in themselves, for themselves. 
Nietzsche's 'restatement of the obvious,1 though, strives 
to reach beyond what he perceives to be Hegel's more
12 Houlgate, Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 86.
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passive reflectivity. Zarathustra makes this kind of
complete affirmation in the following passage:
'And this slow spider, which crawls in the moon­
light, and this moonlight itself, and I and you 
in the gateway, whispering together, whispering
of eternal things must not all of us have been
there before? And return and walk in that other 
lane, out there, before us, in this long dreadful 
lane must we not eternally return?113
Affirmation is yea-saying to the whole, but not to the
moment, or at least not to the moment exclusive of its
situation within the whole. The affirmation of life is
therefore not the blind acceptance of any state of affairs,
but rather the recognition that all states of affairs are
realisations of a part of a perhaps infinitely diverse
whole, and liable in varying degrees to the influence of
one's own will to power, of one's own choosing of situation
within Being, and definition of perspective.
Nietzsche comes to terms with the nature of activity 
at the end of history, after one has beheld the gateway and 
looked back, after one has wholeheartedly affirmed life in 
all its vicissitudes. The liberation of perspective from 
its single-focused, progressive attitude within history is 
described by Nietzsche in some places as dance: it is the 
finding of happiness in the multiplicity, flux and change 
which are constitutive of reality. Nietzsche writes: "A
little wisdom is possible indeed; but this blessed certain­
ty I found in all things: that they would rather dance on
the feet of Chance."14 Here, Nietzsche is clearly departing
13 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 270.
14 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 278.
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from Hegel, but it is a departure necessitated by the 
realisation of the end of history: because the end of
history is a moment which projects no future, it is an 
'eternal* moment. Nietzsche must grapple with the problem 
of the nature of post-historical activity, or, in his 
terms, what one's attitude ought to be in the face to the 
eternal recurrence, what he calls his 'dark thought.'
Nietzsche's self-doubt in proclaiming the eternal 
recurrence is least evident in the speech of Zarathustra's 
animals in the section 'The Convalescent' of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra:
'0 Zarathustra,' the animals said, 'to those who 
think as we do, all things themselves are danc­
ing: they come and offer their hands and laugh
and flee and come back. Everything goes,
everything comes back; eternally rolls the wheel 
of being. Everything dies, everything blossoms 
again; eternally runs the year of being. Every­
thing breaks, everything is joined anew; eternal­
ly the same house of being is built. Everything 
parts, everything greets every other thing again; 
eternally the ring of being remains faithful to
itself. In every Now, being begins; round every
Here rolls the sphere There. The centre is 
everywhere. Bent is the path of eternity.'15
The 'dancing' of all things is movement within Being, 
creating subjects and objects, and 'staking out1 perspec­
tive. The nature of this self-situation is dance at the 
end of history, as opposed to progress or 'ascent within 
history. The falling apart and bringing together of all 
things is the effect of the activity of thought and the 
exercise of freedom, which elaborate both the synthetic
unity, and the diverse, particular nature of Being.
15 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. pp. 329-330.
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Finally, to say that 'round every Here rolls the sphere 
There' is to say that in every moment, in every focus of 
perspective, the self finds itself in its object. The 
truth, or the enduring contact with reality, or the eternal 
recurrence, lies in the middle term: in the meeting of
apparently contradictory paths in the moment of mediation. 
That Being is, ultimately, universal and eternal anchors 
meaning; that the self is a creative, expansive being 
within this is another anchor. It is on the way across 
between these anchors that meaning is found, that the self 
finds a context and the context finds instantiation in 
selves.
If we perceive the gateway 'Moment' as the object or 
goal of all striving, as the essential result of Zarathu- 
stra's 'casting up of stones' and his ascent up the mount­
ainside, then we can see how it marks the revelation of the 
eternal recurrence in the following way. Hegel's con­
clusion is that the object is nothing other than what the 
subject is implicitly, that the goal is the projected 
satisfaction of the desire. Here we find the eternal 
character of 'Moment': the thing-itself remains self-same 
as a whole. Along with this is Hegel's conclusion that the 
object is the appearance of the subject, the showing-forth 
and making-known of what was merely implied or potential: 
one's satisfaction reflects upon one's desire as its 
negation or decline. So the object or goal is not simply
identical to the subject or the desire the relation here
is never an immediate one. Although nothing is added from
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without, a change does occur: the self, through its rela­
tion to the world, gains experience. What is 'new1 for the
self is its history or its fate a past made present
through the consequences of action. Here we find the 
recurring aspect of 'Moment1: the eternally self-same whole 
is higher by the cumulative effect of past action, which is 
the creation of a human world through history. The signi­
ficance of this new height for perspective is not that one 
gains anything absolutely new, something from without the 
whole, but that one is able to live more fully, more 
humanely, by virtue of one's wider perspective, and ex­
panded will to power.
And so, what is new is only apparently so to the 
limited perspective of the self. This limitation is, in 
fact, meaning-creating, because it allows one to take 
satisfaction from the exercise of one's freedom, despite 
the eternal recurrence, or ultimate self-reference, of all 
things. Hegel has shown that changes within Being are 
phenomenological, which is to say that they are internal 
variations within a whole. Although Nietzsche rejects the 
idea that there is a guiding principle at work in this 
whole, he nevertheless projects a unity to all things, 
defined by a limit which is on one 'side' the widest 
possible extension that is eternal recurrence, and on the 
other 'side' nothing. And he shows how it might be 
possible, in spite of the knowledge that all things are 
ultimately irremovable from a universal or eternal context, 
to lead meaningful lives. To 'dance on the feet of Chance'
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means to face the ongoing presencing of things in the post- 
historical epoch in a way which gives as much satisfaction 
as was found through our historical experience of immersion 
in process. Nietzsche expresses a very Hegelian thought 
when he writes: "Whoever reaches his ideal transcends it eo 
ipso.1,16 To transcend is to go beyond what there was 
previously, but only as the continuation of that thing, and 
not as a shift to something essential other than what it 
is. What is essential is not the ideal, or the desire, but 
the achievement.
Nietzsche's emphasis on 'multiplicity, flux, and 
change' is consistent with the doctrine of eternal recur­
rence if one considers that 'Chance' is the appearance 
which the consequences of past action have to man. The way 
the self confronts the world is always from a limited 
perspective, in that although the self has Being every­
thing there is, appearing as it is, eternally for its
object, it remains a single locus of perspective, a single 
origin for world-projection and self-reflection: the
subject is individual. The word "fate" better describes 
the wav in which all things recur eternally, except that 
one is able to affect the appearance of things depending 
upon the strength of one's will to power, of the degree of 
one's affirmation of life. The extent to which one is at 
home in the world depends upon how much of it one can 
effectively make one's object, and make meaningful by 
putting it into relation with oneself.
16 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 80.
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What is for Nietzsche fate is, for Hegel, the ongoing 
dialectic. Even at the end of history, all things, con­
sidered merely in-themselves, are unstable, and perpetually 
'drive outwards' to manifest themselves, to work out the 
tensions or apparent contradictions which are present 
within them. All aspects of this ongoing dialectic are
eternally present to know this is end of history wisdom
 but they never will be immediately so to man. Our
distance from things, or our inability to experience the 
world except through mediation, means that the way in which 
objects are projected appears as fate, subject to our 
control only from our limited vantage-point. But limita­
tions are, as has been argued, meanina-horizons boundary
stones which enable us to make sense of the world.
In Nietzsche's parable, the gateway 'Moment' signifies 
that we are higher; that the path continues onward eternal­
ly signifies that we are the same. To put it another way, 
if the gateway marks the 'beyond' for Zarathustra's ascent, 
then the path onwards shows him that this beyond is 'within
life' the fulfilment and not the condemnation of his
striving. Zarathustra can continue onward from this
'Moment' he can cast off the spirit of gravity because,
in looking back, he perceives his past acts now (i.e., as 
a consequence) to be, effectively, his fate. By acting as 
if his past free choices are a given (which is how they now 
function as consequences), Zarathustra can begin anew. 
Nietzsche writes: "The consequences of our actions take
hold of us, quite indifferent to our claim that meanwhile
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we have 1 improved. 11117 We have indeed 'improved, ' but the 
result is the need to take more complete responsibility, to 
accept greater consequences, because our improvement is the 
acquisition of a past, of a history of developing action 
and thought. Our 'height' in the ascent of Being is built 
upon the cumulative effect of acts and their consequences. 
Being is, Being becomes, and the reflection of this ap­
parent externalisation, this falsification or distortion 
within, raises Being to a unity which is differentiated, to 
a whole with self-consciousness, to a thing which is in- 
and-for-itself. Nietzsche, and Hegel as well, argues that 
despite our realisation of this, there remains a dynamism 
in our relation to the world that continually projects new
configurations of the universal and eternal substance new
grist for the mill of humanity's zest for life.
For Nietzsche, one's freedom is a function of one's 
will to power, of how much reality one can endure. To deal 
with consequences is to take the past as a 'given, ' even 
though one knows that one is ultimately responsible, that 
one cannot separate completely one's identity from the 
whole of Being. In Will to Power, he writes: "A deed
produces its consequences, within the man and outside the 
man, regardless of whether it is considered as punished, 
'expiated,' 'forgiven' and 'extinguished,' regardless of 
whether the church has in the meantime promoted the doer to 
a saint.”18 Post-historical activity what Nietzsche calls
17 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 93.
18 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 212.
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'dance' means that by the creative shifting of perspec­
tive one can continually cast the world (and, in retro­
spect, world history) in a different light. But the fact 
that our past, in-itself. is beyond our reach means that 
the nature of post-historical activity is engagement with 
consequences (which activity in turn produces more conse­
quences, and onwards eternally) . Thus 'the deed' itself 
functions as an anchor to meaning, because it can never be 
recalled. The act may be repeated, and one can re-act to 
it in many different ways, but the past is always a beyond 
within life, which we can 'control,' or make our object, 
only through the mediation of consequences.
The fated appearance of things only contradicts our 
actual freedom immediately: upon reflection, one's fate is 
the manifestation in the present of a past of free choices. 
One makes oneself by expressing what one is, and only when 
one focuses one's attention on a single moment in this 
development does the self appear to be fated. In fact, or 
universally and eternally, one 'bears one's own guilt,' as 
Hegel writes in the Logic: "If man saw . . . that whatever 
happens to him is only the outcome of himself, and that he 
only bears his own guilt, he would stand free, and in 
everything that came upon him would have the consciousness 
that he suffered no wrong."19 Post-historical experience is 
therefore a tension between knowing that one's life is 
wholly unconditioned because of its situation in a context 
of possibilities which are universal and eternal, and
19 Hegel, Logic,v p. 211.
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taking one's starting-point for action as given: as if all 
that has gone before (temporal beyond within life) and all 
that is outside one's effective influence (spatial beyond 
within life) is fated.
In addressing this actual situation, Nietzsche is 
concerned with creating conditions for the living of a 
meaningful life, with how one approaches the question of 
values. He does not baldly state how one ought to live, or 
what values should be projected. Emphasis upon the in­
dividual does not ignore the individual's context, but it 
does contrast the difference between what one is able to 
say about mortal man, and what one is able to say about the 
eternally recurring whole of Being. Greatness lies in 
extent, in over-mastering one's situation to be more than 
what one simply is. What one becomes is the object or the 
beyond, but it is an inferred limit to the self as 'origin' 
of will to power. Nietzsche's individualist emphasis is 
his caution against the trap of attributing causation to be 
essential to this beyond. But nor should we be drawn to 
the opposite extreme, to perceive some force, called will 
to power, as the cause of a meaningful world. Nietzsche's 
philosophy succeeds only if it is, in the Hegelian manner, 
circular and complete. Nietzschean philosophy achieves 
closure defined by the logos of will to power/eternal 
recurrence, and exhaustively described by Apollonian self- 
reference and Dionysian excess.
As Hegel argues, the Idea is the whole of Being and 
its appearance. There is nothing from without, so the
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universe is a closed system. But, consistently with this, 
Nietzsche shows that the universe is boundless, which it 
must be if there is no outside, if the whole is both the 
content and the limit of itself. One can consider this 
temporally as well: although there is nothing other than 
everything there is (in other words, the 'boundary1 of the 
Idea is nihilism), that 'everything there is' recurs 
eternally. Although the moments of history can apparently 
occur only once, in fact they were always implicit in 
Being: their eternal presence is made known through tem­
poral experience. Man is the origin of a limited perspec­
tive because he is a mortal being experiencing eternally 
recurring things, and because he is a single self-con­
sciousness within a universally present Self-Consciousness. 
All things, arranging themselves in infinite configura­
tions, over and over again for all time, are thus able to
seem to be a 'given' material for the exercise of our
freedom. Our limited perspective, within a boundless but 
closed whole, enables us to seize upon the substance of our 
world as the work of Chance: our mortality rescues us from 
eternity. Nietzsche writes:
If only we could foresee the most favourable 
conditions under which creatures of the highest
value arise! It is a thousand times too compli­
cated and the probability of failure very great:
so it is not inspiring to look for them! 
Scepticism. On the other hand: we can increase
courage, insight, hardness, independence, and the 
feeling of responsibility; we can make the scales 
more delicate and hope for the assistance of 
favourable accidents.2 0
20 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 480.
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So overcoming nihilism is not a matter of adopting 
certain true values as against certain false ones. For 
Nietzsche, to overcome nihilism is to adopt a posture in
the face of actual conditions one discovers values by the
way in which one lives; one does not invent them, and then 
decide to live accordingly. A goal is revealed in the 'I 
am1 of the subject, which goal reflects upon that subject 
as its higher being. The ongoing dialectic is the dynamic 
relation between the self, the world, and the value. For 
Hegel, the self is characterised as the moment of desire; 
for Nietzsche, it is taken as the origin of the will to 
power: both forces are an implicit expanding-outwards. For 
Hegel, the world is the objective appearance of Being; for 
Nietzsche, it is the consequences or 'Chance' cast up by 
eternal recurrence. Finally, for Hegel, the value is the 
satisfaction of the desire, and for Nietzsche it is the 
attainment of 'new height' for the self. To value, or to 
live a meaningful life, is, for both philosophers, to stand 
in relation to the world, spatially, and the future, 
temporally. This is a combination of acceptance ("it is 
so"), affirmation ("I will that it be so"), and projection 
("I extend myself into it thus"). And so, Nietzsche 
writes, that, in the face of nihilism, the strongest "not 
only concede but love a fair amount of accidents and 
nonsense."21 To love is to put oneself in relation to the 
object in a way that reflects upon, or transforms, the 
self. To love 'accidents and nonsense' is to actively
21 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 38.
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engage with the world as it appears before one, to allow it 
to affect one's self in the same way that one projects 
one's own nature upon the world. In Hegelian terms, this 
is mutual recognition, which raises both moments to a 
higher level, although adding nothing but the insubstantial 
putting-into-relation of the apparent opposites: the
subject and the object, the self and the world.
To favour Chance, or the apparently given nature of a 
world which is in fact comprehensive to itself, is to set 
up a mediating tension with the opposite impulse, which is 
the will to unity, to appropriate Reason. Nietzsche 
writes: "We possess art lest we perish of the truth.”22
Here we find the nature of post-historical activity: the 
ongoing dialectic which emphasises, once again, the subject 
within the completed object, enabling the self to affirm
itself and thereby 'life' through art selecting certain
possibilities and eliminating others by manifesting one's 
nature in an authentic (i.e., world-engaging) way.
The immediate consequence of the end of history is 
nihilism. When man no longer finds himself involved in a 
meaningful community and progress, he does not easily adapt 
to the new task of involving himself, and so generating a 
meaningful context out of his own fullness of life. He
does not realise, at first, that the past of self--
involvement world is now only present in experience, and
is once again a force latent in himself, waiting for 
expression from this new height. Man must re-engage in the
22 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 435.
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working-out of the nature of himself and his situation, but 
self-consciously: taking the perspective of things as
given, but knowing this to be projected. In other words, 
the dialectical nature of Being as a whole must be incor­
porated in the human self. Not to come to terms with this 
post-historical truth is to lapse into nihilism, to root 
oneself in nostalgic thinking at odds with one's existen­
tial condition. Nietzsche clearly shows that he knows he 
is living through a period of nihilism, precipitated by the 
pervasive awareness that humanity's involvement in life has 
lost its intensity, and not yet learned to posit new goals. 
How one can be able to project a new future is precisely 
Nietzsche's concern, as expressed when he writes:
Let anyone look at the nineteenth century with an
eye for these quick preferences and changes of
the style masquerade; also for the moments of
despair over the fact that 'nothing is becoming. ' 
. . . . Perhaps this is where we shall still
discover the realm of our invention, that realm
in which we, too, can still be original, say, as
parodists of world history and God's buffoons--
perhaps, even if nothing else today has any 
future, our laughter may yet have a future.23
Nietzsche's higher man, or great man, is the one who 
overcomes nihilism by, first of all, possessing the capac­
ity to 'laugh, play, and dance,' or to cope with the
substance of Being, universally present and eternally
recurring, and, second of all, employs this capacity to 
forge new goals, to project a beyond within life.
Nietzsche makes the sad observation that such strength of 
character-possessed by what Hegel would call 'world-
23 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 150.
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historical individuals* did not exist in his time, and
perhaps this is true today as well. He writes: "Such men 
of great creativity, the really great men according to my 
understanding, will be sought in vain today and probably 
for a long time to come."24
Contrary to the mode of language which each philosoph­
er employs, I would argue that Nietzsche is more moderate 
than Hegel in his claims for what the ideal 'type' of 
humanity can achieve. Hegel*s world-historical individual 
sees through history, and raises all apparent givens to the 
level of self-consciousness. The Sage is almost inhuman in 
his capacity for speech, and incapacity for action. 
Nietzsche's higher man, on the other hand, is defined by 
his failure, by the point at which he falls short of the 
most radical of all affirmations. 'The beyond' exists 
beyond one's capacity, to the limit of the eternal recur­
rence. The feeling for this beyond within life is what 
Nietzsche wishes to instill. Although he shares Hegel's 
prescription of fatigue and nihilism with the end of 
history, Nietzsche's modesty furnishes him with the grounds 
of optimism. He writes: "It seems to me that the religious
instinct is indeed in the process of growing powerfully--
but the theistic satisfaction it refuses with deep 
suspicion."25 This instinct finds expression, now, in the 
feeling for the beyond within life.
24 Nietzsche, Will to Power, pp. 501-502.
25 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 66.
285
Dionysus and Apollo 
The religious instinct, which is the drive for unity 
with all things, is expressed by Nietzsche under the 
heading of ’Dionysian spirit.1 Dionysus stands as a 
metaphor for the kind of humanity which Nietzsche sees as 
possible and desirable. While Hegel's philosophy makes 
possible a rational satisfaction, or a self-conscious unity 
with all things through the terms of Reason, Nietzsche 
seeks to go beyond self-reference in an extra-rational 
manner, by 'paying heed' to instinctual life, by drawing 
upon the feeling of expanded life as reflective proof that 
one is truly at home in the world.
In a note to Bevond Good and Evil. Walter Kaufmann 
writes that, "in the later works [of Nietzsche], Dionysus 
stands for controlled and creatively employed passion."26 
The 'control' of passion is a result of the appropriation 
of Reason by the Understanding, to use Hegelian terms: the 
incorporation of world-structure into self-consciousness in 
the person of the Sage. As Nietzsche shows, this is not an 
impediment to the 'creative employment' of passion, but is, 
in fact, an enhancing influence, elevating its activity to 
a higher, expanded level: it turns 'passion' into trans­
formational involvement, or love. Rational satisfaction 
directs the instincts, allowing one to undergo the very 
same 'natural' processes as before, but now self-conscious­
ly. The ongoing dialectic, or the continual emergence of
26 Kaufmann, ed. , Nietzsche's Bevond Good and Evil, p. 
235.
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desires, is ontological. The only difference at the end of 
history is that now passion can be controlled, and also 
creatively employed, knowingly projecting a desired state 
of affairs. And so, Nietzsche writes: "The desire for
destruction, change, becoming can be the expression of an 
overfull power pregnant with the future (my term for this, 
as is known, is the word 'Dionysian')."27
A desire, as has been shown with Hegel, is a force 
which generates a future of itself. The moment of the 
desire, in itself, is insufficient to itself. Therefore,
the self, as the subject of the desire, expands outwards--
seemingly outside itself to incorporate the object and
achieve an equilibrium: the moment of satisfaction reflects 
upon the desire as its completion, as its 'truth. ' The 
Dionysian spirit is precisely this drive outwards, whose 
effect is to manifest a unity which is realised, at a 
greater height than the former moment, which was unity 
implicitly. Nietzsche writes of the Dionysian spirit: "It 
is explicable only in terms of an excess of force."28 The 
overflowing of life projects the only beyond from which 
value may be taken, because this excess leads to a measure 
which is from and of life: the beyond within life always 
affirms a kind of life being led, because it is that way of
life 'writ large' projected into the future, at a higher
level of expanded perspective.
27 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 446.
28 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, p. 560.
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Because the beyond within life is an object which 
contains all of the subject, Nietzsche argues that affirma­
tion must take the good with the bad. He writes: "Toward
a justification of life, even at its most terrible, am­
biguous, and mendacious? for this I had the formula 1 Diony­
sian. 11|29 In Hegelian terms, the drive for unity is a 
reflection upon the self, because the subject is found 
essentially in its object. Man is most human when he 
extends his identity always through the terms of mediat­
ion to encompass all of humanity. Nietzsche gives a more
visceral expression to this thought in his Dionysian 
philosophy. He could hardly be clearer than in the follow­
ing passage:
The word 1 Dionysian' means: an urge to unity, a 
reaching out beyond personality, the everyday, 
society, reality, across the abyss of transitori­
ness: a passionate-painful overflowing into
darker, fuller, more floating states? an ecstatic 
affirmation of the total character of life as 
that which remains the same, just as powerful, 
just as blissful, through all change? the great 
pantheistic sharing of joy and sorrow that sanct­
ifies and calls good even the most terrible and 
questionable qualities of life? the eternal will 
to procreation, to fruitfulness, to recurrence? 
the feeling of the necessary unity of creation 
and destruction.30
The Dionysian spirit is only fully possible with the 
end of history, with the realisation of all possibilities, 
present before one universally and eternally (i.e., purely 
mediated). If strong action is impossible in the histori­
cal sense, then man can only remain true to his nature, and
29 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 521.
30 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 539.
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overcome nihilism, by investing 'mere activity1 with his 
will: one takes delight or finds happiness in the self- 
conscious movement between union with and separation from 
all things. In Twilight of the Idols. Nietzsche writes: 
"Such a spirit who has become free stands amid the cosmos 
with a joyous and trusting fatalism, in the faith that only 
the particular is loathsome, and that all is redeemed and
affirmed in the whole he does not negate any more. Such
a faith, however, is the highest of all possible faiths: I 
have baptized it with the name of Dionvsus."31
Nietzsche's statement that 'only the particular is 
loathsome' should not be seen as a condemnation of par­
ticularity as such: in fact, Nietzsche strongly affirms
setting-at-a-distance as essential to life. What he 
cautions against is an inference from any particular aspect 
to the whole. Only all aspects of Being, presencing 
themselves eternally, are equal to the whole: every aspect 
of Being is certainly beyond the strength of any single 
individual's will to power to embrace. The higher man is 
able to articulate more of the world, and is therefore able 
to lead a more meaningful life, but all things beyond his 
practical influence he must take as fate, or as the work­
ings of chance, if he is to escape a purely reflective, 
inactive existence. Hegel argues that Being-as-subject is 
a self-consciousness which posits a perspective which 
contains all within its purview. That the universal and 
the particular perspectives are never merely identical can
31 Nietzsche, TWilight of the Idols, p. 554.
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usefully be seen as the * fatefulness1 or Chance of all 
things. How we confront the world is, therefore, a more 
worthwhile project for us, Nietzsche argues, than the 
discovery of 'truth' about it. Nietzsche uses the term 
'Dionysian' to refer to the nature of the individual's 
relation to the whole, and he uses the term 'Apollonian' to 
refer more specifically to the particular self, drawing 
attention to the difference of the individual from 'life.' 
He writes: "The word 'Apollonian' means: the urge to
perfect self-sufficiency, to the typical 'individual,' to 
all that simplifies, distinguishes, makes strong, clear, 
unambiguous, typical: freedom under the law."32 In Hegelian 
terms, the Apollonian spirit can be seen as the structuring 
or mediating of Being through Reason. Hegelian philosophy 
is not merely equivalent to the Apollonian spirit: 
Nietzsche emphasises man's posture when confronted with a 
realised unity, and relates man's instinctual life with 
what Hegel has shown to be his distance from and proximity 
to things through the terms of Reason.
Nietzsche's notion of controlled and creatively 
employed passion gives substance to Hegel's notion of 
desire, but now translated to the new height of the end of 
history. Nietzsche gives expression to the Hegelian idea 
that instinctual life is the fulfilment of Reason, when 
raised to the level of self-consciousness: passion, far
from contradicting Reason, is Reason in its very essence. 
For Hegel, Reason is a system of relations, and we find
32 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 539.
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this exact language used by Nietzsche, in the following 
passage from The Will to Power: "The misunderstanding of
passion and reason, as if the latter were an independent 
entity and not rather a system of relations between various 
passions and desires; and as if every passion did not 
possess its quantum of reason."33
The realisation of the end of history leads to a 
concentration on the completeness or unity of things, which 
often means the neglect of persistent mediation and in­
dividuation. What was taken to be the absolute or open- 
ended nature of things, which was its discreteness, is now 
known to be its concrete character; its very life. To 
confuse the overcoming of difference in unity with the 
elimination of parts in the whole is to fall into nihilism. 
Both Hegel and Nietzsche retain the essential balance; 
meaning itself is a tension, poised between two extremes. 
And so, whilst praising the Dionysian spirit, Nietzsche 
does not neglect the Apollonian. With regard to desires 
and their satisfaction, Nietzsche recognises the practical 
necessity of emphasising the former moment for the sake of 
the health of the whole. Given the end of history, this 
pre-occupation is justified? given that, as Nietzsche says, 
'nothing is becoming, ' or that man 'does not negate any 
more.' Again, we must take these statements in the strong 
sense, as a reflection upon the way things appeared within 
history. Becoming or negation do not cease in the post- 
historical epoch, but they become a self-conscious
33 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 208.
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activity. Nietzsche seeks to make this possible by pro­
claiming his Dionysian philosophy, through such statements 
as: "In the end one loves one's desire and not what is
desired.1,34
The eternal recurrence makes it possible to recapture 
the feeling of strong action which man had by engagement in 
history. Since goals outside life are impossible, then 
they are 'at hand': this is the end of history. But if 
goals are affirmed eternally, which is what vital will to 
power does through us, then goals are not only present, but 
also stand at a distance eternally. The object is now 
known to be present in the subject, but mediately, through 
Reason, according to Hegel, or through its eternal recur­
rence, according to Nietzsche. Nietzsche confronts the 
post-historical dilemma as follows: "Can we remove the idea 
of a goal from the process and then affirm the process in
spite of this? This would be the case if something were
attained at every moment within this process and always
the same."35
Nietzsche exhorts the reader to take a stance with 
regard to goals. To do this, he distorts the process of 
value creation by placing emphasis on certain moments, in 
many places on the moment of the self, or the will, or the 
desire. But Nietzsche's distortions bring to light the 
nature of all values as emerging from a point of view. To 
value is to stand-in-regard to something, to project a
34 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 93.
35 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 36.
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framework which always embraces some possibilities and 
rejects others. For the sake of the middle term (meaning) , 
Nietzsche places greater emphasis upon the subjective term 
(the self) , because he sees the objective term (the world) 
as dominant in the present-day. This is precisely Hegel*s 
conclusion: the end of history necessitates a return to
self: once again, the human individual is the focus of
consideration, since he is the embodiment of all previous 
movements. Therefore, Nietzsche gives his hierarchy of 
value-feelings as follows: "Higher than *thou shalt1 is 'I 
will* (the heroes); higher than *1 will1 stands: *1 am'
(the gods of the Greeks).”36 In Hegelian terms, Being as 
potential posits its own Becoming as actualisation, which, 
all together (or eternally) is the Idea: Being in-and-for- 
itself. This last term is a return to the first moment, 
but at a higher level. For Nietzsche, the 'I am1 of the 
gods (e.g., Dionysus) is not the mere Being of Hegel*s 
origin, but the self-conscious Being of Hegel's end of 
history. The gods are powers which are potent with the 
future and know this fact.
To emphasise aspects, as against the overarching unity 
of the whole, does not deny that unity, but rather, gives 
it expression. Differences are maintained because, along 
with the ongoing resolution of dialectical movements in 
unity, there is the perpetual introduction of desires out 
of man's instinctual life. Hegel's State is matched by the 
particular desires of its citizens, just as Nietzsche's
36 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 495.
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Dionysian spirit is matched by the Apollonian. Differences
between human beings are as constitutive of reality as
their common humanity, and this is reflected in every
aspect of experience. What Nietzsche calls the 'offence*
the two paths give each other in fact raises both to a
higher level, makes possible the gateway 'Moment,' which is
the realisation of growth. He writes:
Without that pathos of distance which grows out
of the ingrained difference between strata  .
. . that other, more mysterious pathos could not
have grown up either the craving for an ever
new widening of distances within the soul itself, 
the development of ever higher, rarer, more 
remote, further-stretching, more comprehensive
states in brief, simply the enhancement of the
type 'man,' the continual 'self-overcoming of 
man, ' to use a moral formula in a supra-moral 
sense.37
As we saw with the master/slave dialectic, the slaves's
need of the master is essential to his liberation, because
the development of his relation to the master leads to
mutual recognition. The need for tension between apparent
opposites to live a meaningful life leads Nietzsche to set
these up himself, and to lament the homogeneity of his
times. He writes:
The cleavage between man and man, status and 
status, the plurality of types, the will to be
oneself, to stand out what I call the pathos of
distance, that is characteristic of* every strong 
age. The strength to withstand tension, the 
width of the tensions between extremes, becomes 
ever smaller today; finally, the extremes them­
selves become blurred to the point of 
similarity.38
What Hegel has shown to be humanity's rational satisfaction
37 Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, p. 201.
38 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, p. 540.
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in the end of history means that the self's relation to 
other selves and to the world is through pure mediation. 
The 'gap' between things is as small as it can be, as 
nothing actually other intervenes. Nietzsche, therefore, 
draws attention to the fact that this 'gap' has in no way 
disappeared, and so he encourages courage or strength in 
the face of great tension, or apparent otherness.
Nietzsche's proclamation of the eternal recurrence 
indicates his recognition that a great circular movement
has been completed, that his times marked a return to
essential philosophical concerns. At the same time, he 
sees that what is happening is no mere repetition, but a 
re-encounter of 'opposites,' where both participants have 
been transformed, each through the other. Man finds 
himself, at the end of history, in a pre-historical condi­
tion, but with his historical experience intact. He can 
not 'merely' return, but must re-engage, in a similar way, 
from this new perspective. Nietzsche traces this revela­
tion as follows:
German philosophy as a whole--- Leibnitz, Kant,
Hegel, Schopenhauer, to name the greatest is
the most fundamental form of romanticism and 
homesickness there has ever been: the longing for 
the best that ever existed. One is no longer at 
home anywhere; at last one longs back for that 
place in which alone one can be at home, because 
it is the only place in which one would want to 
be at home: the Greek worldI But it is in preci­
sely that direction that all bridges are broken 
 except the rainbow-bridges of concepts!39
This last phrase touches upon Hegel's entire enterprise: to
attain again the feeling of oneness, but through something
39 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 225.
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(the logos of Reason) , since one has lost forever the 
possibility of immediate unity.
From our new height, which means through the terms of
mediation which we have revealed through history, man seeks
to restore the 1 innocence of becoming1 which he had when he
set about the historical enterprise. Since there is
nothing beside the whole, we cannot create anything 'new'
as we thought we were doing in history. But the whole is
so extensive beyond the particular self, both spatially and
temporally (because of our singular perspective and our
mortality), that our stance towards it can be similar to
what it was throughout history. We can treat the eternal
recurrence of all things as Chance; we can treat the
multitude of objects (whether other selves or the world)
which are effectively outside our influence as 'given.1
Nietzsche writes, in Twilight of the Idols;
One is necessary, one is a piece of fatefulness,
one belongs to the whole, one is in the whole;
there is nothing which could judge, measure, 
compare, or sentence our being, for that would 
mean judging, measuring, comparing, or sentencing 
the whole. But there is nothing besides the 
whole. That nobody is held responsible any 
longer, that the mode of being may not be traced 
back to a causa prima. that the world does not 
form a unity either as a sensorium or as 'spirit'
 that alone is the great liberation; with this
alone is the innocence of becoming restored.4 0
We see here that Nietzsche separates 'the whole' and
'unity' in a way that Hegel does not. But Hegel's Spirit
is not what Nietzsche calls 'spirit' here: it is nothing
imposed upon the whole, but rather that whole exhaustively,
40 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, pp. 500-501.
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that whole revealed in its entirety. Spirit is not a causa 
prima. In fact, Hegel's revelation that it is not such a 
thing is the conclusion of the end of history, which is 
precisely the 'great liberation' about which Nietzsche 
speaks. For Hegel, 'the True' is the whole, and concerning 
the True he writes in the Phenomenology; "It is the process 
of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as 
its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only 
by being worked out to its end, is it actual."41 The whole 
is therefore the unitv of its actualisations: since nothing 
is added from without, no principle is imposed, but rather 
given its very content from within. The end is realised in 
wisdom and it is actual in the State. The end is a return 
to the beginning universally, i.e., for Spirit, but also a 
higher perspective in particular, i.e., for human self- 
consciousness. For both Hegel and Nietzsche, then, the 
'innocence of becoming restored' is the new starting point, 
higher yet the same.
Metaphorically, the end of history is a return to the 
perspective of a child, but with the experience of an 
adult. One still seeks to grow, but one's self-sufficiency 
makes this impossible in the same way as before: one cannot 
posit the same goals, but one must posit the same kind of 
goals, the same beyond to the self, but this time wholly 
within a life which the self has already attained in 
principle. Nietzsche expresses this thought in religious
41 Hegel, Phenomenology, p. 10.
297
terms as follows: "The Kingdom of Heaven is a condition of
the heart ( it is said of children 'for theirs is the
Kingdom of Heaven1): Not something 'above the earth.'" 
The activity of the self imbued with Dionysian spirit, 
overfull with the capacity for life, is stated by Nietzsche 
to be 'laughter, play, and dance. ' Not to project some­
thing else, but to project the same in infinite and eternal
variation this is the new ground of values. Nietzsche
writes: "'Play,' the useless as the ideal of him who is
overfull of strength, as 'childlike.'"43 Goals are now 
'useless' only in the historical sense, since it is impos­
sible to translate the self by action to another world, 
this world must be affirmed by the controlled and creative 
employed passions of humanity.
The last word is Hegel's: "The harmoniousness of
childhood is a gift from the hand of nature: the second
harmony must spring from the labour and culture of the 
spirit. "44
42 Nietzsche, Will to Power, pp. 98-99.
43 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 419.
44 Hegel, Logic, p. 43.
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